مهمې مقالې

ملی مبارز، ډیپلومات، شاعر او سپه سالار سیدال خان ناصری.

د محمد سیدال خان پلار ابدال خان کله چی سلطان ملخی توخی (د نازو انا پلار) له جلدک څخه تر غزنی سیمه کی خپلواک ژوند او حکومت کاوه، هلته له خپلو خلکو سره میشته شو.

ابدال خان له نورو ملی مشرانو سره د صفویانو د حاکم ګرګین پرضد جګړه کوله او صفویانو ته یی اجاره نه ورکوله چی پر قلات حکومت وکړی.

سیدال خان، وړتیا او زړورتیا له خپل پلار څخه په میراث اخیستی وه، د پوهې او ادب په حصول کې هم ډیر هڅاند وه او د فقی، تفسیر، صرف او نحو … او دري ادبیاتو زده کړې یې هم وکړې.

د هوتکيانو د واکمنۍ په دریو لسیزو کې د هیواد دننه او بهر د مبارزو او فتوحاتو په جریان کې، سیدال خان ناصري د حکومت یو له اصلي ستنو او ټینګو بنسټونو څخه و، چې په نظامي برخه کې یې یو عالي او تل پاتې تاریخي ریکارډ پریښی دی.

کله چې په ۱۷۰۸ میلادی کال کې، ملي مشر میرویس خان هوتکي، د دیني عالمانو د فتوا ترلاسه کولو وروسته، قندهار کی د ایران صفوی حکومت ظالم و سفاک حاکم ګورګین له مینځه لری کړ، او د هوتکيانو خپلواک حکومت یی اعلان کړ، سیدال خان ناصري د افغان ځواکونو مشر او سپه سالار وه.

او کله چی صفویانو د کندهار د بیا نیولو لپاره پوځ را ولیږه، ملی مشر میرویس خان سیدال خان ناصري د هغوی جګړی ته ولیږه چی صفوی پوځ یی تار په تار کړ.

سیدال خان ناصري د میرویس خان د اته کلن مشرتابه په ټولو اتو کلونو کی د صفوی خلاف په ټولو جګړو کې ښکېل وه، چې په ټولو جګړو کې یې افغانانو ته بریاوی راوړی وی.

د حاجي میرویس خان (۱۶۷۳ – ۱۷۱۵ میلادی) تر مرګه وروسته لومړی د هغه ورور او بیا د هغه زوی شاه محمود هوتکي واک تر.لاسه کړ.

د شاه محمود هوتکي ځواکونو د امان الله سلطان ، سیدال خان ناصري او نصرالله خان … په مشری لومړی په کرمان او بیا د ایران د صفویانو په پلازمینه اصفهان برید وکړ او فتح یې کړ.

د ۱۷۲۲ کال د اکتوبر په ۲۳ نیټه (چی د ۱۱۳۵ کال د محرم له ۱۲ سره سمون لری) د شاه محمود هوتکي په سر د سلطاني تاج د ایران شاه حسین صفوی کیښودو چی ورسره په ایران کې د افغانستان امپراطوری بنسټ کښیښودل شو.

شاه محمود هوتکي د اصفهان په چهلستون ماڼی کې شانداره میلماستی جوړه کړې وه چې په ترڅ کې یې د شاه حسین صفوی لور سره واده وکړ.

په دې توګه، د یووالي او مبارزې په پایله کې، میرویس خان هوتکي او د هغه ځای ناستو نه یوازې په کندهار کې د صفویه واکمنۍ پای ته ورساوله، بلکې د صفویانو د واکمنی لړی یې هم پای ته ورسوله.

شاه محمود هوتکي حکومت نږدې نهه کاله وه چی دوه نیم کاله یی په ایران کی هم حکومت وکړ. بیا، د رواني ناروغۍ له امله، هغه له واکه لرې شو او د هغه د تره زوی، شاه اشرف هوتکي قدرت ته ورسید.

سیدال خان ناصری د عثمانی ترکانو او روسانو پر وړاندې په فارس کې د شاه اشرف هوتکي په ټولو جګړو او خبرو اترو کې، د افغان ځواکونو سپه سالار او لوی درستیز و چې په ټولو جګړو او خبرو اترو کې بریالی و. هغه د روسیې او عثماني ترکیې لخوا د ایران د ځینو برخو د نیولو پلان شنډ کړ.

له یوې خوا په ایران کې د نادر افشار په نوم د یوه کس په څرګندیدو او له بلې خوا د افغانانو خپلمنځی ناخوالو، په ایران کې د هوتکيانو حکومت کار له خنډ سره مخ کړ. له همدې امله شاه اشرف او افغانان له ایران څخه په شاشول. شاه اشرف په شورابک سیمه کې ووژل شو.

له ۱۷۳۹ کال څخه وروسته، د هوتکيانو واکمنی یوازې په کندهار پورې محدود شوه، چی د میرویس خان کشر زوی، شاه حسین هوتکي چی یو ادیب او په فرهنګ مین سړی وه او په پښتو او دری ژبو یی شعر وایه، یی پاچا وه.

کله چې سیدال خان ناصري کندهار ته ورسید، نو هغه د شاه حسین هوتکي لخوا بیا هم سپه سالار وټاکل شو.

له بده مرغه، هغه د نظامي ځواکونو د چمتو کولو لپاره وخت نه درلود، مګر سره له ټولو ناخوالو بیا هم تر آخره یی له مقاومت څخه کار واخیست.

یو ځل له ۳۰۰۰ سرتیرو سره د هرات د ابداليانو مرستې ته هم ولاړ، خو د نادر افشار د ستر لښکر په وړاندې بریالي نشول او سیدال خان بیرته قندهار ته ستون شو.

د سیدال خان ناصري ځواکونو شمیره شل زره او د نادر افشار ځواکونه یو لک وه.

سیدال خان ناصری د دښمن په ځواکونو خواره واره بریدونه کول او د یو کال لپاره یی کندهار ته د نادر افشار د ننوتلو مخه ونیوله.

نادر افشار د فتح علی خان په قومانده، د قلات د نیولو لپاره یو اته زره کسیز لښکر ولیږه. شاه حسین د سیدال خان په مشرۍ یو څلور زره کسیز ځواک د قلات دفاع لپاره ولیږه، چې په پیل کې یې دښمن ته سخت ګوزارونه ورکړل. کله چې نادر افشار په ځواک کې د سیدال خان د شتون څخه خبر شو، نو په خپله د پنځوس زره ځواک سره هلته ولاړ، او سیدال خان او ځواکونه یی په کلا کی محاصره شول.

د څو ورځو محاصرې وروسته، نادر افشار بیرته د کندهار په لور ته راستون شو، مګر ۳۰۰۰۰ قوي ځواک د سیدال خان د ځواکونو د محاصره لپاره پاتی شول. دښمن هڅه کوله چې افغان ځواکونه د کلا څخه وباسي. دښمن ځواکونو د دوو میاشتو لپاره ونشو کولای چی کلا ته ننوځی.

دښمن ، چې د سیدال خان تسلیم کیدل د کندهار د فتح لپاره کلي ګنله، یو ناوړه چل او عمل ترسره کړ. د کلا څخه بهر یی، افغان میرمنې له تیانو ځړولی او تر هر ډول سپکاوي او توهین یی ورته کاوه او شرط یی دا وه چی هغوی به دا کار هلته بس کړی، کله چی سیدال خان او د هغه ځواکونه له جګړی او مقاومت څخه لاس واخلی.

سیدال خان لپاره چې د افغان ښځو عزت او وقار خورا مهم وه او له بلې خوا دوی ته اوبه او خواړه هم نه وه ورپاتی، افغان ځواکونو ته یې د اوربند امر وکړ.

سیدال خان ناصری چې ۳۱ کاله یې د افغانانو د پت او عزت او د ټاټوبی دفاع کړې وه، د نادر افشار بند ته ورغی.

نادر افشار په یو لوی محفل کې چی په دی اړه نیول شوی وه داسی وویل:

“به بسیار زحمات این گرگ باران دیده را به چنگ آورده ایم. اگر چه نمی زیبد که اینچنین سردار بزرگ و قهرمان کشته شود مگر من توان دو چشم این عقاب را ندارم٬ فلهذا هر دو چشمت را به من ببخش”.

او د سیدال خان ناصری دواړه سترګې د اور په لمبو کې سور شوی سیخانو باند ړندې کړې.

نادر افشار د خلکو د تیتولو او خواره واره کولو لپاره ځینی ایران ته واستول، او سیدال خان ناصري او کورنۍ یې د کابل شکر درې ته ولېږدول شول. څه وخت وروسته، سیدال خان ناصري په شکردره کې نړی څخه سترګی پټی کړی چی هلته د سیا سنګ هدیره کې ښخ کړای شو.

شاه حسین هوتکي د لسو میاشتو لپاره مقاومت وکړ، خو په پای کې کندهار نادر افشار لاس ته ورغی.

دا د یو ملي او هیواد پال شخصیت د ژوند د ځینو برخو یادونه وه.

د سیدال خان ناصري د دی ملی، آزاد او اوسپنیزی ارادی خاوند شخصیت روح، او د ټولو ملي مبارزینو روح چې دښمن ته یی سر ټیټ نه کړ، دی خوښ او ځای دی جنت وی.

ناصر اوریا * ۲۳ سپتمبر ۲۰۲۰ – تکزاس Naser Oria

آیا میدانید اصفهان پایتخت شاهان صفوی ایران بدست کی فتح شد؟

سیدال خان ناصری خان سپه سالار، دیپلمات، شاعر و مبارز ملی. 

«دستِ وحدت کاخ استبداد را ویران کند»

ابدال خان پدر محمد سیدال خان، در زمانی که سلطان ملخی توخی (سلطان ملخی توخی پدر نازو انا مادر میرویس خان هوتکی) استقلال خویش را حاصل نموده و از جلدک تا غزنی حکومت می کرد، همراه با خانواده و مردمش در آنجا اقامت گزید. ابدال خان همراه با عادل خان به مقابل بیگلر بیگی که از طرف دولت صفوی (ایران) گماشته شده بود، مبارزه می کرد و اجازه نداد که صفویان بر قلات حکومت نمایند.

سیدال خان که شجاعت، رشادت و بزرگمنشی را از پدر به ارث برده بود، در کسب علم و ادب نیز کوشا بود و فقه، تفسیر، صرف و نحو … و ادبیات دری را نیز فرا گرفت.

سیدال خان ناصری در طول سه دههٔ سلطنت هوتکی ها در مبارزات و فتوحات داخل و خارج از کشور یکی از ستون های اصلی و پایه های استوار حکومت بود که در بُعد نظامی کارنامه های تاریخیِ درخشان و ماندگار از خویش به یادگار گذاشته است.

از زمانی که در سال ۱۷۰۸ میلادی مطابق ۱۱۲۰ هجری قائد ملی میرویس خان هوتکی، بعد از اخذ فتوای علمای دینی، گورگین حاکم (بیگلر بیگی دولت صفوی ایران) خون آشام و سفاکِ دولت صفوی ایران در قندهار را سر به نیست نموده و دولت مستقل هوتکی را بنا نهاد، سیدال خان ناصری سرلشکر قوای افغان بود.

هنگامی که دولت صفویان غرض اشغال دوباره، به قندهار لشکر کشید، میرویس خان، سیدال خان ناصری را به مصاف آنها فرستاد که قوای صفوی را تار و مار کرد.

سیدال خان ناصری در تمام جنگ های دورهٔ ۸ سالهٔ رهبری میرویس خان علیه اشغالگران صفوی شامل بود که در همه جنگ ها فتح و پیروزی را از آن افغان ها ساخت .

بعد از وفات حاجی میرویس خان (۱۶۷۳ – ۱۷۱۵ میلادی)، نخست برادرش و سپس پسرش شاه محمود هوتکی به سلطنت رسید.

قوای شاه محمود هوتکی به سرلشکری امان الله سطان، سیدال خان ناصری و نصرالله خان … نخست به کرمان و سپس به اصفهان پایتخت دولت صفوی ایران یورش برد و آنرا فتح کرد.

به تاریخ ۲۳ اکتبر سال ۱۷۲۲ میلادی مطابق ۱۲ محرّم ۱۱۳۵ با گذاشتن تاج سلطانی بر سر شاه محمود هوتکی بدست شاه حسین صفوی، شهنشاهی افغان ها در ایران بنیاد گذاشته شد.

شاه محمود هوتکی در کاخ چهلستون اصفهان ضیافتی ترتیب داد که در ضمن آن با دختر شاه حسین صفوی ازدواج نمود.

به این ترتیب در نتیجهٔ وحدت و مبارزه در مدت کوتاهی میرویس خان هوتکی و اخلافش نه تنها سلطهٔ صفوی ها را در قندهار پایان داد بلکه سلسله پادشاهی صفوی ها را نیز ختم کرد.

شاه محمود هوتکی حدود ۹ سال سلطنت نمود که دونیم سال در ایران حکومت کرد. سپس به اثر مریضی روانی از قدرت خلع و بعد از وفاتش، پسر کاکایش، شاه اشرف هوتکی قدرت را بدست گرفت.

در تمام جنگ ها و مذاکراتِ شاه اشرف هوتکی در فارس مقابل ترک های عثمانی و روس ها، سیدال خان ناصری سرلشکر قوای افغان بود که در همهٔ جنگ ها و مذاکرات فاتح و پیروز بدر آمد. وی نقشه و پلان اشغال مناطقی از ایران توسط روسیه و ترکیهٔ عثمانی را خنثی نمود.

با ظهور شخصی به نام نادر افشار در ايران از یک طرف و اختلافات ذات البینی افغان ها از طرف دیگر، كار حكومت هوتکی ها در آن کشور با مشكل روبرو شد. لذا شاه اشرف و افغان ها از ايران عقب نشيني كردند. شاه اشرف درهنگام عقب نشيني در مربوطات شورابك كشته شد.

از اين پس تا سال ۱۷۳۹ میلادی حکومت هوتکی ها به قندهار منحصر شد که شاه حسین هوتکی جوانترین فرزند میرویس خان، که یک پادشاه ادیب و فرهنگدوست بود و به زبان های پشتو و دری شعر می سرود، حاکم آن بود.

زمانی که سیدال خان ناصری قندهار رسید از طرف شاه حسین هوتکی دوباره به منصب سپه سالار مقرر ګردید.

با تأسف که وقت به وی مجال نداد که قوای نظامی را آرایش لازم دهد ولی با آنهم تا نهایت از مقاومت باز نه ایستاد.

باری هم با ۳۰۰۰ قوا به کمک ابدالی های هرات رفت ولی مقابل لشکر بزرگ نادر افشار پیروزی بدست نیاورد.

قوای سیدال خان ناصری بیست هزار و قوای نادر افشار صدهزار بود.

سیدال خان حملات و شبیخون های متعددی به قوای دشمن وارد کرد و برای یکسال مانع ورود نادر افشار به قندهار گردید.

نادر افشار یک لشکر هشت هزار نفری را غرض گرفتن قلات فرستاد. غرض دفاع قلات یک قوای چهارهزار نفری به سرکردگی سیدال خان فرستاده شد که در ابتدا به دشمن ضربات شدید وارد نمود. زمانی که نادر افشار از موضوع حضور سیدال خان در این قوا اطلاع یافت با یک قوای پنجاه هزار نفری بدانجا رفت و سیدال خان مجبوراً در قلعه محاصره شد. نادر بعد از چند روز محاصره دوباره به صوب قندهار رفت ولی قوای سی هزار نفری قوای سیدال خان را محاصر نموده بود و دشمن تلاش می نمود تا قوای افغان را به بیرون آمدن از قلعه وادار نماید. قوای دشمن تا دو ماه نتوانست قلعه را بگشاید. دشمن که تسلیم شدن سیدال خان را کلید فتح قندهار میدانست به خدعهٔ‌ نامردانه ای دست زد. دشمن در بیرون قلعه خانم های افغان را از سینه ها آویزان نموده و مورد هر نوع توهین و تحقیر قرار میدادند تا سیدال خان و قوایش تسلیم شود.

سیدال خان که آبرو و عزت خانم های افغان از همه چیز برایش مهم بود و از طرفی هم آب و آذوقهٔ شان به پایان رسیده بود به قوای افغان امر توقف جنگ را داد.

سیدال خان این سردار رشید که از مردم و سرزمین افغان ها بیشتر از ۳۱ سال دفاع نموده بود بندی به مقابل نادر افشار آورده شد.

نادر افشار در جشن بزرگی که به این مناسبت براه انداخته بود در محضر عام چنین گفت:

“به بسیار زحمات این گرگ باران دیده را به چنگ آورده ایم. اگر چه نمی زیبد که اینچنین سردار بزرگ و قهرمان کشته شود مگر من توان دو چشم این عقاب را ندارم٬ فلهذا هر دو چشمت را به من ببخش”.

و هردو چشم سیدال خان ناصری را با سیخ آتشین کور و وی را از نعمت دید محروم کرد.

نادر افشار غرض تیت و پاشان کردن مردم تعدادی را به ایران تبعید و سیدال خان ناصری و خانواده اش به منطقهٔ شکر درهٔ کابل فرستاده شد. بعد از مدتی سیدال خان ناصری در شکردره فوت و همانجا در سیاه سنگ به خاک سپرده شد.

شاه حسین هوتکی ده ماه دیگر نیز مقاومت کرد ولی بالاخر قندهار به دست نادر افشار افتاد .

این بود یادآوری بخش هایی از زندگی یک شخصیت ملی و وطندوست.

روح سیدال خان ناصری این مرد آزاده و آهنین و روح همهٔ مبارزین ملی که به دشمن سر خم نکردند شاد باد و مکانش بهشت معلی.

ناصر اوریا * ۲۳ سپتمبر ۲۰۲۰ – تکزاس Naser Oria


افغانستان، اگرچه به‌عنوان یک کشور و یک ملت دارای تاریخی جدید است؛ اما، این سرزمین از لحاظ قدمت تاریخی، یکی از کهن‌ترین کشورهای جهان به‌شمار می‌رود.[۱]
افغانستان به دلیل قرارگرفتن در مسیر جاده ابریشم پیوندگاه تمدن‌های بزرگ جهان بوده و یکی از مهم‌ترین مراکز بازرگانی عصر باستان به‌شمار می‌رفته‌است. این موقعیت مهم و حساس ژئواستراتژیکی و ژئوپولیتیکی افغانستان در شکل‌دادن موزائیکی غنی از فرهنگ‌ها و تمدن‌های بزرگ همچون ایرانی، یونانی، بین‌النهرینی و هندی در این کشور نقش مهمی داشته‌است. از عصر پارینه‌سنگی و طی دوره‌های تاریخی، مردم افغانستان جایگاه عمده‌ای در معرفی و گسترش ادیان جهانی و نقش مهمی در بازرگانی و دادوستد داشته و گهگاه کانون مسلط سیاسی و فرهنگی در آسیا بوده‌اند. از این رو افغانستان در طول تاریخ گلوگاه یورش مهاجمان و جهان‌گشایان بوده که ردپای آن‌ها هنوز در گوشه و کنار این سرزمین دیده می‌شود.[۲]
همان‌طور که از میان‌رودان (بین‌النهرین؛ عراق امروزی) به‌سبب تمدن‌های کهن و باستانی‌اش به‌عنوان "گهوارهٔ تمدن"، و از مصر باستان به‌سبب اهرام باستانی‌اش به‌عنوان "عجایب دنیای باستان" خوانده می‌شود، از افغانستان نیز به‌سبب موقعیت مهم و حساس ژئواستراتژیکی و ژئوپولیتیکی‌اش و حضور موزائیکی غنی از فرهنگ‌ها و تمدن‌های بزرگ و تاریخ هزاران ساله به‌عنوان "چهارراهِ فرهنگ‌های باستان" یاد می‌شود.[۳][۴]
در این نوشتار دوران تاریخی پیش از اسلام افغانستان به دو دوره تقسیم می‌شود:
1.    دوران پیشاتاریخ: دورانی که به‌سبب نبود خط و کتابت در آن معلومات زیادی از آن در دسترس نیست و فرضیات دانشمندان از این دوره تنها بر آثار بدست‌آمده از کاوش‌های باستان‌شناسی و مطالعات زبان‌شناسی استوار است؛ این دوران از دورهٔ پارینه‌سنگی زیرین که در این دوره نخستین شواهد باستان‌شناسی از حضور انسان در شمال کوهپایه‌های هندوکُش در حدود ۱۰۰٫۰۰۰ پیش از میلاد به‌دست آمده، آغاز می‌شود، و تا پایان عصر بُرُنز و عصر آهن در اوایل سدهٔ هفتم پیش از میلاد (پیدایش خط) را در بر می‌گیرد؛
2.    تاریخ باستان: دوران پس از پیدایش خط، که معلومات زیادی از آن در نوشته‌های کهن به جای مانده، و از دورهٔ فرمانروایی مادها و هخامنشیان در اوایل سدهٔ هفتم پیش از میلاد آغاز می‌شود، و تا حمله اعراب به افغانستان در سدهٔ هفتم میلادی را در بر می‌گیرد.
دوران پیشاتاریخ[
دوران پیشاتاریخ یا دوران پیش از تاریخ یا ماقبل تاریخ از پیدایش انسان آغاز می‌شود و به پیدایش خط و کتابت منتهی می‌گردد. در آن دوران تجربه‌ها و دستاوردهای مردم به سرعت از بین می‌رفت و دانش انتقال پیدا نمی‌کرد.
دوران پارینه‌سنگی[
 
نگارهٔ ۱: ابزارهای سنگی شامل انواع تیغه‌های کوچک، متعلق به دورهٔ پارینه‌سنگی پایانی (۳۰٫۰۰۰ پیش از میلاد) که از قَرَه‌کَمَر در ولایت سمنگان، شمال افغانستان به‌دست آمده‌اند.
دوران پارینه‌سنگی[پ ۱] یا عصر حجر (سنگ) کهن، نخستین، ابتدایی‌ترین و طولانی‌ترین مرحله زندگی انسان است؛ از دو میلیون و پانصد هزار تا دورهٔ نوسنگی (عصر حجر نو)، زمانی که انسان با کشاورزی آشنا شد، در حدود دوازده هزار سال پیش را در بر می‌گیرد. این دوران خود به سه زیر دوره تقسیم می‌گردد:
1.    دورهٔ پارینه‌سنگی زیرین یا قدیم[پ ۲] یا دورهٔ دیرینه‌سنگی که از حدود دو میلون و پانصد هزار سال پیش شروع و تا یکصد هزار سال قبل ادامه پیدا می‌کند. در این دوره، گونه‌های اولیهٔ سردهٔ انسان (Homo) ظهور می‌کند، که از آتش استفاده می‌کرده و ابزار ساز بوده‌است. آثار دورهٔ پارینه‌سنگی زیرین در آفریقا، شرق مدیترانه و اروپا پیدا شده‌است.[۵]
2.    دورهٔ پارینه‌سنگی میانی[پ ۳] یا دورهٔ میان‌سنگی-موسترین از حدود یکصد هزار سال قبل شروع و تا سی هزار سال پیش ادامه داشته‌است. انسان نئاندرتال در این دوره ظهور می‌کند. در این دوره، سنت ابزارسازی موسترین[پ ۴] پدیدار می‌شود که از ابزارهای پیشین پیشرفته‌تر است و شامل تراشه‌های سنگی، رنده‌ها، قلم‌ها، برمه‌ها (مته‌ها)، چاقوهای دسته‌دار و انواع تبر بوده‌است. در این دوره آیین تدفین وجود داشته‌است. انسان نئاندرتال به همراه متوفی ابزار، گُل و گِل اخرا دفن می‌کرده‌است. بر اساس نظریهٔ خروج از آفریقا و با توجه به شواهد ژنتیکی و فسیلی، انسان خردمند[پ ۵] در این دوره، حدود هفتاد هزار سال پیش از خاستگاهش در قاره آفریقا خارج می‌شود و از طریق تنگهٔ آبی باب‌المندب در قسمت جنوبی دریای سرخ به قارهٔ آسیا پا گذاشته و از آنجا به دیگر نقاط زمین مهاجرت می‌کند.[۶]
3.    دوره پارینه‌سنگی پایانی[پ ۶]-بارادوستین از حدود پنجاه هزار سال پیش شروع و در ده هزار سال پیش پایان می‌گیرد. در این دوره انسان نئاندرتال از بین می‌رود و انسان خردمند در آسیای میانه پدیدار می‌گردد، و بدین‌ترتیب این منطقه را به یکی از قدیمی‌ترین منزلگاه‌های انسان تبدیل می‌کند.
دوران پارینه‌سنگی افغانستان
فاصلهٔ زمانی زیاد، دیدگاهمان را راجع به پیدایش نخستین مردمان در افغانستان، که در تراس‌های رودخانه‌ها و غارهای زیستگردار و پناهگاه‌های صخره‌ای در شمال و شرق این کشور امروزی می‌زیستند تار می‌کند. صدها ابزار سنگی در ساحه‌های متعدد در دشت و صحرا پراکنده شده‌اند - ابزاری چون ابزار کوارتزی متعلق به دورهٔ پارینه‌سنگی زیرین (تبرهای دستی، چاقوهای دسته‌دار و تراشه‌ها) با قدمتی بیش از ۱۰۰٫۰۰۰ ساله - گواهی است بر موجودیت فعالیت‌های منظم انسان در ابتدایی‌ترین بُرهه‌های تاریخی. اسکلت انسان نِئاندِرتال در طی اواسط دههٔ هفتاد میلادی در درهٔ کور در بدخشان، و همچنین استخوان گیجگاهی بزرگی یافت شده‌اند که به عقیدهٔ دانشمندان می‌بایست متعلق به انسان امروزی با ویژگی‌های نئاندرتالی باشد. لوئی دوپری، باستان‌شناس دانشگاه پنسیلوانیا راجع به کشف درهٔ کور می‌گوید:
شمال افغانستان شاید منطقه‌ای باشد که هوموساپینس‌های امروزی، یا دست کم گونه‌ای از انسان امروزی، از نظر فیزیکی و جسمانی تحول پیدا کرده و شروع به متحول کردن فناوری عصر حجر کردند.
اما با حملهٔ شوروی به افغانستان در ۱۹۷۹ میلادی کاوش‌های باستان‌شناسی را که احتمالاً می‌توانست این فرضیهٔ شگفت‌انگیز را تأیید کند، متوقف ساخت.
در شمال افغانستان، از بلخ تا سرحد پاکستان، شواهدی روشن بر فرهنگ‌های عصر حجر، عصر نوسنگی و عصر بُرُنز اولیه موجود است. در یک پناهگاه صخره‌ای در قَره‌کَمَر، در ۱۴ مایلی شمال سمنگان ابزاری متعلق به عصر حجر با قدمتی حدود ۳۰٫۰۰۰ پیش از میلاد به‌دست آمده‌اند. (نگارهٔ ۱) بیشتر از ۲۰٫۰۰۰ ابزار سنگی بدست‌آمده از آق‌کُپرُک (در ولایت بلخ) آنچنان ماهرانه ساخته شده‌اند که باستان‌شناسان اغلب از سازندگان این ابزار در آق‌کُپرُک به عنوان «میکل‌آنجلوهای دورهٔ پارینه‌سنگی فوقانی» یاد می‌کنند. آثار بدست‌آمده از آق‌کُپرُک متعلق به یک دورهٔ فرهنگی است که ۵۰۰۰ سال، از حدود ۲۰٫۰۰۰ تا ۱۵٫۰۰۰ سال پیش طول کشید. در دوره‌ای که هنرمندی ناشناس چهرهٔ یک مرد (یا یک زن؟) بر روی سنگ آهک کوچکی تراشیده - و یکی از نخستین ترسیم‌های چهرهٔ انسان ساخت دست است که به ما رسیده‌است. (نگارهٔ ۲)

نگارهٔ ۲: سردیسی از انسان از آق‌کُپرُک، در ولایت بلخ، شمال افغانستان، پیرامون ۲۰٫۰۰۰ پیش از میلاد - نخستین ترسیم چهرهٔ انسان که تا اکنون در افغانستان کشف شده‌است.
اگرچه ترسیم‌هایی دیگر از استخوان و سفال در چکسلواکیا و فرانسه در دوره‌ای مشابه ساخته شده‌اند، اما بقایای حجاری‌های آق‌کُپرُک هنوز یکی از قدیمی‌ترین ترسیم‌های شناخته‌شده از چهرهٔ انسان است که تا به کنون کشف شده‌است. اما چرا این کنده‌کاری صورت گرفته؟ شاید پاسخ این پرسش را هرگز نیابیم.
دورهٔ پارینه‌سنگی زیرین افغانستان ابزارهای مربوط به دورهٔ پارینه‌سنگی زیرین با قدمت بیش از ۱۰۰ هزار سال پیش در دشت ناوُر در غرب غزنی پیدا شده‌است. این ابزار شامل تعدادی ابزار سنگی ساخته شده از کوارتز است که شامل تراشه، ساطور، رنده، تیشه و تبر ابزار هستند. این آثار نخستین شواهد بدست‌آمده از دورهٔ پارینه‌سنگی زیرین در افغانستان هستند.[۷]
دورهٔ پارینه‌سنگی میانی افغانستان (۳۰٫۰۰۰–۵۰٫۰۰۰ پیش از میلاد): آثار بدست‌آمده از درهٔ کور (کُر)، در غرب بدخشان، نخستین شواهد آشکار زیستگاه‌های انسان را در افغانستان نشان می‌دهد. طی کاوش‌هایی در درهٔ کور در سال ۱۹۴۴ توسط لوئی دوپری و همکارانش، ابزارهای موسترین و جمجمهٔ انسان نئاندرتال به‌دست آمده که مربوط به دورهٔ میان‌سنگی بوده و عمر آن را ۳۰ هزار سال پیش تخمین زده‌اند.[۸] از دیگر پایگاه‌های باستان‌شناسی مربوط به این دوره می‌توان از درهٔ چخماخ (در ولایت بلخ)، درهٔ دادِل (در ولایت بلخ)، دشت ناوُر (در ولایت غزنی)، غارِ مُرده‌گوسفند (در ولایت فاریاب)، حَیرَتان (در ولایت سمنگان)، قَرَه‌کَمَر (در ولایت سمنگان)، کِشم (در ولایت بدخشان)، سَرِ نمک (در ولایت سمنگان) و زَمبوکَن (در ولایت بلخ) نام برد.
دورهٔ پارینه‌سنگی فوقانی افغانستان (۱۰٫۰۰۰–۱۵٫۰۰۰ پیش از میلاد): آثار به‌دست آمده از این دوره در آق‌کُپرُک (در ولایت بلخ)، درهٔ کلان (در ولایت سمنگان)، حَیرَتان (در ولایت سمنگان)، اسلام‌پنجه (در ولایت جوزجان)، کِلِفت (در ولایت بلخ)، کوک‌جَر (در ولایت سمنگان)، و سَرِ نمک (در ولایت سمنگان) یافت شده‌اند.[۹]
دورهٔ فراپارینه‌سنگی افغانستان (۸٫۰۰۰–۱۰٫۰۰۰ پیش از میلاد) آثار به‌دست آمده از این دوره در آق‌کُپرُک (در ولایت بلخ)، باد آسیا؟ (در ولایت بدخشان)، بهارک؟ (در ولایت بدخشان)، برخَنِ زادیان (در ولایت بلخ)، درهٔ کلان (در ولایت سمنگان)، هزارسُم (در ولایت سمنگان)، قَرَه‌کَمَر (در ولایت سمنگان)، لَنگارکیش؟ (در ولایت بدخشان)، رحمان‌گُل (در ولایت بدخشان)، سَندوکتی (در ولایت جوزجان)، شاه‌تپه (در ولایت سمنگان)، سیاه‌ریگان (در ولایت سمنگان)، تاش‌گُذر (در ولایت فاریاب)، تاشقورغان (در ولایت سمنگان) و اوچ‌تپه (در ولایت بلخ) یافت شده‌اند.[۹]
دورهٔ نوسنگی
(۴۰۰۰–۸۰۰۰ پیش از میلاد)
دورهٔ نوسنگی واپسین مرحلهٔ عصر حجر است و قبل از عصر فلزات یعنی عصر مس (Chalcolithic)، عصر بُرُنز (۴۰۰۰–۸۰۰۰ پیش از میلاد) و عصر آهن (۷۰۰–۱۵۰۰ پیش از میلاد) آغاز می‌گردد. در دورهٔ نوسنگی، در برخی نواحی خاور میانه، انسان در حدود ۱۱ هزار سال پیش، از مرحله جمع‌آوری و شکار به مرحله کشت و اهلی کردن انتقال یافت. به این خاطر دورهٔ نوسنگی را «عصر کشاورزی» نیز دانسته‌اند.[۱۰]
در سال ۱۹۶۵ دکتر لوئی دوپری در نتیجه کاوش‌های خود در آق‌کُپرُک، در جنوب مزار شریف و کنار بلخ‌آب، آثاری را به دست آورد که براساس شواهد اهلی‌ساختن حیوانات در این دوره، متعلق به دورهٔ نوسنگی است.[۱۱]
از دیگر پایگاه‌های باستان‌شناسی مربوط به دورهٔ نوسنگی می‌توان از چاش‌بابا (در ولایت جوزجان)، چیلیکِ قُل (در ولایت جوزجان)، چیلیکِ یَلدَش (در ولایت جوزجان)، چیلیکِ یاس‌خان (در ولایت جوزجان)، گورزیوان (در ولایت فاریاب)، هزارسُم (در ولایت سمنگان)، جَرقودوق (در ولایت جوزجان)، کَوک (در ولایت جوزجان)، خواجه دوکوه (در ولایت فاریاب)، خواجه دوکوه نو (در ولایت فاریاب)، کیلیفت (در ولایت بلخ)، لَیرو؟ (در ولایت زابل)، قاق (در ولایت فاریاب)، قاقِ نظارآغا (در ولایت فاریاب)، قره‌قُل (در ولایت جوزجان)، قَره‌تپه (در ولایت سمنگان)، قورقودوق (در ولایت جوزجان)، سَفَروال (در ولایت جوزجان) و سیدآباد (در ولایت جوزجان) نام برد.[۹]
زمین‌های کشاورزی با قدمتی ۲۰٫۰۰۰–۳۰٫۰۰۰ پیش از میلاد، که در هزار سُم و در کوهپایه‌های هندوکش یافت شده‌اند، این واقعیت را تأیید می‌کنند که شمال افغانستان یکی از نخستین جایگاه‌های حیوانات و گیاهان خانگی بوده‌است؛ و بعدها، روستاهای زراعی، با قدمتی ۵٫۰۰۰–۷٫۰۰۰ سال پیش از میلاد، در نزدیکی تپهٔ دِه‌مُراسی (پشتو: دِه‌مُراسی غوندَی) در ولایت قندهار، دورهٔ تحول انسان را نشان می‌دهد که روستاهایی با زمین‌های کشاورزی پدیدار شده و جایش را به شهرهای کوچک داده‌است. در این دوران، شواهدی از فرهنگ عصر بُرُنز به وفور پدیدار می‌شود.
در این دوره، در حدود ۷۰۰۰ سال پیش از میلاد، دهقانان و چوپانانی در جلگه‌های حاصلخیز پیرامون هندوکُش زندگی می‌کردند. این مردمان صنعت ابتدائی خانه‌سازی با خشت خام و سفالگری را با خود به همراه آوردند و بعدها، در عصر مس (Chalcolithic)، از فروش لاجورد (Lapis lazuli) که در سواحل و بستر رودخانه‌ها می‌یافتند و تجارت آن به کشورهای اولیه باختری از طریق فلات ایران و میان‌رودان ثروتمند می‌شدند.[۱۲]
عصر بُرُنز و عصر آهن
(عصر برنز: ۱۵۰۰–۴۰۰۰ ق.م. عصر آهن: ۷۰۰–۱۵۰۰ ق. م)

نگارهٔ ۳: تندیس‌های ایزدبانوان مادر از مُندیگَک (چپ) و تپهٔ دِه‌مُراسی (راست)، گِل پُخته، ولایت قندهار، هزارهٔ سوم پیش از میلاد.

نگارهٔ ۴: سنگ لاجوَرد (لاتین: Lapis lazuli) نوعی سنگ قیمتی آبی‌رنگ است که تنها در افغانستان یافت می‌شود[۱۳] ولی از هزاران سال پیش در جهان خواهان زیادی داشته‌است. این سنگ در جواهرات فراعنهٔ مصر باستان، هنر خاور نزدیک باستان و تا هنر رنسانسِ ایتالیا به چشم می‌خورد. وجود ده‌ها تُن سنگ لاجورد بکارفته در گنجینه‌های شاهان میان‌رودان (بین‌النهرین) و فراعنهٔ مصر باستان نشان‌دهندهٔ این واقعیت است که این سنگ قیمتی در آن عصر در اوج مُد بوده و نیاکان باشندگان افغانستان در تجارت و بازرگانی در عصر بُرُنز نقش پویایی داشتند. همچنین ضرورت انتقال این همه سنگ لاجورد از افغانستان به خاور نزدیک و مصر گواه بر موجودیت امکانات و تأسیسات پیشرفتهٔ بین راهی در آن عصر است. سمت چپ، بالا: نمونه‌ای از سنگ لاجوَرد. سمت چپ، پایین: لاجورد بکار رفته در یکی از زیورآلات توت‌عنخ‌آمون، یکی از فراعنهٔ مقتدر مصر باستان، ۱۳۵۲–۱۳۶۱ پیش از میلاد. سمت راست: لاجوَردِ بکار رفته در «قوچ در یک بیشه»، بدست‌آمده از مقبره‌های شاهی شهر باستانی اور، میان‌رودان (بین‌النهرین) باستان، عراق امروزی، ۲۵۰۰–۲۶۰۰ پیش از میلاد.
فرهنگ عصر بُرُنز (عصر مِفرَغ) اولیه در شمال و شرق افغانستان پدید آمد. در عصر برنز سه تمدن باختر-مرو (که گاه 'تمدن آمودریا' نامیده می‌شود)، درهٔ سِند و جیرُفت (تمدنی نیاعیلامی) در افغانستان اثرگذار بودند.[۱۴] (نقشهٔ ذیل را ببینید). نخستین شواهد واقعی شهری‌سازی در تپهٔ دِه‌مُراسی (پشتو: دِه‌مُراسی غوندَی) و مندیگَک (در نزدیکی قندهار امروزی) پدیدار گشت، که پایتخت‌های محلی تمدن دره سند بودند. اقتصاد بر اساس گندم، جو، دامداری و معدن‌کاری استوار بود. سنگ لاجوَرد که در گورهای پادشاهان اور در جنوب عراق، پیرامون ۲۵۰۰–۲۶۰۰ پیش از میلاد، بکار رفته بود از بدخشان در شمال‌شرق افغانستان در همان دوره استخراج شده بود. همچنین شبکهٔ راه زمینی بازرگانی دوربردی با میان‌رودان (بین‌النهرین) و مصر ایجاد شده بود. با اینکه بسیاری از آثار ساحه‌های چون دشت دَشلی به غارت رفته، آثار بسیار زیاد دیگری نیز کشف شده، و آثار بیشتری انتظار می‌رود در این ساحه‌ها پیدا شوند. در طی جستجوهای باستان‌شناسان برای یافتن تمدن، آن‌ها در مُندیگک (در نزدیکی قندهار امروزی) شواهدی از یک شهر واقعی پیدا کردند، و شواهدی از بناها و اشیائی که شهرهای واقعی برجای می‌مانند: بناهای مذهبی و آثار هنری حجاری‌شده و نقاشی شده. در مندیگک، باستان‌شناسان بنای ستون‌دار بزرگی متعلق به هزارهٔ سوم پیش از میلاد کشف کردند که درگاهش با خط سرخ ترسیم شده بود، و احتمالاً برای اهداف مذهبی بنا شده بود. در تپهٔ دِه‌مُراسی، باستان‌شناسان مجموعه‌ای از یک زیارتگاه را پیدا کردند که حاوی اشیایی بود متعلق به مراسم مذهبی همچون شاخ‌های بُز، یک کاسه، مُهر مِسی، لولهٔ مسی توخالی، جام کوچکی از سنگ مرمر، و یک تندیس سفال‌گری‌شده و کنده‌کاری‌شده از یک ایزدبانوی مادر (نگارهٔ ۳) و تندیسی که نشانهٔ فراوانی بوده و مشابه تندیس‌هایی بود که در مندیگک نیز یافت شده بودند. عاقبت تپهٔ دِه‌مُراسی در حدود ۱۵۰۰ پیش از میلاد متروکه شد، شاید به دلیل تغییر مسیر رودخانه به‌سوی غرب که تپهٔ دِه‌مُراسی آنجا بنا شده بود. مندیگک برای ۵۰۰ سال دیگر نیز دوام پیدا کرد. دو هجوم پیاپی قومی کوچ‌نشین از سوی شمال باشندگان این ساحه‌ها را بعد از ۲۰۰۰ سال زیست مداومشان در این شهر مجبور به ترک آن شدند. زمانیکه باستان‌شناسان در افغانستان تمدن‌های باستانی را در مندیگک و دِه‌مُراسی کاوش می‌کردند، نزدیک به سه هزار کیلومتر آنطرفتر در غرب، در شهر باستانی اور در جنوب عراق، یک تیم دیگر از باستان‌شناسان زمانی که جواهر و آثار کشف‌شدهٔ دیگر یافت‌شده از مقبره‌های شاهی (حدود ۲۴۰۰ پیش از میلاد) را مطالعه می‌کردند، به آثار چشمگیر دیگری برخوردند. بیش از بیست هزار مُهره‌های ساخته‌شده از سنگ لاجوَرد از مقبره‌های شاهی بیرون کشیده شده بودند که همگی دقیقاً ترکیب معدنی یکسانی داشتند؛ بدین معنا که همگی از یک معدن استخراج شده بودند. در واقع، پس از بررسی‌های گسترده، به این نتیجه رسیدند که تقریباً هر یک از این لاجوردهای بکاررفته در جواهرات شاهانِ خاور نزدیک باستان (نگارهٔ ۴) - که هزاران کیلو سنگ لاجوَرد بود - همگی از یک رشته‌کوه آمده بودند، معدن سرِ سنگ در اعماق هندوکش افغانستان.
انتقال این همه سنگ لاجورد از افغانستان تا میان‌رودان (بین‌النهرین)، و حتی تا مصر (جایی که این سنگ آبی‌رنگ به عنوان اوج مُد انگاشته می‌شد)، و حمل اجناس قیمتی از آنطرف (همچون طلا، مس، سنگ‌های قیمتی، چوب و حیوانات غیر بومی) بدون تدارکات لجستیکی پیشرفته و مجموعه‌ای از امکانات و تأسیسات بین راهی امکان نداشت. همان‌طور که شواهد باستان‌شناسی نشان می‌دهد، تمدن دوران هزارهٔ چهارم و سوم پیش از میلاد هیچ خلأئی را در پهناوری دنیای ارتباطی و تجاری که میان‌رودان را با هند و چین وصل می‌کرده، باقی نگذاشته‌است. در ۴۰۰۰ پیش از میلاد، شکل‌های اولیه از زندگی شهری با فرهنگ‌های خاص در بازه‌های زمانی منظم رونق پیدا کرد، که نمونهٔ آن جاپاهای سنگی، در سرتاسر آسیای میانه است؛ بنابراین لاجوَردی که از معادن سرِ سنگ در افغانستان به شهرهای بزرگی چون اور در ۲۴۰۰ پیش از میلاد می‌رسید و در امتداد راه‌های تجاری حمل می‌شد، مبادلهٔ آن هزاران سال پیش از آن فعال بوده‌است. برعکس تمدن‌های میان‌رودان، مصر یا درهٔ سند، در تمدن‌های آسیای میانه، رودهای برتری برای تمرکز دادنِ مردم، منابع و مبادلات در مسیر کوه تا اقیانوس وجود نداشت. با این وجود، آمیزشی بزرگ از مردمان متنوع و جوامع مستقل در این سرزمین‌های دورافتاده برخاستند - یک شهرنشینی ناپیوسته که در آن کمبود آب و شرایط اقلیمی سخت معمول بوده‌است.
آثار به‌دست آمده از عصر بُرُنز در افغانستان (۱۵۰۰–۴۰۰۰ پیش از میلاد) در اکرم‌قلعه (در ولایت هلمند)، علی‌آباد (در ولایت کُندوز)، آق‌کُپرُک (در ولایت بلخ)، اَرَنجی (در ولایت جوزجان)، اَیَتان‌تپه (در ولایت سمنگان)، باد سه‌غوندَی (در ولایت قندهار)، باغِ پول‌غوندی (در ولایت قندهار)، بَرَگ‌توت (در ولایت فراه)، باسیز (در ولایت کُندوز)، بوئینه‌قره (در ولایت بلخ)، چادُرتپه (در ولایت بلخ)، چارسنگ‌تپه (در ولایت قندهار)، چولِ آبدان (در ولایت کُندوز)، دَم (در ولایت نیمروز)، درهٔ کور (در ولایت بدخشان)، دَشلی ۱ (در ولایت جوزجان)، دشلی ۳ (در ولایت جوزجان)، دشلی شرقی (در ولایت جوزجان)، دشلی جنوبی (در ولایت جوزجان)، تپهٔ دِه‌مُراسی (در ولایت قندهار)، ده نو (در ولایت سمنگان)، فرخ‌آباد (در ولایت بلخ)، گردان‌ریگ (در ولایت نیمروز)، هیردای‌تپه (در ولایت فاریاب)، قندهار، خوش‌بای (در ولایت تخار)، خوش‌تپه (تپه فُلول) (در ولایت بغلان)، کهنه قلعه طالقان (در ولایت تخار)، لَیرو (در ولایت زابل)، مُندیگَک (در ولایت قندهار)، مُندی‌حصار (در ولایت قندهار)، قونسای (در ولایت کُندوز)، قورغان‌تپه (در ولایت تخار)، سعید قلعه‌تپه (در ولایت قندهار)، سسماق (در ولایت تخار)، شهر صفا (در ولایت زابل)، شیرآباد (در ولایت سمنگان)، شورتوغَی (در ولایت تخار)، سیاه‌ریگان (در ولایت سمنگان)، اِسپیروَن (در ولایت قندهار)، تیکَر (در ولایت فاریاب) و اورته‌بُز (در ولایت تخار) یافت شده‌اند. (نقشهٔ بالا را ببینید)[۹]

1863-1901

BY

M.  HASSAN KAKAR

BEG/ D

1 6 g 3

BRILL

LEIDEN • BOSTON

2006

On he coW: Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan

This book is printed on acid-free paFr.

Ubrary Of Congress Cataloging-in-PubEcaGon Data

Kakar, M. Hassan.

A political and diplomatic history or Afghanistan, 1863-1901 / Mohammad Hassan

  1. cm. - (Brill's Inner Asian library ; v. 1 7)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15185-7

ISBN-10: 90-04-15185-0 (hardback : alk. paper)

  1. and government— 19th century. 2. relations. I. Title. Il. *rics.

DS364.K35 2006

958.1'03—dc22

2006043934

                                                             ISSN         1566-7162

ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15185-7

ISBN-10•. 90-04-15185-0

O Copyrght 2006 by Koninkljke BrillNV, [Æiden, The Netherlands

Konink19ke        .NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academe Hblishers, Martinus JVjhoff hbhshers and VSE

All r*hts reserved. No part of this publication mgy be reprduced,                    stored in a retrieval                        or transmitted in anyform or by ay means, elu&onic, mechanual, photocopying, recording or omau.'ig, u,'iåout FmissOnfrom publisher.

Authorization to photocopy itemsfr inurnal or personal We granted by Brill the appmphaußs are paid directly to The

C„karante Cmter, 222 Ibiz:e, Suite 910 M,' 01923, USA.

Fees are subßt charge.

To my teachers and professors especially the late Najm al-Din Tarakay of the high school in Laghman and Malcolm Edward Yapp of the University of London.

CONTENTS

Preface

Other books and translation of books by M. H. Kakar              

x

Abbreviations .  

Introduction .

PART ONE

POLITICAL HISTORY

Chapter One:

The Reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan    

9

Chapter Two:

The British Afghan War and the

Accession or Amir               al-Rahman

 

 

Khan                                    

25

Chapter Three:

The Afghan Victory at Maiwand

 

 

and the Reunification of Afghanistan        

45

Chapter Four:

The Pacification of Eastern

 

 

Afghanistan  

63

Chapter Five:

The Great Ghilzay Uprising and its

 

 

Suppression  

87

Chapter Six:

The Revolt of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq

 

 

and its Suppression            

96

Chapter Seven:

The Pacification of Border Principalities

 

 

in Northern Afghanistan            

106

Chapter Eight:

The Pacification of the Hazaras   

120

Chapter Nine:

The Conquest of Former Kafiristan   

PART •rwo

EXTERNAL RELATIONS

139

Chapter Ten:

Relations with the British Government

 

 

of India and the Durand Agreement    

159

Chapter Eleven:

Relations with Rus.sia and the Russian

 

 

Occupation of Panjdeh        

193

Chapter Twelve:

Relations with Persia and the Ottoman

 

 

Turkey  

210

CONTENTS

Conclusion                        217 Appendices 231

241

Glossary  247 Index          251

PREFACE

My first work in English entitled, Afghanistan, A Study in Internal Political Developments, was published in 1971. It covered only sixteen years of the 21-year reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan (pronounced Abdur Rahman) and was based only on the unpublished and published documents of the British Government of India, which I had collected from the India Offce Library and Records in London (now a part of the British Library Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections), for my M.Phil. thesis.

In the following years of the 1970s, I overhauled the entire 1971 publication on the basis of new sourcc material that I had obtained from the archival centers in Kabul and New Delhi. The Afghan offcial chronicle, Siraj al-Tawarikh, became another valuable source which was not available to me in London. I completed the revision of the 1971 work at Princeton and Harvard universities where I served as a visiting Fellow. These new sources enabled me to cover the entire reign of the amir, not only politically but diplomatically also, and to add some new topics as described in the Introduction of the present study. Subsequently, I revised the previously overhauled 1971' text on the basis of two important books: Sirdar Abdul Qadir Effendi's Royals and Royal Mendicant (1948?) and Major General Sir Charles M. MacGregor's War in Afghanistan, 1879—80 (1985).

I have performed the revision of my original study over an extended period of time, in line with the advice of Socrates, who had advised that the lover of inquiry must follow his beloved wherever it may lead him."l As a result of the thoroughness of this revision, the excellence of the historical sources, and my specialist knowledge of the subject, it is now possible to state that the national as well as the local history, of Afghanistan during this period (1863—1901) has become clearer than its history, during any other comparable period.

I would like to express my thanks to Stanley Barton for reading the entire manuscript and offering valuable editorial suggestions.

Plato, The Trial and Death Of Socrates, Translated by Grube, C. M. Hacket Publishing Co. Indianapolis, Cambridge, 1975, 18.

OTHER BOOKS AND TRANSLATION OF BOOKS BY M. H. KAKAR

In English

Afghanistan, A Study in Internal Political Developments, 1880—1896 (l .971)

Government and Society in Afghanistan, The Reign of Arnir tAbd al-Rahman Khan (1979)

Afghanistan, The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979—1982 ( 1995)

In Pashto

The Geneva Compromise on Afghanistan (1988)

Afghans in the Spring Of 1987 at War with the Russians (1990)

L.ight and Defense or Essays on the Population, History and Current Affairs Of Afghanistan, Editor (1999)

              Journey to the Homeland;                  Taliban and Islamic Fundamentalism, (2004)

The Reign of King Aman Allah Reconsidered (2005)

In Dari

Afghan, Afghanistan and Afghans and the Organization or the State in India, Persia and Afghanistan (1978)

The Second Anglo-Afghan War (1989)

Translation

(Pashto or Dari)

Gorky on Literature (1961)

What is History? E. H. Carr, author (1968)

The Real World of Democracy, C. B. McPherson, author (1971)

 Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, 2 vols., M. Elphinstone, author (1982)

Introduction to the Philosoehy of Education, George Knclle, author (2002)

Manuscript in Pashto

Journal of Political Developments, 1979— 1982

ARAMFA

The Archives of the Royal Afghan Ministry• of Foreign Affairs, Kabul

BACA

Biographical Accounts of Chiefs, Sardars and others of Afghanistan, Calcutta, 1888

BSOAS

Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies

CD

Chitral Agency Diary

DSCD

Dir, Swat, Chitral Agency Diary

GAK (1895)

Gazetteer of Afghanistan, Kabul, pt. 4, 1895

GD

Gilgit Agency Diary

IGA

Imperial Gazetteer of India, Afghanistan and Nepal, (Calcutta, 1908)

IOL

India Offce Library, Commonwealth Relations Offce,

London

HD

Herat Diarv

Kand. D

Kandahar Diary Kabul Diary

Kh.D.

Khyber Agency Diary

Maia. D.

Malakand Agency Diary

ABBREVIATIONS*

Monthly Memorandum

Military Report ori Afghanistan, (Calcutta, 1906)

MRA (1925) Military Report on Afghanistan, (Delhi, 1925)

NAI National Archives of India, Delhi Peshawar Agency Diary

PNEA Papers relating to Afghanistan, Narrative of Events in Afghanistan, 1878—1880

PSI-I Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures Received fin London] from India

References to the records without ARAMFA or NAI indicate recor& of the India Omce Library, and Commonwealth Relations Offce, now a part of the British library, London.

Archival sources are cited without special marks while their volumes and pages are cited only by their numbers. The pattern Of the archival sources varies toward the end of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman's reign. Siraj al-Tawa+ikh without the mention of volume refer-s to its third volume which is devoted entirely to the sixteen years of the amir's reign.

ABBREVIATIONS

SJD Sawal wa Jawab-e-Dawlati (Amir CAbd al-Rahman's interviews with the viceroy of India), Mohammad Nabi, (author), Kabul 1915

(T) Telegram



This work begins with the death of Amir Dost .\lohammad KhaJ1 in 1863 and ends Lhc death of Amir %Abd al-Rahman Khan in 1901. It is an in depth study of the political history and external relations of Afghanistan during the second reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan and thc entire reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan (pronounced Abdur Rahman), who ruled from July 20, 1880 to OC',ober 2, 1901. The reigns of these two amirs were characterized by their efforts in centralizing and consolidating state order as never before. It was also during their reigns that the boundaries of Afghanistan were internationally agreed for the first time in its long history albeit to its disadvantage. The centralization efforts also became significant because they became a model for their succes•ors.

The introductory remarks of this study begin with the reign of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, who founded the Mohammadzay dynasty following a long period of civil war, which broke out after the Sadozay dynasty fell from power, in 1818. He was the father of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, and the grandfather of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, and these three figures were the giant players of nineteenthcentury Afghanistan. The Sadozays and Mohammadzays, who played a pivotal role in the history of modern Afghanistan for almost two and a half centuries (1747—1978) were respectively sections of the Popalzay and Barakzay divisions of the Pashtun Durranay tribal confederation, while the Pashtuns have dominated the political scene of the country in modern times. I

 The Pashtuns (or Pakhtuns) also caned the Afghans, and the Pathans are among the ancient inhabitants of Afghanistan, constituting lin91istically fifty five and genealogically two percent of the present population or the country. The Tajiks, the Hazaras, Uzbeks, the Turkmen, the Char Aimaq and others are the other ethnic goups of the country. (Wak Foundation of Afghanistan, Ethnic Composition of Afghanistan, Sapay Center for Pashto Research and Development, Peshawar, 1998, 62, 73).

The name 'Pashtun' is probably the 'Pakthas' of the Vedic period, which Hendotus in the fifth century B.C.E. recorded as "Påctyes% in the inhabitants of "the Pactyic country, north of the rest of India," who, he States, "live much like the Bactrians." The word Afghan appears in ancient Indian, Persian and Chinese

Dost .Nlohammad Khan assumed power first as the governor of Kabul in 1826 and later as the amir of Afghanistan, in 1834, but the British deported him to India in 1840 after they had invaded Afghanistan in 1838. The invasion resulted in a full-scale war

sources as 'Asvaka'. 'Asva-Ghana', 'Abgan', 'Apakan', 'Avagana', •Ap-o-kicn' and, finally, 'Afghan•. The Persian-speaking people still pronouncc 'Afghan' as 'Aoghan'. In modern times the word 'Afghan' has come to signify all of thc inhabitants or Afghanistan.

According to many authors, the name •Pathan' is derived from •Pakhtana', the plural of 'Pakhtun'. However, this docs not seem to bc true as the name has come into use since the twelfth century in India when some Pashtuns sctded in the Patna district in the Bahar province. The Indians then called them, according to the historian hrishta, as •Pathan' after Patna.

Although the Pashtuns are genealogy-conscious they have no written records of their ancestors. Herodotus mentions Gandaharii, Aparytae, and Sittagydae, names that may refer to the inhabitants of Gandahara, Apriday (or Afriday), and the Khattak. But according to one legend, the present-day Pashtuns are the descendants of a person known as Qays, who may have lived in and around the Kisay Char, or in Ghor, in western Afghanistan in the seventh century. This Qays, according to the legend, v•isited the Prophet Muhammad in Medina, who named him QAys %Abd al-Rashid.

The name •Qays' is probably the Arabicized form of 'Kisay', a name that signifies a series of ranges that came to be known in the Islamic period the 'Sulaiman Mountains', described by Morgenstieme "as the earliest known home of the Afghans." 'Kisay' was probably also the given name of the person in question, and that he changed it to Qays 'Abd al-Rashid under the Islamic impulse, as was common practice in Islamic Afghanistan. The change Of Isapzai or Asapzai to Yusufzay is another example of this type.

Groups of people have also related themselves to the Arabs. The Shinwaray Pashtuns, for example, formerly called themselves sods—that is, the descendants of the Prophet, Muhammad, through his daughter, Fatima. Even Pashto has been consi&red by some to a Semitic language. Ihe Kam tribe of the former Kahristan too that they were related to the Quraysh tribe to which the Prophet, Muhænmad, belonged. These associations were made because in Islamic Afghanistan thc sayedJ were (and still are) respected, and the govcrnment paid them as well as the mullas and religious leaders (pi'S) allowances. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, however, compelled the sayycds to present the firmans on the basis of which they received allowances. Since only a few could, he discontinued the allowances, saying, "I am tired of these Soyids (sic). How is it that the soyids arc found in such large numbers everywhere? I can not accept the genealogical table of any of them". In general, it is probably imposible for Afghan sgyyds to prow hat they are Arabs by descent.

Qays 'Abd al-Rashid had four sons: Beett (or Beettnai), Ghorghasht, Sarbun, and Korla. The contradiction is obvious between these names and the name •Abd al Rashid'. If •Qays' had converted to Islam, as the legend says he had, he certainly would have given his sons Muslim names, not purely Pashto names such as these. Also, how can the descendants of one person multiply in the course of fourteen centuries to about forty million known souls of the present day Pashtuns, who now Eve on both sides of the Durand Line? Recendy (1976), Afghan historian, Ahmad •Ali Kohzad, has advanced the view according to which Beett, Ghorghasht, and Sarbun were the illustrious ancestors and heroes of the Pashtuns in the Avestan

(1838—1841) that came to be known in the Afghan sources as the First Anglo-Afghan war and in the English annals as thc Afghan war. After the British had lost more than 16, 500 soldiers and their Indian camp followers, and that the war had ended, they allowed Dost Mohammad Khan to return to Afghanistan. Upon his return home in 1843 he assumed power once again as an independent amir and ruled the country until his death in June 1863. By the time of his death he had reunited the fragmented country more by statesmanship than by force, and reorganized the shattered economy and the government along traditional lines. The Afghanistan that he ruled stretched from the Oxus River (Amu Darya) to the territories up to Peshawar. Dost Mohammad Khan was assisted by his numerous sons and grandsons some of whom served as provincial governors, known as sardars ('persons in command; general'), and governed almost autonomously, subject only to Amir dost Mohammad Khan.

After the heir-apparent, Sardar Sher 'Ali Khan (b. 1822), became amir some of the provincial governors rebelled. The rebellion lasted interrnittendy for four years (1864—1868) during which time Afghanstan

period who were then known respectively by the names Of Atratt, Gharshasib, and Sarand

According to the aforementioned legend, the present-day di'Åsions of Pashtuns  descended from the first three sons; for example, the Durranays (formerly called Awdaul or Abdaul), the Barezh, the Tarin, the Ghoryakhel, and the Yusufzays are said to descended from Sarbun; the Kakars, the Daways, the Babis and 0thers from Ghorghast; and the Ghilzays, the Lodays, the Suris, the Niazays and others are descended from Beett. Korla is said to have had no issues. (For details see, Neamet Ullah, History of the 4Éhans, Trans. from Persian into English with annotadons by Dom, Bernard, Vanguard Books (PVT), Lahore, 1999 (Reprint), 26—42. Herodotus, The History, Translated by Grene, D. , The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London, 1987, 3—91, 3.102, 7.67, 7.85. Khattak, Tahkh-e-Mtmwa' (in pcshto),

  1. Cknaal Hi.Jtory of the Pashtuns, ed. Kamil Momand, D. M., University Book Agency, Peshawar, 606—624. Afzal Khan Khattak was a grandson of the great poet and warrior Khushhal Khattak. Morgensticrne, G., "The People; The Pashto Language: Pashto Literature", The Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. l, 1960, 216—221. Durnnay, Sultan Mohammad, The History of Sultant, (in Dari) Bombay, 1298 H. Q, 14—23. Kakar, M. E. ."han, Ughani5tan and the *ans and the Organization ofthe State in Indi, Persia and Afanislan, (in Dari), Kabul University Press, 1978, 1—37. Kakar, Govnment and Society in afghanistan, The of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 1880—1901, rexas University Press at Austin, 1979, 157—158. Kohzad, Ahmad 'Ali, Gharghaht ya Gharshasib, (in Persian), (Gharghasht or Gharshasib], Kabul, first published In 1976, reprint by the Daunish Book Store, Peshawar, 1999. Siyal, Mira Jan., Zeno Pafhtano ShØary aw da Mainay azv Lund Tahkh, (in Pashto) [The of Sme Pasha-m Tribes and lands and Short Histoy), University Book Agency, Peshawar, 1986. I am grateful to Dr. Zamin Mohrnand for lending me this important book.

was plunged into a war in which many sons and grandsons of the late amir participated. In the course of the war Sardar 'Abd alRahman Khan, the only son Of the eldest son of the late amir, distinguished himself by helping his father and his full-uncle to the throne one after the other. Amir Sher CAIi Khan became a fugiti\e within his own country, but did not give up the fight. Finally in September 1868, he regained the throne with the help of his eldest son, Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub Khan, and Sardar %Abd al-Rahman Khan fled to Samarqand in Central Asia after his father and his full-uncle had died one after the other. In Samarqand Sardar CAbd al-Rahman Khan remained on a Russian pension for eleven years.

During his second reign, described in Chapter One, Amir Sher CAIi Khan organized his administration, and introduced some reforms, which put Afghanistan on the road to becoming a nation-state. However, the British, in the pursuit of their Forward Policy of the 1870s, occupied the country once agam in 1878. This occupation resulted in the Second Anglo-Afghan war, and it destroyed all that Amir Sher 'Ali Khan had accomplished. The viceroy of India, Lord Lytton, even decided to break up the country, and help the fugitive

Sardar CAbd al-Rahman ascend the throne of what he called "Northem Afghanistan."

Lytton opposed thc risc to power of any member of the house of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, after the Afghans had massacred•the personnel of the British embassy in Kabul in an uprising. However, subsequent events obliged him as well as his immediate successor to abandon the scheme of fragmentation. His successor even assisted the new ruler, Amir CAbd al-Rahman Khan, in reuniting the whole country. This occurred after Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, a son of the late Amir Sher %Ali Khan, had inflicted a stunning defeat on the British army at Maiwand, threatening the position of the British as well as that of the new amir. To overcome the common foe, the British assisted the amir, not only with money and weapons, but also by handing him over the province of Kandahar, which they had omcially declared independent in the name of a local ruler as part of their scheme of fragmenting the country. To the relief of the British the amir expelled his rival cousin to Persia, and succeeded in reuniting the country. But the reunification was incomplete since the British retained the Khyber and the Michni Passes, along with the districts of Kurram (Kurma), Pishin and Sibi that they had acquired by the treaty of Gandumak, of 1879. Additionally, the British were to conduct the external relations of the country, and later by the Durand Agreement or the Kabul Convention of 1893, they even deprived the amir of ruling over a vast region in the castern hinterland.

As amir, 'Abd al-Rahman Khan began the work which his predecessor, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, had begun, but focused more on state building than nation building. Consequently, he concentrated on order and security, and drastically curtailed the traditional liberty that the Afghans especially their rural magnates enjoyed. He had reasons for doing so. Externally, by then Afghanistan had Iren encircled almost entirely by the British and Russian empires. They also curbed the amir's drive for regaining the territories that Afghanistan had lost previously, and also seized additional territory. Later in his reign they even reached an understanding between themselves and made Afghanistan a buffer state. The amir suspected both powers, and made their understanding a further justification for consolidating the government and his dynastic power, thereby demanding sacrifices from his subjects. Internally, the amir also had problems not less demanding. He was to establish his rule in the face of opposition of dynastic rivals. The more popular son of the late amir, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, proved a formidable rival, as noted above. While Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan succeeded in expelling him to Persia in 1881, his struggle with him, as well as his close ties with the British, alienated from the amir the Durranays and most of those who had fought the British during their occupation of Afghanistan. In 1888 the amir's full-cousin, Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan, the virtual autonomous governor of Afghan Turkestan, rebelled, but failed to unseat the amir. The defeated sardar took refuge in Samarqand a second time and the expansionist empires of Britain and Russia became homes to his dynastic rival cousins, including the former amir, Mohammad Yacqub Khan.

The external threats coupled with those from dynastic rivals as well as potential threats from provincial magnates con•hnced the amir that for Afghanistan to survive as a country it must have a strong central government with a strong military force. But this schene required the allocation- of a large proportion of financial resources and the curtailment of traditional autonomy of tribal communides and elders. Consider-ing the country's meager resources and the unwillingness of its people to live under a police state this was a most stupendous task that the amir set for himself. This scheme

resdted in over 40 rebellions of which I have studied only the major ones. The pacification of Hazarajat and the conquest of Kafiristan for the first time were different in nature. All of these events as well as the encirclement of the country by the British and Russian empires, and the demarcation of its boundaries make the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan as the most formative period in the history of modern Afghanistan.

In view of their importance to the history of Afghanistan, Afghan relations with the British Government of India and with Russia constitute the major part of this study. Britain and Russia which had started the so-called Great Game to dominate the Central Asian lands much earlier in the century had finally besieged Afghanistan in the period under discussion. To them Afghanistan was a land without borders, an alibi for their forvvard movements. On the other hand, it was the policy of Afghan rulers in particular Amir •Abd al Rahman Khan to restore to Afghanistan the outlying territories she had previously lost. Afghanistan became, thus, a theatre for these pouers to carry on their forward policies in opposite directions. All this made the period not only rich in events internally but also internationally. I have studied the external developments in particular the Durand Agreement and the Russian occupation of Panjdeh in detail mainly in reference to the internal politics of Afghanistan, the kind of study no other scholar has previously attempted.

The foundation of-the present study is my M.Phil thesis entided Ughanistan, A Study in Inumal Political DweloPtnenLs, 1880—1896, published privately in Lahore in 1971. This work was narrower in scope and covered only the sixteen years of the twenty-one-year reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. After its publication I located a great number of new sources particularly while performing research for my Ph.D. thesis, entitled, Gowmment and Socio *a.nütan.• The of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Dwt. Published in 1979, this work, as its title indicates, is a study of the government structure and some aspects of society to the exclusion of political and diplomatic history

The source materials drawn upon in the present study, as web my previous works, are varied and extensive, and have been ated in detail in my 1979 publication. Among the new unpublished sources that I have consulted for the present work are those diat I collected from the National Archives of India, in New Delhi. I also collected source materials from the India Offce Library and Records, in landon, (now part of the British Library Asia • Pacific and Africa Collections), and in the Royal Ministry of External Relations, in Kabul, where I was the only scholar to be given access to the files relating to the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. Among a number of omcial and un-official printed sources in Persian, mention should be made of volume three of Siro al-Tawarikh, (The Lnmp of Histories) and the works of Mohammad Yusuf Riyazi. As an offcial chronicle, the first covers in minute detail the first sixteen years of the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan while the second addresses the events of the period in a general way. These works I was unable to consult before.

An especially important and rare work not consulted previously is Royals and Royal Mendicmt by Sirdar Abdul Effendi (b. 1888), the eldest son of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan. Based on tamily archives it is a biographical account of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan and Amir Sher CAIi Khan, as well as that of the hero of Maiwand, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan. It is the first major book of its kind in which an educated prince describes events surrounding his fallen dynasty, and is noteworthy for the author's objectivity, and critical attitude. In his own words, "With these exposures I feel proud that I have got nothing hidden from the reader. I •sould never sacrifice truth for any consideration.'" I remain permanently grateful to Sardar Mohammad Yahya Effendi, a relation of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan and now a retired army offcer in Rawalpindi in Pakistan, for granting me a copy of it. Mention should also be made pf an unpublished pamphlet, Reminiscences: A Short History of an Era, 1869—1881 by Mahmud Tarzi (1865—1933) who was a grandson of a brother of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan As a patriotic poet, a prolific author, and a distinguished journalist and diplomat, Tarzi influenced his contemporary politicians and intellectuals, and as the minister of external in the reign of King Aman Allah Khan he played a leading role in state affairs. His account, although brief and sometimes unreliable contains some useful information and insights. I am grateful to Dr M. Ibrahim Majid Seraj, a grandson of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, for providing me with a copy of its English translation.

Sirdar M. A.

 1791—1947, Lon Hess, Lahore, year of print unhiown (1948?), 284. Efindi• was the eldest son Of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub and a gran&n Of Amir Sher •Ali.

One ,important work in English is IV'ar in Afghanistan. 1878—80, the Persona] Diary of Major General Sir Charles Metcalf MacGregor, published only recently (1985) with an introduction by Dr. William Trousdale. As the compiler Of the Gazetteer of Central Asia (a large part of which is devoted to Afghanistan) MacGregor, who served as the Chief of Staff of the British forces Kabul was well informed. His diary is in sharp contrast to the official statements and published reports of the British government officers of the era which were composed within strict limitations. Although clumsy in matters of diplomacy and hopeless in strategy and realpolitik, in all of whic' he mistakenly believed he excelled but he had, nonetheless, telli g insights into personalities and issues. "3 The diary complements official reports as well as Royals and Royal Mendicants. While the latter is a valuable source about the Mohammadzay rulers and princes and elders, MacGregor's diary is a valuable source with regard to their British counterparts in Kabul. I remain grateful to Dr. Trousdale for giving me a copy of this important work.

It is due to the excellence of source materials, both Afghan and non-Afghan, that this work meets the requirement of historiography. These materials are not only abundant but also highly reliable, given the complexity of human affairs and the limitations and fallibility of those who record them. The sources, as well as my specialist knowledge of the subject, have enabled me to give a balanced and proportionate account of the whole story. Now and then during the past thirty years or so I have revised and developed -as well as compresed the entire text of the original work, especially the chapter on the former Kafiristan. The Introduction is entirely new as is Chapter I as well as the following subsections: Waziristan, Bar Duarranays and Afghanistan, Maymana, Roshan and Shighnan, Wakhan, and International Significance of the Conquest of Kafiristan. Part Two, which deals exclusively with external relations, is likewise an entirely new addition as is the Conclusion.

3 Trousdale, W. Introduction, in MacGregor, War in Ughantstan, 1879—80, The Persmal Diar ofMajor Gneral Sir Charks, MetaCfe MacGregor, with an Introduction by Trousdale, W., Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1985, 68.

CHAVÆR ONE

THE REIGN OF AMIR SHER CALI KHAN

The Accession

After Arnir Dost Mohammad Khan, the founder of the Mohammadzay dynasty, died Of asthma on June 9, 1863 at the age Of seventy-two, his ambitious sons from among his twenty-seven sons and twenty— five daughters born of sixteen wives fought among themselves in a conflict that lasted intermittently for four years. During the 21 years of his second reign, which had begun in 1843, the amir had succeeded in reunifying the fragrnented country which stretched from the Oxus River to the plains of Peshawar mainly through statesmanship and strategy. From an early age, during the Sadozay rule (Or the Durranay Empire), he held high offcial posts along with his many brothers, most of whom alQ) served the dynasty.

Sadozay dynasty had been founded by Ahmad Shah Durtanay, who ruled from 1747 to 1773. Following the dynasty's fall, in 1818, Dost Mohammad Khan distinguished himself greatly in the ensuing struggle for power even though he was one of the youngest of his brothers, and born of a Sipahmansur Qizilbash mother, from a minority Turkoman ethnic group. Of the twenty-one sons of Sardar Payanda Khan, called the Barakzay or Mohammadzay sarchrs, it was the eldest, Wazir Fatih Khan, and one of the youngest, Sardar Dost Mohammad Khan, who played the most important roles in the downfall of the ruling Sadozay dynasty. While the forrner acted as a state minister (wazir) and promoted his brothers to high posts the latter finally grabbed the throne when the former had died. In 1826 Sardar Dost Mohammad became the governor of Kabul, and in 1834 he became amir. During this long period of civil he, along with his brothers, first overcame members• of the forrner dma.sty and aften.vard sidelined his own rival brothers. Some of his rival brothers had already died of natural causes. However, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan's fint reign did not last long as the British deported him to India in 1840, after they had invaded Afghanistan in 1838. During his second reign, which began in 1843, his many sors and grandsons helped him extend his authority throughout the country. Known as the great amir (amir-e-kabir), he died in Herat shortly after he ircorporated that province into his kingdom. Herat had been autonomous since 1818. 1

At the time of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan's death his third son, Sardar Sher             Khan held the position of heir—apparent (u,uli'ahd

The amir had designated him as such after the two heirs-designate— Sardar Mohammad Akbar Khan and Sardar Ghulam Haydar Khan had died one after the other in 1847 and 1859 respectively. Just before his own death the amir ". . . pulled himself together to don the turban [Of rulership] on the head of our hero, the "Lion or 'Ali"2 after which hc was called Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. On the subject of state power, however, Pashtun princes have seldom heeded the words of their dead fathers. It is alleged that even before the late amir was  buried the new amir's " . . youthful brother [Sardar Mohammad] Aslam intended to dispatch him [to the grave] with a pistol bullet, when the enlightened elder brother Sardar [Mohammad] ACzam prevented regicide. "3 However, the "enlightened elder brother" was among the first to raise the standard of rebellion.

 Civil War

Amir Sher Khan ruled in relative peace for two years with the exception of minor expeditions such as the one undertaken against Sardar Mohammad AC zam Khan, the governor of Zurmula (Zurmut) who was exiled to India. In 1864, the amir undertook the first major expedition against his eldest half- brother, Sardar Mohammad Afzal Khan, the governor of Turkcstan, who had refused to pay revenue and read the Friday sermon (khutba) in the amir's name. This was an open act of rebellion as reading khutba in the name of the reigning amir as well as payrng revenue was the obligation of a governor. The amir feared that he might claim the throne, since he was the ddest of their father's M)ns, and further, possessed an army of

I ETendi, Royals and Royal Madiant, 72. According to Fayz Mohammad, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan had 27 Sons and 25 daughters bom Of 16 wives. d-

Tazurh, vols. I and 2 one cover, Kabul, 1331 H.Q., 250. 2 Effendi, Royals and Royal Madwant, 81.

                                         I l

twenty-five thousand troops, and had ruled the important frontier region for almost ten years after it had been pacified in 1855. A former British offcer, William Campbell, re-christened Sher Mohammad, who had been taken prisoner in a battle that Dost Mohammad Khan had waged against Shah Shuja' east of Kandahar, in 1834, had helped Sardar Mohammad Afzal Khan in organizing his army. All of these events influenced Amir Sher CAIi Khan to reconcile himself with his rebellious brother after their armies had fought inconclusively in Bajgah, in June 1864.

However, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, the only son of Afzal Khan, worked against this arrangement because ' . he could not bring himself to see his father's legitimate right of succession the eldest son of Dost [Mohammad Khan] trampled.

V%ile [Sardar Mohammad] Afzal and the arnir were walking hand in hand in the shrine [of in Mazar] to endorse [the] peace, %4bd alRahman exposed his mala fide to arrest the king and shoot the crown prince (Sardar Mohammad (Ali Khan]. Sher was convinced that the father and the son had resolved to end the ruling house.5

The amir then seized his brother and took him to Kabul in custody, while the latter's son, Sardar CAbd al-Rahman, fearful for his life, had already escaped to Bukhara. In 1865 Amir Sher cAli Khan set out for Kandahar at the head of his army. At the time his younger full-brother, Sardar Mohammad Amin Khan, the governor of Kandahar, had rebelled, and, further, had occupied Kalat-e-Ghilzay. In the fighting that took place at Kajbaz in June 1865 the rebel governor, the crown prince, Sardar Mohammad 'Ali Khan, as well as many others were killed. The deaths were too much for the amir to bear, and losing all interest in world affairs he took refuge in the khirqa (the location of the reputed robe of the Prophet, Muhanmad) in Kandahar just as Shah Mahmud Hotak had become a recluse after his conquest of Persia, in 1722. Repeated pleas from offcials failed to move Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, and his opponents, led by Sardar Mohammad ACzam Khan and Sardar CAbd al-Rahman Khan, who had earlier fled to India and Bukhara respectively, proeeded toward Kabul and occupied it. They then helped the imprisoned

 Ibid., 84. 5 Ibid., 87.

Sardar Mohammad Afzal Khan become amir in Kabul, in Niay 1866. Only then did Amir Sher CAli Khan leave the khirqa and dedicate himself to organizing an army. In a short time he succeeded in doing so, but his army suffered defeats in Sayyedabad in May 1866, in Muqur in January' 1867, and in Panjsher in September 1867 by the armies of his opponents. In the battle of Sayyedabad alone "the belligerents sustained casualties to the tune of eight thousand warriors."6 If true, this was indeed an enormous toll. Amir Sher 'Ali Khan retreated to Herat, and Amir Mohammad Afzal Khan died in October 1867. The latter was succeeded by his full-brother, Amir Mohammad Nzam Khan. Shcr 'Ali Khan, still did not resign, but instead he doubled his efforts in regaining the lost throne. His son, Sardar Mohammad Yatqub Khan (b. 1849), and several of his full-nephews helped him in his endeavor. However, his efforts to march on Kabul via Balkh failed, and he returned to Herat and planned to recover Kabul by way of Kandahar.

The first successful step in this recovery was taken by Sardar Mohammad Yacqub Khan, who expelled from Kandahar the sons of Amir Mohammad Atzam Khan who ruled over it despotically. Sher 'Ali followed his triumphant son and proceeded from Kandahar toward Kabul, engaging Amir Mohammad ACzam Khan in a batde near Ghazni. It was at this time that a few sardars in Kabul, tired of Amir Mohammad ACzam Khan's tyranny, occupied the capital ciw for Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. Having lost the capital city and failed in overcoming their opponent in military engagements Amir Mohammad ACzam Khan and Sardar CAbd al-Rahman Khan left Afghanistan once again. A'zarn Khan died on the way to Tehran, and Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan took asylum in Samarqand where he as a Russian pensioner for eleven years. Sher 'Ali Khan entered Kabul on September 8, 1868 and began to rule as amir for the second time. 7

There were particular reasons why the sons and grandsons of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan fought among themselves. The amir had divided his kingdom among his sons, just as Timur Shah Durranay

6 Ibid., 92.

For the best account of the civil war, see Mawlawi Nur Ahmad Nuri, G'Lshane-Amaral, [The Garden of the Amirate], History Association, Kabul, 1334/1956. was a contemporary of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan.

had done earlier, and they, therefore, regarded themselves as autonomous rulers, subject only to their father. Each of these governors had his own military force, and the authority to collect taxes and send the surplus to Kabul after deducting his own expenses; and each ruled his prmince as he pleased, and consequently, each looked upon it as his own domain. Another serious problem was the lack of unity among Amir Dost Mohammad Khan's numerous sons, who were the progeny of many mothers of different ethnic background. Princes born of the same mother joined forces against their rival half-brothers, but sometimes even they fought against each other in disputes over inheritance and power.

The rivalries between those born of different mothers may be explained by the fact that full-brothers and half-brothers were brought up in different milieus under different tutors (talas). Also, in the competitive atmosphere of dynastic circles mothers in general, and cowives in particular, raised their sons with a view to making them manly, competitive, partisan, and contentious. Only with these qualities, as well as skill in horsemanship, was a prince able to compete effectively in the hard and unpredictable profession of politics. Rivalry was always present in the families of the sardars, among whom it 'c . . would start with the governors and pages and end up uöth their ladies." The rivalry and all that was connected with it 's. . . would then spread among the sardars and the sons of lesser nobles, resulting in ever growing feuds over power and inheritance. "8 However, competitiveness and rivalry were not confined to the families of the goveming sardars; they were characteristics of the Pashtuns among whom it was said that in the tribe you may not be without cousins, among cousins not without brothers, and among brothers not without sons. All this is due to the custom of åüburi or rivalry among paternal cousins that exists among them with force even to the present day.

The immediate causes of the civil war were personal. Sardar Mohammad Afzal and Sardar Mohammad ACzam felt that their father had wronged them by passing over them in the succession.

As the eldest sons of their father, they believed that it was their

  • Tarzi, M. Rerninicences, "A Short History of an Era, 1869—1881," Trans from Persian into English by Wahid Tarzi, Unpublished manuxript, 4.

"natural and legal rights'" to succeed him, one after the other. They felt especially wronged since as governors, they had proved themselves to be able administrators and soldiers, though not as able as Amir Sher CAIi had been. They were, however, the sons of a provincial Pashtun mother, whereas Amir Sher cAli Khan was the son of a Sadozay mother, connected to the inner dynastic circle. This is not to suggest that the mother of Amir Sher cAli Khan had directly influenced the great amir in his decision. It is said that "Amir Dost Mohammad Khan was too strong a character to be swayed by the gust of love for woman. "10 Besides, "Sher CAIi's mother was too ugly to appeal to a man with aesthetic taste. "ll But the great amir had

 . . stupendous regards for her" as she had been the mother of Wazir Mohammad Akbar Khan, the 'Liberator of Afghanistan. '12 By all accounts it was the astounding qualities of Sher CAM, which led his father away from the path of justice". 13 The unjust path, however, ". . . not only knocked the bottom out of his house, but opened a wide chasm in the fidelity and the faith of the people, which unfortunately still [as of 1948] endure[s] and emit[s] a nasty smell of a festering sore." 14 Thus, the death Of the great amir followed by a civil war as the death of Timur Shah Durranay (who had also shown a preference for his third son as his  had been.

During the civil war many other sardars also played roles, since, by custom, each commanded contingents of private soldiers, enjoyed rent-free lands, and received allowances in return for military services in times of emergency. Some of these sardars, who had been deprÅed by the amir of many of their privileges, entered the war, as did tribal and community elders. However, during the entire period of this struggle, the triumphant Mohammadzay sardars did not treat their fallen rivals brutally as some of the triumphant Sadozay princes had done earlier, Nor did they treat harshly the sardars who had changed sides and by doing so had contributed to the prolongation of the war. With the one exception of the execution of a

  • Efrndi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 84. 'o Ibid., 85. Ibid. 12 Ibid. '3 Ibid.

Ibid., 84.

non-Mohammadzay general, Mohammad Raff Ludin, they only imprisoned or expelled their fallen opponents. Among a people whose high politics were associated with violence this was indeed an achievement. This was perhaps because the Mohammadzay sardars viewed the war as a dynastic struggle, and they considered the punishment they inflicted on their fallen opponents to be fitting for disloyalty to a member of their own dynasty, rather than to a ruler representing heaven, the fatherland, the people, or the state,

The Reforms

The civil war in Afghanistan coincided with the gigantic stride of Russia in Central Asia, as a result of which it became coterminous with Afghanistan for the first time. (See Chapter Eleven). Understandably, Amir Sher %Ali Khan feared that Afghanistan would be probably Russia's next target. To forestall this danger, he thed to consolidate his government at home and gain the support of the British Government of India.

First, on November 12, 1868, he ordered the expulsion under guard of Sayyed Jamal al-Din Afghani (1830s—1897) via Kandahar and Quetta to India, in opposition to his own desire to proceed to the Russian-dominated Bukhara. As an instigator of the Muslim world determined to oppose the European domination of the Muslim countries and working for the revival of Islam, Afghani advocated the Pan-Islamic movement as well as the overthrow of the Muslim absolutist rulers. However, Amir Sher CAIi Khan charged that this person has an object of his own in view," and consequently considered his continued residence in Afghanistan "to be full of hazard to the country."

Afghani had entered Herat in 1866, and since October 1867 had lodged at the Bala Hissar in Kabul. There, as a leading member of Amir Mohammad A'zam Khan's Privy Council he advised him "to follow an anti-British course." Apparently, he also intended to advise the new amir to follow a similar line. In the words of his biographer, "1t is plausible that Jamal al-Din, who had already evinced a strong hostility to the British, was simply trying to marshal 111 the persuasive power he could to turn the amir to an anti-British policy." However, this much was known that in addition to being an Anglophobe he was also a Russophile, and in response to his desire

                                               CHAVI'E.R      

for the conclusion of an alliance between "the Russian and Afghan Governments" Amir Sher 'Ali Khan had bluntly told him that "I perfectly know my neighbors, and am well acquainted with the circumstances Of the Russian Government; your further residence in this country is contrary to my pleasure. 15

Second and more importantly, early in 1869 the amir visited India omcially, and held meetings in Ambala with the governor-general and viceroy, Lnrd Mayo, who received him well, but did not share his fear of Russia. However, he granted him weapons, and the latter, in addition, brought back with him ". . . many Indian [Muslim] artisans and retired non-commissioned offcers of the Indian Army" as vsell as "scores of workers to train his forces and trim his subjects."16 Thus, it is clear that the reforms the amir introduced began during his visit to India, which

. . . convinced him that a primitive Afghanistan will scarcely expect to be treated on terms of equality by the two powerful neighbors, Russia and England, nor will she remotely command recognition and respect abroad.

The amir would openly say that all people are advancing in the arts of peace and civilization. It is we Afghans who remain the ignorant asses we have always been.

The amir's reforms had many dimensions, and the military attracted most of his attention. According to Effendi the amir dedicated

  • Keddje, N., ad-Dim "al-Ughani", a-4 Political Biography, University Of Califomia Press, Berkeley, Inndon, 1972, 37, 58. Roy Mottahedeh has characterized the great instigator of the Muslim world in the following words: "He had a madrasah education both in Iran and Iraq. He also acquired training in ser-fan from an Iranian teacher and himself wrote a trcatise on Islamic mysticism. From then on he shifted from country to country and role to role in an attempt to revive Islam as a political force. At the court of the Ottoman emperor, the Egyptian khedive, in exile in Paris or British India Or czarist Russia he proved a tireless and fearless adopter Of roles and philosophies, to many of which he proved inconstant: he was at various times a Scottish freemason, a defender of Islam against European materialism, an advocate of parliamentary government within Islam, and an admirer of the messianic politics of the mahdi of the Sudan." The Mantle ofthe B@htt, Rtl*ion and Po&ics in Iran, Pantheon Books, New York, 1985, 183.
  • Effendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 130. Ghobar, Mir Ghu]am Afohammad,

Afghanistan Dar WfzsiT-e-TariM [Ughanistan along the H&hway of Histoy, or A

Histor 'f4Vuzniftan], Kabul, 1967, 596. For a description of the workshops in Kabul where weapons were made in the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan see Kakar, Goverrment and Society in Afghanistan, 193—194.

  • F"ndi, Rya-Is Madiant, 130. , 129.

his life and soul" to the military and viewed it as a '•private religion". 19 Toward the end of his decade-long reign the amir had organized a large regular army. Thus, he became the first Afghan ruler to do so, while his predecessors had relied mainly on irregular army and the notables of the land. Based on the British model, the regular arn•y of 56,173 troops was grouped into 42 regiments of cavalry, 73 Of infantry, and 48 batteries.20 The British Supreme Commander, General Frederick Roberts, reporting from Kabul in 1879, stated the following:

Before the outbreak of hostilities last year [1878] the amir had raised and equipped with arms of precision, 68 regiments of infantry and 16 Of cavalry. The Afghan artillery amounted to nearly 300 guns. Numbers of skilled artisans were constantly employed in the manufacture of rifled Cannon and breach-loading small guns. More than a million pound of powder and, I believe, several million rounds of homemade snider ammunition, were in the Bala Hissar. Swords, helmets, uniforms and other articles of military equipment were stored in proportionate quantities. "21

The amir had turned Kabul into a military city where c'. . . shouts, marches and trumpets were heard everywhere. "22

Amir Sher CAIi also attempted to popularize the army by inducIng royal princes to serve it. He s'. . . enlisted Crown Prince 'Abd Allah to don the apron of a shoe-maker, while his favorite grandson Ahmad 'Ali would discharge his duty with a pair of scissors to be a good cutter of the soldiers uniforms."Z3 The amir would admonish the royal clan of the Mohammadzays to take to martial

Ibid., 135.

  • Figures on the army of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan are many and at variance with each other. Those noted by J. Lambert are probably accurate, because he had compilcd them from the offcial pay rolls in Kabul whcn the British had occupied it in 1879. These I have cited in the text. Lambert, J. "Statement of the Revemue and Expenditure of Afghanistan, 1877—78," Pros. 1 886, Nos. 161—166, 1886,Forcign Departrnent, Secret-F, National Archives of India, New Delhi (Henceforth, NAI). Mahmud Tarzi's figures also tally with them when he states that . . the arny was organized into about 80 battalions of 800 soldiers," Reminiscences, 7.
  • Roberts F., (from Kabul), to Alfred C. Lyall, Secretary to the Goverrment Of

India, 22 Nov. 1879, Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures Receved (in London) from India, (Henceforth PSI-I), vol. 23, p, 1579. India Offce Library,

London. Effendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 139.

  • Tarzi, Reminiscences, 7.
  • Effendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 137.

life and hard work, while to the aristocracy to cut off from ease and see hearth and home well protected".[1]3a However, the Mohammadzays and the aristocracy showed little interest in the military service.

In order to train in the science of war, the amir set up a military academy where mathematics, geography, map- reading and strategy were taught. The manuals of instruction were translated into Pashto in which words of command and military tides, as well as decrees were also issued. These words of command are still in use. Lingual reform became necessary as the Pashto—speaking Ghilzays and Wardaks, and their notables dominated the army, and held high civil and military posts. The amir regarded Persian as "borrowed feathers", and therefore felt that it was necessary to replace it with Pashto, the language of the overvvhelming majority.

During this period, the large tract of Pashtun land up to Peshawar was still a part of Afghanistan. According to Effendi, "Soon the grateful monarch found himself in a position to claim Pashto, to bc the national language of his countrymen."24 The reform was well received, since the Pashtuns constituted the great majority of the population, members of the dynasty still spoke Pashto, and the Persian-dominatcd bureaucracy was only limited. QAZi %Abd al-Qadir (Yusufzay), known as Qazi Wro, whom the amir had brought with him from Peshawar assisted him in his reforms. A competent tradesman, wellversed in Pashto, English, Urdu and Persian and privy to the innermost circle of the Afghan court, Qazi Qadiro "would always point out the path of progress to his powerful master." Through his devotion and skill he "had so won his master's mind that he sat safe against attackers. 'V2S In 1876 The Qazi had even supervised the enumcration of the residents of the city of Kabul, which then had a population of 140,700 men and women. To author Abdul Q9dir Effendi, Qazi Qadiro was "a genius." Contrary to the assertion Of some scholars it was not Jamal al-Din Afghani, but who had advised the amir to introduce the reforms.

Military service was for life on a voluntary basis26 and soldiers were paid in cash instead of by drafts (barat) which had been the

Ibid.

practice previously.27 The military expcnditurc strained thc cconomy, since out of the yearly income Of over thirteen million Kabuli rupccs over five-and-a-half million (or nearly forty-three percent) were event on the army2H The military expenses madc it neccssary for thc amir to revamp the system of taxation.

Information on the overall system of taxation is not available. However, reports on certain districts indicate that the revenuc on land was assessed either on the basis of se-kol [one-third] or jam' bitst [assessment on a tribal communi5']. Under the former system, thc government took one-third of the produce, and this was usually farmed out, while under the latter a fixed lighter amount Was assessed. Thc rate of revcnuc on the statc land (khalisa) was, of course, highcr. r• For rcvenuc purposes, districts were classified on ethnic lines. Various other types of taxes were also imposed, as was the custom duty of' two-and-a half percent on the original price of merchandises. Further, occasionally additional taxes were also levied. In 1878, when the amir believed that Afghanistan was threatened by foreign powers, he levied four Kabuli rupees on cach male to strengthen the army. This led to general  and eroded the good will that the amir had caused to generate when he had abolished payment of land revenue by landowners and various other types of taxes collected three months in advance of the actual produce taken from the land.31

Meanwhile, the amir took some austerity measures, and even decreased the allowances of the royal household including those of his wives so that "every. penny saved would go to strengthen thc country's defense, which was that patriotic sovereign's one and only desire."32 Through this and othei measures the budget, which was in deficit in the first years of the amir's rule" remained in urplus towards the closing years of his reign." State revenue was then

  • n Sykes, Sir Percy, A of I-ondon, 2, 78. Ghobar, 594.

28 Lambert, %tatement of the Revenue," 7.

  • B Hastings, Major, "A Short Account of thc Ghazni 4, PSLI, 26, Pt. 3, 358.

       Fayz Mohammad,        al-Tauu'W1, Hutorwl, Kabul, vol 3, 339.

Nuri, (hdshan-t-Amaral, 186.

Effendi, Royals and Royal A-fadia_nl, 134.

Fayz Mohammad, Sir•  336.

34 Iamtrrt, "Statement of Rcvcnuc," 7. Ihc total surplus the year 1877-78 was I Kabuli rupees.

increased by over five million Kabuli rupees from the annual total at the end of the reign of Amir Dost NIohAmmad Khan. In thc latter•s reign state revenue was eight rHllion Kabuli rupees.

Amir Sher C AIi Khan also emisaged opening a naval base to deliver the country from isolation and lay the ground fv prosperity:

He made neither a mistake nor a secret of his cherished ambition to have Gawadir, the forlom harbor of southern Baluchistan, on the entrance to the Persian Gulf, for a naval base, where-from his strong, small but smart navy should proudly emerge. to show his royal standard of the head of the Bengal tiger, on a crimson background, to all countries and al] climes.Ni

At the time Baluchistan was a part of Afghanistan.

The amir also introduced administrative reforms by setting up a twelve-member state council composed of civic leaders and military offcers, whom he himself selected.37 After Ahmad Shah Durranay, Amir Sher cAli was the first Afghan ruler to do so, but his council was only consultative. Additionally, although the council was devised to be permanent38 toward the latter years of his reign it was not heard of. Instead, the amir acted in consultation with a few trusted advisers from the royal court and the branch of government the latter of which he had enlarged in 1873 on the occasion of the festivities that were held that year in honor of the official nomination of his younger son, Sardar 'Abd Allah Jan, as heir apparent.

Also on the occasion of the offcial nomination, Amir Sher 'Ali pronuied offcials to ministerial positions with prestigious titles, in Pashto Nur Mohammad Shah Foshanji as loy mukhtar (prime minister), Asmat Allah Khan Ghilzay as loy mayan de ghro mulk (minister of home affairs), Aersala Khan Ghilzay as loy mayan de baunday (minister of foreign affairs), Habib Allah Khan Wardak as loy mulk (minister of finance), Hussayn 'Ali Khan as tol mishr (minister of war), Ahmad 'Ali Khan Timuri as loy tolawunay (minister of treasury), and Mohammad Hassan Khan (Qizilbash) as loy kishil (chief secretary to the amir). The amir adopted the title of Assistant to the Religion (Mdin "I-Din) for himself.39 No one from the royal dynasty was made

's Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-tTtarikh, 575.

  • Effendi, Royals and Royal Mendüant, 135.
  • Nun, Gulshan-e-Amarat, 186.
  • Ghobar, Ughaniskm Dar Masir-e-TaÅkh, 595.
  • Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi e [Events Observed] in Kglhyat-e-Rbazi (in Persian) [ne

a member of the ministerial cabinet, and the amir gave full %right to the principle of personal qualification. The standing army enabled him to do so as it freed him from traditional dependence on the Alohammadzay sardars as well as the magnates. The system worked, and during the critical days before and after the amir's death some of these officials, especially Prime Minister Nur Mohammad Khan Foshanji and Mustaufi Habib Allah Wardak, distinguished themselves-40

Out of "expediency" the amir did not abolish polygamy, but he would exercise his full powers, to secure her [widow] the freedom of [re] marriage and the guardianship of her brood [sic] from her deceased husband. . , . Polygamy had made I-Te intolerable to the pa.rties concerned, and would cultivate antagonism from generation to generation. "0

Also, out of "expediency" the amir did nothing to abolish slavery even though both men and women "would be bought and sold like so many chattels, to perform [domestic duties] and labor under shocking conditions." In particular, "The slave-girls would satiate the lust of their masters, to be mercilessly punished by their jealous mistresses. "42 However, slavery was practiced on a small scale in Afghanistan.

Other measures included the establishment of postal services, the building of the Sherpur (also Sher Abad) cantonmept, and the setting up of a lithographic printing press in which Shams al-Nahar, the first official periodical in Afghanistan, was published. Coins were issued bearing the verses: "By the favor of the Eternal Creator, the money of Sher 'Ali has found circulation", and 'Through the abundant kindness of the Beneficent King of Heaven, Amir Sher 'Ali coined money like the bright, full rhoon."43 Previously, coins bore the names of rulers with anonymous titles such as sahib-e-zaman (lord of the age) or Sahib-e-mulk (lord of the land). Also, important was the use of the word "Afghan" on his coins.44 Additionally, for the first

Collected Works Of RiyazO, Mashhad, 1904, 173. Ghobar, Afghanistan Lkr e-TaHkh, 595. Rishtia, Ughanistan Dar @m-e-Nuzdah [Afghanistan in the Nineteenth Century] 273.

40 Riyazi, al-Waqgyzt, 173. Ghobar, Ughanistan Dar  595. Fayz Mohammad, al-Tauuikh, 332.

Effendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 133. 42 Ibid

 Gulzad, Zalmay A, B&rnal and he mvelopmeni of åe ,4fgh.an _Mnetænth Century, Peter Lang, New York, San Fransisco, 1994, 70. 44 Ibid.

time the government opened a school along with a military academy. The schools were, or course, in addition to the madrasas (traditional seminaries) which had existed in Afghanistan since the time Of Emperor Sultan Xlahmud Of Ghazna, in the eleventh century.

lien after it had been reformed the government was still unable to rule directly over the entire country. It controlled only cities, towns and their dependencies as well as those areas where contingents of troops were stationed. Tribal communities, especially those of the frontier regions, remained self-administered as before, and their affairs werc settled by elders mainly through jirgas in accord with the Sharita and Pashtunwadi (Pashtun code Of behavior). In cases in which disputes between individuals and tribes were unsettled the conflicting parties often resorted to violence. Thus, in these rural autonomous comrnunities anarchy and order co-existed, and the government intervened only when general order was disrupted.

In the new state that emerged from these reforms the most important force was the amir himself. History, social conventions and Islam sanctioned allegiance to him, but the ties between him and his subjects were still personal in character rather than institutional. Thus, allegiance to his •successor was not automatically transferred; rather, the successor had to command it, and the moment the reigning amir disappeared for whatever reason, powerful forces were ready to assert themselves. Among these forces, personal ambition was the most important, while the forces of regionalism and tribalism were still strong against which centralism and modernism had begun to operate on a large scale for the first time. As previously noted, the most important instrument of power in the hands of the government was the army. However, the army itself was organized along tribal and regional lines. Even cistlicts were organized in this way. Likewise names which referred to region and ethnicity such as Kandaharay, Heratay, Tajik, Wardak and so forth, were %idespread and emotionally charged.

Amir Sher 'Ali Khan was the first Afghan ruler to organize (or reorganize) the state or more specifically the government along relatively modern lines. He started an extremely important movement, which his successors strengthened. It is then fitting to describe him an enlightened and a visionary ruler, and dso relate him to the 'beginnings of a new Afghanistan", as some historians have done."

  • s Gregorian, Vartan, Stanford University Pres. 1968, 93.

:ALJ

The Sons against 'he Father

Despitc his successful reforms' Amir Sher 'Ali experienced serious problems with his two eldest sons: Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub Khan (b. 1849) and Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan (b. 1858): As previously noted, in 1873, the amir nominated his minor son, Sardar 'Abd Allah Jan (b. 1866) as heir-apparent in a grand ceremony. By doing so, he provoked his eldest sons, and demonstrated that he was unable to run his family affairs smoothly.

Amir Sher CAIi's troubles have been traced -to his unequal treatment of his wives, and the recalcitrance of Sardar Mohammad Yazqub Khan. The amir favored the mother of the heir apparent to the mother of Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub Khan, and he had proviied the former with five hundred Kabuli rupees a month as allowance, while the same amount was provided for the latter for the whole year "because of the rebellions of her sons."" However, Effendi states that his grandfather was a S'misogynist" and that the reason he bypassed his eldest son was due to his 'Svindictiveness." However, whilc the amir may have been a "misogynist" as Effendi claims he was still open to the influence of the mother of heir-apparent. This may have been due to the fact that she was a woman of the dynasty, whereas Qamar Jan, the mother of Sardar Mohsammad Ya'qub and Sardar Mohammad Ayyub, was the daughter of Saiadat Khan, the Khan of the frontier tribe of Mohmand.

Further, Effehdi also states that in Herat Ya'qub Khari had accorded a "rude reception [to] his fugitive father", and that later in Kabul he had associated himself with a party, known as "Yakubzais", which had, for its purpose, the unseating of his father. He describes the situation thus:

A party hostile to the amir for their [sic] ends, was secretly forming under the intriguer Bahadur Khan Kabuli, with the grandiose tide Of Yakubzais. Bahadur had earrnarked premiership with dictatorial pov•fr ers for himself while his lieutenant Shahpisand Khan Barakzai was appeased to be the commander-in-chief Of the Afghan army. Yakub was to be a mere puppet while Shere Ali had either to end [his] days as a blind prisoner in jail or be banished from hearth and hone.""

+6 Effendi, Royals and Royal •MendeanLs, 134.  Ibid., 107.

'I'he intrigue surfaced when Sardar -Mohammad Ya'qub Khan "set ow for rebellion at the head of six thousand irregular horse", warning his father with a bluff that "he would raise piles of skulls of the dead if he was pursued" while he was on his way to Herat of which prmincc he took control after some vicissitudes."

Surprisingly, after his brother, Mohammad Ayyub joined him in Herat, Nlohammad Ya'qub Khan reappeared in Kabul and sought a pardon, which his father granted him and sent him back to his post in Herat. The amir, thus, pardoned him, but had lost hope in him to succeed him. In 1873, the amir bypßsed• him as well as his full-brother, and nominated his seven-year-old son, Sardar 'Abd Allah Jan, as his heir—apparent (wali'ahd). According to Effendi, "Yakub again kicked his traces", but the amir "immediately summoned [him] to account for his misdeeds, which had become too much to tolerate, "49 On the condition that he would not be "molested" which the amir apparently granted, Mohammad Ya'qub Khan appeared before his father yet again, but this time he was detained "in solitary confinement in the rdyal palace. "50 The amir did so because he also suspected him of making "Herat an independent principality under the protection Of Persia. "51 Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan fled to Mashhad in Persia. Thus, the amir got rid of his troublesome sons, but he also deprived himself as well as the country of the services of the most able and dynamic members of his house.

" Ibid, 108. 49 Ibid., 112.  ibid.

160

CHAPTER •nvo

THE BRITISH AFC,HXX WAR AND THE ACCESSION OF AMIR 'ABD AL-RAHMAN KHAN

Prelude to I Var

After Lord Edward Robert L B. Lytton assumed power as governor-general and viceroy in India, in 1876, Indo-Afghan relations worsened. Lord Lytton came to India with explicit instructions to deal with Afghanistan in line Mith the aims of the 'Forward Policy' that will soon be described. In India "Lytton won the grudging support of his Council and set in motion a diplomatic policy toward the Amir Sher CAIi [which] he knew could only culminate in the Indian army's advance into Afghan territory. "l This subject has been described in Chapter Ten. In order to obviate the assumed Russian advance on India via Afghanistan, Lord Lytton formulated a policy the purpose of which was to establish actual control over Afghanistan. This required a military advancc on Afghanistan similar to thc one that his rcmote predecessor, Lord Auckland, had undertaken forty years earlicr. As a result of that invasion the British had lost almost an entire army, but Lord Lytton was not deterred by that defeat. Instead, he made a strenuous effort to implement the new Forward Policy the advocates of which

. belie•.ed not only that England had no choice but to meet this Russian challenge, but that there was an implicit obligation in the Administration Of the Indian subcontinent to extend that form of government to the numerous fragmented tribal groups who would be the ultimate beneficiaries of European values and civilization.

In reality, the notion of the importation of "European values and civilization" was a screen for expansion and domination. Afghanistan had a history that extended back thousands of years, and the country

I Trousdale, W., Introduction, in War in Afghanistan, 49. This topic is discussed in

Chapter Ten.

       2                             48.

already possessed a rich culture, including the attributes of Islamic ciGlization. Further, under Amir Sher %Ali Khan a central government had been* instituted on modern lines. (See Chapter One). As William Trousdale states:

For most of the Forward Policy believers, the Scientific Frontier was a tempocary screen for their real aim. If the [British] government would support annexation Of the southem half of Afghanistan [Kandahar and Herat] it would in timc tolerate annexation of the whole.3

To reach this goal, Lytton took certain steps, among them, the occupation of the city of Quetta, as part of a treaty, which India concluded with the Khan of Qalat in Baluchistan, a feudatory of Afghanistan, in 1876. The viceroy was vvilling to conclude an offensive and defensive treaty with Amir Sher Ali Khan, provided he placed his external relations under him, and accepted British offcers stationed around the frontiers of his country. In return, Lytton was willing to offcially recognize the young heir-designate, CAbd Allah Jan, and thus ensure the amir's dynastic rule. Since Lytton's proposal was meant to turn the independent country of Afghanistan into the protectorate of the British, whom the Afghans considered "infidels", the amir did not accept the proposal, and a stalemate prevailed over Indo-Afghan. relations.

At this juncture General Constantine P. von Kauffmann, Russia's governor-general in Tashkand, forced a mission Of his own, under the command of General Stolietoff on the amir. After its arrival in Kabul in the summer of 1878, the mission was said to have concluded a defensive and offensive treaty with him. However, the real purpose of the mission was for Russia to embroil the British in Afghanistan, so hoping that the latter would recall the Indian troops that they had sent to Malta in support of the Ottomans, with whom Russia was then at war.

The Second Anglo-Afghan War

The Kaufmann scheme succeeded, and this provided an excuse for Lytton to force his own mission under Neville Chamberlain. However, when the Afghans blocked the mission's entry at the Khyber Pass,

         3                          49

                                                  THE BRITISH AFGHAN WAR                                          27

he declared war on Afghanistan, on November 21, 1878. The Second British War with Afghanistan began as simple as that. Three columns of the British army overran some frontier cities and districts on their way to Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad in the first phase of the Second British Afghan War or the Second Afghan War, as the British sources describe it.'

Amir Sher 'Ali Khan did not opt to fight the invaders with his own army, telling his people "1 am leaving in order to unite with the Russians and acquire financial and military assistance so that I may return to avenge myself." He also said that "The British have not accepted our right to freedom and independence, and want us in captivity. "5 After touring the city, and while he had already sent "the families, luggage and the multitudes of soldiers" he left for Mazar in the north of the country to seek the help of Russia. Surprisingly, Kauffnann refused to extend Russia's assistance, instead advising the amir to come to terms with the British, and even refused him entry into his domain. Russia had duped Amir Sher cAli Khan. He remained in Mazar where because of c'. . . his chronic ailments of gout and tuberculosis, which for years had obliged him to move around in his special litter, suddenly recurred with such severity that" he died on February 21, 1879.6

Before his departure for Mazar Amir Sher 'Ali Khan had, as requested by the courtiers, released Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub Khan from prison arid introduced him to a specially convened darbar (court) 'Cin regal uniforrn as regent." The young heir-designate, %Abd Allah

Jan, had already died. Following Amir Sher 'Ali Khan's death, Mohammad Ya'qub Khan became amir, in Kabul. However, he was no longer the enterprising man that he had been. His imprisnment (1874—1878) had taken its toll and he had become "all pale with poor eyesight and no strength to walk straight."7 Additionally, he had dynasdc rivals, each of whom had a faction of his own. Weakened

Among the many books dealing with the Second Anglo-Afghan War those that describe it in detail are Kakar, M. H., Jag-e-Dotoom afghan-Egli$, (Penian) [77u  Wc], The Nadonal Islamic Front Of Afghanistan, Peshawar, 1989. Forbes, A, Tie "han Wars, I-andon, 1892. Hanna, H. B. The '(than War, 1878-79, 3 vols. Imdon, 1899-1910. Hensrnan, H., wr 41879-80, London, 1881.

  • Tarzi, Remini_rences, 6.
  • Ibid

Kakar, lave-mt.om-t-4fghan-Englis, 41.

by imprisonment, and also fearing that his rivals would outbid him in dealing the British, he accepted the advice of his "pro-British" companions who "would say to him that it is all over; you must surrender to the British so that at least, as the amir, you may continue in luxury and succcss."8 He then accepted Lytton's demands by concluding a treaty with Major Pierre Louis N. Cavagnari, an envoy of the British government of India, on May 26, 1879.

The treaty was concluded in a British military camp in the Safed Sang village in Gandumak, in eastern Afghanistan, where the last troops of the British army retreating from Kabul had perished, in 1842. Its main points were the control of Afghanistan's external relations by the British, and the stationing of British officers in Afghanistan. The British were also to control the Khyber Pass and Michni Pass, and, for only administrative purposes, British India, was assigned the populous districts of Kurma (Kurram), Pishin and Sibi. All of these concesions were made in return for British support against foreign aggression on Afghanistan, plus a small subsidy and a promise of non-interference in the internal affairs of thc country.

Since the treaty had made the 'infidels' preponderant in Afghanistan and transformed the country's ruler into their vassal, it was bound to turn most Afghans against it even though there were some who ''[i]n their sectarianism, preferred non-Muslims to' Sunnis." They were mostly the Shifi Qizilbzshes, who lived in Chindawal, a distinct quarter in the city, protected by strong walls and a moat.9 This explains why the amir did not •make the treaty public, and why he disclosed its contents to only a few Of his courtiers. The author D. P. Singhal, in his book, India and Ughanistan, 1876—1907, states that the aim of the treaty was to reduce Afghanistan into principalities. This does not seem •to be the case, since the treaty had no provision by which to split Afghanistan. Actually, Lytton intended to rule Afghanistan through the amir as he hoped that his power would gradually be transferred to the British envoy. "Il In this way, the country was

  • Tarzi, Reminiscences, 7.
  • Ibid, 11.
  • Singh], D. P. India #ani.stan, 1876—1907, A                        in Diploma-tx

The Univcrsity of Queensland Press, Australia, 1971, 46. Based mainly on omcial records of the British Government of India, this is a specialized and highly mendable book. It covers the external relations of Afghanistan during the reigns of Amir Shel 'Ali Khan and Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. l ' Ibid., 49.

28

by imprisonment, and also fearing that his rivals would outbid him in dealing the British, he accepted the advice of his "pro-British" companions who "would say to him that it is all over; you must surrender to the British so that at least, as the amir, you may continue in luxury and succcss."8 He then accepted Lytton's demands by concluding a treaty with Major Pierre Louis N. Cavagnari, an envoy of the British government of India, on May 26, 1879.

The treaty was concluded in a British military camp in the Safed Sang village in Gandumak, in eastern Afghanistan, where the last troops of the British army retreating from Kabul had perished, in 1842. Its main points were the control of Afghanistan's external relations by the British, and the stationing of British officers in Afghanistan. The British were also to control the Khyber Pass and Michni Pass, and, for only administrative purposes, British India, was assigned the populous districts of Kurma (Kurram), Pishin and Sibi. All of these concesions were made in return for British support against foreign aggression on Afghanistan, plus a small subsidy and a promise of non-interference in the internal affairs of thc country.

Since the treaty had made the 'infidels' preponderant in Afghanistan and transformed the country's ruler into their vassal, it was bound to turn most Afghans against it even though there were some who ''[i]n their sectarianism, preferred non-Muslims to' Sunnis." They were mostly the Shifi Qizilbzshes, who lived in Chindawal, a distinct quarter in the city, protected by strong walls and a moat.9 This explains why the amir did not •make the treaty public, and why he disclosed its contents to only a few Of his courtiers. The author D. P. Singhal, in his book, India and Ughanistan, 1876—1907, states that the aim of the treaty was to reduce Afghanistan into principalities. This does not seem •to be the case, since the treaty had no provision by which to split Afghanistan. Actually, Lytton intended to rule Afghanistan through the amir as he hoped that his power would gradually be transferred to the British envoy. "Il In this way, the country was

  • Tarzi, Reminiscences, 7.
  • Ibid, 11.
  • Singh], D. P. India #ani.stan, 1876—1907, A                        in Diploma-tx

The Univcrsity of Queensland Press, Australia, 1971, 46. Based mainly on omcial records of the British Government of India, this is a specialized and highly mendable book. It covers the external relations of Afghanistan during the reigns of Amir Shel 'Ali Khan and Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. l ' Ibid., 49.

war. They occupied the city of Kabul in early October after Afghan warriors unsuccessfully resisted them in Char Asia. Fearing humiliation in front of his rivals for his failure to save his British allies, the amir was said to have offered his resignation to General Frederick Roberts, Supreme Commander of the occupying forces in Kabul." Later in India, Ya'qub Khan claimed that he had been unjustly forced to resign, and that Britain had no right to force him to do so. 15 While it is true that the British did not have the right to force the amir to resign, they had the might to do so. At first they kept the amir in custody pending a decision on his fate, but it was soon clear that he had become a prisoner. As Sir Charles M. MacGregor, Chief of Staff of the British forces in Kabul, notes in his War in Ughanistan, 1879—80 "Had meant to examine thc amir tomorrow, but Bobs [Roberts] said we had better not awhile, as he might look as if he was a prisoner, which he Further, the amir himself  . complained of having been made a prisoner and being badly treated "17 The British also detained some senior offcials except for General Dawud Shah, the Commander-in-Chief, who tried to save the lives of the British.

On October 12th, Roberts held a public darbar in Kabul. There, in the presence of some pro-British Mohammadzay sardars, he proclaimed that, as the chief civil and military administrator, he had appointed Major General Sir James Hill-Jones as the military governor of Kabul, and a few sardars as governors of provinces. Among them were Sardar Wali Mohammad Khan and Sardar Mohammad Hassan Khan, who were proclaimed as the governors of Turkestan and Maidan respectively. Both were brothers of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan.

-me takeover of the government and the brutal punishment of those who had been implicated or assumed to be involved in the destruction of the embassy created the impression that the British intended to stay in Afghanistan, and rule the country. While there

14 According to Riyazi, Roberts imprisoned Mohammad Yacqub Khan, and comrlled him to resign. gyn al-Waqyie, 188.

 Kakar, jag-e-Lhuom-e-4&-Eglis, 76.

  • MacGregor, Way
  • Roberts, F., Siah Sang, Kabul, 9 Oct. 1879, 9 (909), Diqatche frm•n the

Government of India Containing a Statement Of the Cases Tried before the Military Commision, I.ondon, 1880

is no official policy pronouncement to confirm this, the British officials in Kabul behaved as if it was actually the case. MacGregor for one is explicit about it in the following passage,

. under the present juncture of affairs, the thing to do is to say to the Afghans. You shall give in, you have killed Cavi[gnari], and his 100 men, but we are sending another representative with 10,000 men, and he shall stay there whether you like it or not. We wish one thing from you, and that is friendship, but whether we get this Or not, we will have your obedience, you may chafe as much as you please, but we will be your masters, and you will find that the only escape from our heavy hand will be your entire submission. lB

Next, Roberts arranged for the execution of those had been implicated or assumed implicated in the destruction Of the embassy. In his own words: "Every soldier and civilian who took part in the massacre of the British Embassy on the 3rd of September last will be executed."19 It was, of course, impossible for him to execute all of those who had participated in the massacre, but about those who were apprehended he gave an order that the prisoners were to be tried and hung. "Z0 The word "hung" indicates that Roberts had already decided to hang all those who were caught whether tried or not. This and other similar actions led MacGregor to conclude that Bob is the most bloodthirsty beast I know."21 Roberts' order made the political commission that had been set up to determine who had taken part in the massacre almost meaningless. However, some offcials, including MacGregor, saved the lives of a few Afghans who would otherwise have been.

AS an alien •non-Muslim military' despot, Roberts had a logic of his own which was to employ force in order to intimidate the Afghans into submission and also to inflict revenge. Even as early as Scptcmbcr 14th, which was about a month before his arrival in Kabul, he had decided to do so. At that time, writing from Ali Khel to General Baker, he stated the following:

Until we have proof that any soldiers actively befriended the Embassy, we must consider all as belonging to the one lot, and, get rid Of them,

         MacGregor,        in A*anistan, 77.

19 Roberts, Siah Sang, Kabul, 9 Oct 1879, 9 (909), Dispatches from the Covemment of India containing a Statement of the Cases Tried before the Military Commision, London, 1880.

 MacGregor, War in 4Éhanisun, I I I. n Ibid.

-rvvo

whether their regiments were in Kabul or not—for soldiers caught ',v.th arms in the field trial is unnecessary. A bullet will do if you are pressed for time otherwise hanging, qhich does not waste ammunition.

This was why, according to Trousdale the 's . . . vengeful hangings at Kabul were far more indiscriminate than Roberts cared to admit." Also, MacGregor knew that innocent and guilty alike were hanged in that autumn of retribution, that the military tribunal was a sham. "23 He also states that he "[flound that men were being simply murdered under name ofjustice," 24 and that Roberts has shot some 6 men alrtady in cold blood." Further, MacGregor states that "1 have saved three fron his clutches already. "25 According to an omcial report, eightynine suspected persons, including Mohammad Aslam Khan, chief of the security forces Kabul Kotwal), and those who had shot some Qizilbashes for their cooperation with the British were hanged. 26 But Hayat Khan, an Indian Muslim member of the commission, has been quoted as saying that 1 70 men were hung and that 70 of them y«ere for fighting against us.

It appears that Roberts resorted to brutal punishment because, according to MacGregor, as a 'favorite of fortune" he s' was like an activeflea, and jumped whichever way the Viceroy ordered. "28 Lytton had instructed him that

[f]or such a crime the whole Afghan nation should be held responsible, and that the punishment for such an act should be inflicted not only on the Afghan nation, but also on every individual who had taken part in the event. 29

While it appears that Roberts was simply carrymg out the Instructions of his superior, in reality he himself held a similar view even before he received Lytton's instructions: Lytton's instructions were datcd September 29th, while Roberts had already—made up his mind about the punishment by September 14th, as previously noted.

n Roberls quoted in MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, n.' 167.

23 Trousdale, Introduction in War in .'@hanistan, 60. 24 MacGregor, War in Ughanistam, 1 12. Ibid., 101.

'x Robert, Siah Sang, Kabul, 9 Oct. 1879. 5 (905), Di9atches from the Govemment of India Containing a of the Cases Tried before the Military Commission, London, 1880.

27 MacGregor, War Ughanistan, 192. a Ibid., 171.

29 Kakar, jang-e-Dowom-e-Åfghan-Engäs, 79.

The instructions strengthened him still further in his resolve, since hc then committcd excesses in affecting the killing of so many Afghans that of this outraged the liberal press in India, as yell as England. Fredrick Harrison argued that the punishments were illegal and unlawful for the simple rcason that people can not be considercd guilty for defending their country.•u) The public in Britain was also outraged and this in part contributed to the defeat of the government in the general election that was held later, in April 1880.

The executions were followed by the deportation to India of the amir, and his principal ad\isers, among them Sardar Yahya Khan (the amir's father-in-law), Shah Mohammad Khan, Minister of External Affairs; and Sardar Zakria Khan. Only Mustaufi Habib Allah Wardak (b. 1828), the minister of financial affairs was not deported, but was left in Kabul because the authority needed his skills in administrative and financial affairs. In addition, in Kabul, the family of the deported amir was placed under house arrest. Also, MacGregor "[g]ot orders out for the occupation of the Sherpur Cantonment and the destruction of the Bala Hisar. "ll

The Bala Hissar citadel, which was the seat of Afghan rulers after 1 776, had been the scene of an explosion in which some Gorkha soldiers were killed on October 16th. Afterward, the British destroyed it because Cavagnari and others had been massacred there, and because MacGregor believed that it would be difficult to guard after the army moved to the Sherpur Cantonment. The well-cultivated Cantonment had water ducts running through it, large halls, broad verandas, and substantial gateways, and it could accommodate over twenty thousand men. 32 The destruction of the Bala Hissar, which was associated with the glory of the kingdom, contributed even more to the anger of the people.

The Ughan Response

The takeover of the administration, the brutal punishments, the deportation and the house arrest of the amir's family aroused the

Sunni population of the regions around Kabul to action. They believed

 Ibid., 81.

31 MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 110. 32 Ibid., 103.

33

The instructions strengthened him still further in his resolve, since hc then committcd excesses in affecting the killing of so many Afghans that of this outraged the liberal press in India, as yell as England. Fredrick Harrison argued that the punishments were illegal and unlawful for the simple rcason that people can not be considercd guilty for defending their country.•u) The public in Britain was also outraged and this in part contributed to the defeat of the government in the general election that was held later, in April 1880.

The executions were followed by the deportation to India of the amir, and his principal ad\isers, among them Sardar Yahya Khan (the amir's father-in-law), Shah Mohammad Khan, Minister of External Affairs; and Sardar Zakria Khan. Only Mustaufi Habib Allah Wardak (b. 1828), the minister of financial affairs was not deported, but was left in Kabul because the authority needed his skills in administrative and financial affairs. In addition, in Kabul, the family of the deported amir was placed under house arrest. Also, MacGregor "[g]ot orders out for the occupation of the Sherpur Cantonment and the  destruction of the Bala Hisar. "ll

The Bala Hissar citadel, which was the seat of Afghan rulers after 1 776, had been the scene of an explosion in which some Gorkha soldiers were killed on October 16th. Afterward, the British destroyed it because Cavagnari and others had been massacred there, and because MacGregor believed that it would be difficult to guard after the army moved to the Sherpur Cantonment. The well-cultivated Cantonment had water ducts running through it, large halls, broad verandas, and substantial gateways, and it could accommodate over twenty thousand men. 32 The destruction of the Bala Hissar, which was associated with the glory of the kingdom, contributed even more to the anger of the people.

The Ughan Response

The takeover of the administration, the brutal punishments, the deportation and the house arrest of the amir's family aroused the

Sunni population of the regions around Kabul to action. They believed

 Ibid., 81.

  • MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 110.
  • ,

general retreat. 36 This is a scapegoat view of history. A more likely explanation for this is that after they restored Kabul the Afghans preferred to loot the quarters of the pro-British Qizilbashes, the Hindus" and the houses of the rich pro-British Mohammadzay sardars to defeating the invaders. 38

For ten days the insurgents left the besieged army almost unmolested, even though it was vulnerable at the time. Only General Mohammad Jan Wardak proposed to the besieged General Frederick Roberts that the British evacuate Afghanistan, and surrender their weapons,39 presumably in return for a safe passage. The proposal was similar to the one that Sardar Mohammad Akbar Khan had made to the besieged British army in Kabul forty years earlier. However, while Mohammad Akbar Khan had succeeded in his plan, Mohammad Jan Wardak did not. His proposal as well as the delay gave Roberts and his offcers time to fortify their position. On December 23, 1879, the Afghan warriors, who were either unarmed or lightly armed,40 assaulted the besieged army but failed to overcome it. The British soldiers, whose officers were informed Of the planned attack in advance, drove them away by their counter-shelling fired from superior artillery and rifles.41 Ultimately, the cold, the shortage of provisions, and the lack of a unified command contributed to the retreat. More importantly, as MacGregor has noted the Afghan power is a good deal broken and we have got most of their arrns and ammunition and nearly all their guns.''42 It was,

Ghobar, "hanütan Ihr Masir-e-Tarüh, 630. Rishtia, S. Q. Afghanistan Dar Qarn-e-Nuzdah, 253.

Forbes, The "han Wars, 255.

Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayit 190.

    39 Hensman,    Afghan War Of 1879—80, 245.

  • o Ibid., 248.

Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waggyi% 190. Fayz Mohamrnad,                         [The lamp of Histories] vol. l, Kabul, 1915, 358.

MacGregor, Wc I I l. For details and d&rent verionl Of the campaigns see Ghobar, Afghanistan Ma*-t-Tari", 623—633. alWaqgi' 186-193; Hcnsman, wr of 1879-80, 218-259; Hanna, ne &tnd War, I I I , 168—25; Was, 202—265; and Kakar,

90— 105.

Fayz Mohammad alleges l, 358) that during the ani-Bridsh campaigu, General Mohammad Jan Wardak accepted a bribe from the

This is not true. In the first place, 1 have found no such a refererre eith« in the unpubbshed or published C&ial -rcccn•ds. In plue, such sation can not be Gue becaur Wardak was the of the campaigns and for this the people revered him as a saint and a hero. He is the first

a defeat. •r intermittently,

KandaharJ in August have been described bulk of the Afghan as their temporary center after they drove away from there the Hazaras who had occupied it at the instigation of General Roberts, when he and his army were besieged in Sherpur. Represented by the Ghazni Party or the National Party, as it was referred to in the British omcial reports, they chose Sardar Musa Jan, a young son of the exiled amir, as the new amir. The National Party did not have a single leader, but several leaders of equal status, and wanted to restore the former amir and observe the "01d  a reference to the treaties of 1855 and 1857 concluded between Amir Dost Mohammad Khan and the British Government of India. In these treaties, the amir had agreed to be "the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the British."

The "JVew Order" for Afghanistan

As a result of the December uprising the Kabul administration headed by Major-General J. Hill-Jones collapsed. General Roberts decided to set up a new one and give it an indigenous appearance, with a Mohammadzay sardar, assisted by offce holders to head it. However, the Mohammadzays were in their twilight years, and even less influential than the mullas had been.45 Away' from their power base— that is, Kandahar, they could not count on the active support of others in times of war, when the government and the army had

military offcer in Afghanistan whom the rank and file of the army elected to the rank ofgeneral (ghamushr) to lead them in the campaigns against the British invaders. support of the house of Amir Sher arranged to have him killed the accusation that Wardak a by the chronicle's author in

Of Events in Afghanistan,

CHAPTER TWO

a defeat. •r intermittently,

KandaharJ in August have been described bulk of the Afghan as their temporary center after they drove away from there the Hazaras who had occupied it at the instigation of General Roberts, when he and his army were besieged in Sherpur. Represented by the Ghazni Party or the National Party, as it was referred to in the British omcial reports, they chose Sardar Musa Jan, a young son of the exiled amir, as the new amir. The National Party did not have a single leader, but several leaders of equal status, and wanted to restore the former amir and observe the "01d  a reference to the treaties of 1855 and 1857 concluded between Amir Dost Mohammad Khan and the British Government of India. In these treaties, the amir had agreed to be "the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the British."

The "JVew Order" for Afghanistan

As a result of the December uprising the Kabul administration headed by Major-General J. Hill-Jones collapsed. General Roberts decided to set up a new one and give it an indigenous appearance, with a Mohammadzay sardar, assisted by offce holders to head it. However, the Mohammadzays were in their twilight years, and even less influential than the mullas had been.45 Away' from their power base— that is, Kandahar, they could not count on the active support of others in times of war, when the government and the army had

military offcer in Afghanistan whom the rank and file of the army elected to the rank ofgeneral (ghamushr) to lead them in the campaigns against the British invaders. support of the house of Amir Sher him arranged to have him killed the accusation that Wardak a by the chronicle's author in

                                       to                                           Of Events in Afghanistan,

India Offce Library, London,

a defeat. •r intermittently,

KandaharJ in August have been described bulk of the Afghan as their temporary center after they drove away from there the Hazaras who had occupied it at the instigation of General Roberts, when he and his army were besieged in Sherpur. Represented by the Ghazni Party or the National Party, as it was referred to in the British omcial reports, they chose Sardar Musa Jan, a young son of the exiled amir, as the new amir. The National Party did not have a single leader, but several leaders of equal status, and wanted to restore the former amir and observe the "01d  a reference to the treaties of 1855 and 1857 concluded between Amir Dost Mohammad Khan and the British Government of India. In these treaties, the amir had agreed to be "the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the British."

The "JVew Order" for Afghanistan

As a result of the December uprising the Kabul administration headed by Major-General J. Hill-Jones collapsed. General Roberts decided to set up a new one and give it an indigenous appearance, with a Mohammadzay sardar, assisted by offce holders to head it. However, the Mohammadzays were in their twilight years, and even less influential than the mullas had been.45 Away' from their power base— that is, Kandahar, they could not count on the active support of others in times of war, when the government and the army had

military offcer in Afghanistan whom the rank and file of the army elected to the rank ofgeneral (ghamushr) to lead them in the campaigns against the British invaders. support of the house of Amir Sher arranged to have him killed the accusation that Wardak a by the chronicle's author in

Of Events in Afghanistan,

                                                THE BRITISH AFGHAN WAR                                          39

mir of Badakhshan, Shahzadah Mohammad Hasan, opposed the enuy of Sardar CAbd al-Rahman. Eventually, however, the mir was driven out of his domain to Gilgit by his rivals, Mir Baba and Mohammad 'Omar, who brought Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman to Fayzabad, the capital city of Badakhshan.

In the middle of March Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan lcf! for Qataghan where by a stroke of luck he was joined by a detachment of the Afghan army, which had been sent there by General Ghalam Haydar Wardak from Mazar to chastise Sultan Murad, the of Qataghan. This was a turning point for the sardar. Among the predominantly non-Pashtun inhabitants he became the acknowledged leader of a regular army. His power increased still further when the whole army of Mazar joined Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan, who supported the cause of %Abd al-Rahman Khan. Ishaq Khan was a full-cousin of Sardar CAbd al-Rahman Khan, and like the latter, had been in exile in Samarqand. Afterward, Sardar CAbd al-Rahman Khan doubled his efforts in extending his influence throughout the country.

In Kabul, opposition to the occupation lasted longer than the British had anticipated. The British government, in London, was getting restless, and was unwilling to continue to sanction the war." Further, the executions in Kabul had aroused fury, even in England, as previously noted. Under pressure, Lord Lytton decided to evacuate 'Northern Afghanistan' by the following autumn, and this made it necessary for him to make new arrangements. As part of his plan, he replaced General Roberts with General Donald M. Stewart as the supreme commander of 'the Northern Afghanistan Field Force.' No reason was given for the replacement, but MacGregor maintained that 'c, our misfortune was in having a man like Bobs, when we wanted a strong, honest and able man. "52 This implies that General Stewart whom MacGregor viewed as a masterful man, a real commander"53 would have succeeded where Roberts had failed. This was highly unlikely because, as the massacre and the resistance

so Kushkaki, B, Rahnomq-e-@tghan un Badahshan, [A Guide to Qatagyan and

Badakhshan], Kabul, 1302/1924, 171.

51 Singhal, India and Ughanütan, 59.  MacGregor, in 171. Ibid, 184.

don of 'Northern Afghanistan.' In line with the guidelines that he had issued to Griffn, Kandahar was to be separated from 'Northern Afghanistan' and a suitable individual, other than the deported amir, was to be approached?' In truth, Lytton was against the coming to power of any member of the family of the late Amir Sher cAli Khan, as he bclieved that no member of the family would go along with his scheme. Further, he held a grudge against the entire family because of the massacre, even though the Investigation Commission had declared Mohammad Ya'qub Khan only "inculpably negligent." The diffculty of Griffn can be appreciated in the context of this mebdrama, in which the views of the Afghans and of Lytton were poles apart.

In Kabul, the search for a ruler aroused various factions to action. The strongest party was probably that of Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan, a cousin and brother-in-law of the deported amir, but the National Party did not trust him, and the British withdrew their support when they began negotiating with Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. The wali of Kabul also aspired to the throne, although it was known that without the British military support he could not succeed. With regard to the choice of a ruler the National Party was the most influential voice, and it would support only a member of the family of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. Although it opppsed the occupation vehemently, it still preferred a closer relationship with British India to one with Russia.

Roberts had already sent Mustaufi Habib Allah Wardak to Ghazni to impress upon elders of the National Party the necessity of naming someone to rule over "Northern Afghanistan."55 They named the deported amir, guaranteeing his friendship with the British,56 but don of 'Northern Afghanistan.' In line with the guidelines that he had issued to Griffn, Kandahar was to be separated from 'Northern Afghanistan' and a suitable individual, other than the deported amir, was to be approached?' In truth, Lytton was against the coming to power of any member of the family of the late Amir Sher cAli Khan, as he bclieved that no member of the family would go along with his scheme. Further, he held a grudge against the entire family because of the massacre, even though the Investigation Commission had declared Mohammad Ya'qub Khan only "inculpably negligent." The diffculty of Griffn can be appreciated in the context of this mebdrama, in which the views of the Afghans and of Lytton were poles apart.

In Kabul, the search for a ruler aroused various factions to action. The strongest party was probably that of Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan, a cousin and brother-in-law of the deported amir, but the National Party did not trust him, and the British withdrew their support when they began negotiating with Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. The wali of Kabul also aspired to the throne, although it was known that without the British military support he could not succeed. With regard to the choice of a ruler the National Party was the most influential voice, and it would support only a member of the family of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. Although it opppsed the occupation vehemently, it still preferred a closer relationship with British India to one with Russia.

Roberts had already sent Mustaufi Habib Allah Wardak to Ghazni to impress upon elders of the National Party the necessity of naming someone to rule over "Northern Afghanistan."55 They named the deported amir, guaranteeing his friendship with the British,56 but don of 'Northern Afghanistan.' In line with the guidelines that he had issued to Griffn, Kandahar was to be separated from 'Northern Afghanistan' and a suitable individual, other than the deported amir, was to be approached?' In truth, Lytton was against the coming to power of any member of the family of the late Amir Sher cAli Khan, as he bclieved that no member of the family would go along with his scheme. Further, he held a grudge against the entire family because of the massacre, even though the Investigation Commission had declared Mohammad Ya'qub Khan only "inculpably negligent." The diffculty of Griffn can be appreciated in the context of this mebdrama, in which the views of the Afghans and of Lytton were poles apart.

In Kabul, the search for a ruler aroused various factions to action. The strongest party was probably that of Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan, a cousin and brother-in-law of the deported amir, but the National Party did not trust him, and the British withdrew their support when they began negotiating with Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. The wali of Kabul also aspired to the throne, although it was known that without the British military support he could not succeed. With regard to the choice of a ruler the National Party was the most influential voice, and it would support only a member of the family of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. Although it opppsed the occupation vehemently, it still preferred a closer relationship with British India to one with Russia.

Roberts had already sent Mustaufi Habib Allah Wardak to Ghazni to impress upon elders of the National Party the necessity of naming someone to rule over "Northern Afghanistan."55 They named the deported amir, guaranteeing his friendship with the British,56 but don of 'Northern Afghanistan.' In line with the guidelines that he had issued to Griffn, Kandahar was to be separated from 'Northern Afghanistan' and a suitable individual, other than the deported amir, was to be approached?' In truth, Lytton was against the coming to power of any member of the family of the late Amir Sher cAli Khan, as he bclieved that no member of the family would go along with his scheme. Further, he held a grudge against the entire family because of the massacre, even though the Investigation Commission had declared Mohammad Ya'qub Khan only "inculpably negligent." The diffculty of Griffn can be appreciated in the context of this mebdrama, in which the views of the Afghans and of Lytton were poles apart.

In Kabul, the search for a ruler aroused various factions to action. The strongest party was probably that of Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan, a cousin and brother-in-law of the deported amir, but the National Party did not trust him, and the British withdrew their support when they began negotiating with Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. The wali of Kabul also aspired to the throne, although it was known that without the British military support he could not succeed. With regard to the choice of a ruler the National Party was the most influential voice, and it would support only a member of the family of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. Although it opppsed the occupation vehemently, it still preferred a closer relationship with British India to one with Russia.

Roberts had already sent Mustaufi Habib Allah Wardak to Ghazni to impress upon elders of the National Party the necessity of naming someone to rule over "Northern Afghanistan."55 They named the deported amir, guaranteeing his friendship with the British,56 but

with neither, and consequently, he was unwilling to ally himself with Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan against the British, instead opting to come to terms with them. On June 9, 1880, about three weeks before 'Abd al-Rahman Khan set out for Kabul, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan left Herat ror Kandahar. Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan thought that if his rival cousin came to Kandahar, the Durranays and Ghilzays would rally behind him. He also feared that his rival might negotiate with the British before he did. 'Abd al-Rahman was eager to become a ruler, while Mohammad Ayyub Khan was first and foremost concerned with ousting the invaders. This explains why the former speedily appeared near Kabul and accepted the British terms. The Ghilzays supported the family of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, but their opposition to the invaders was stronger than their loyalty to the family. Consequently, in the absence of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, they accepted Sardar %Abd al-Rahman Khan at the last minute.

Sardar al-Rahman did not have a substantial support among the Mohammadzay sardars in Kabul. Arnir Sher 'Ali Khan had supprescd those sardars M'ho had supported the family of Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman in the civil war. The other sardars were either 'Cavagnanzays', or Yacqubzays, or had ambitions of their own. Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan bypassed them all, and appealed directly to the people. It is a tribute to his insight and skill that he gained the support of those who had opposed the British along with the support of those who had been committed to the family of the late amir, while at the same time successfully negotiating with the British. However, by accepting only 'Northern Afghanistan' he went along with the British scheme to divide Afghanistan. Further, he surrendered the external independence Of the country for which his compatriots had fought.

THREE

THE AFGHAN VICTORY AT -MAIH'AND AND THE

REUNIFICATION OF AFGHANISTAN

The negotiations conducted between the British officials and Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan in 1880 resulted in the establishment of the latter's rule in northern and eastern Afghanistan. In western Afghanistan, Kandahar and Herat remained outside his domain. The British, who had stationed a contingent of troops in Kandahar, had formally placed it under Wali Sher %Xli Khan, while Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan ruled Herat independently. This chapter describes how after the British had evacuated Kandahar as a result of the defeat of their army at Maiwand, Ayyub Khan occupied it and soon afterward lost it in a military encounter with the new amir, CAbd alRahman Khan. The victory made it possible for the amir to occupy Herat, and to reunify the whole country.

Kandahar a Separate Hinczpali!v

Of all the provinces of Afghanistan, Kandahar was the most Important, since it was large, fertile, and the home mainly of the Durranay tribal confederation with its main divisions of Popalzay, Barakzay, Alkozay, Achakzay, Nurzay, Alizay, Ishaqzay, Khugianay and Maku. The Durranays were formerly called Audaul (or Abdaul). Ghilzays, Qizilbashes (or Parsiwans) and other groups also lived there, and it was the Ghilzay elder, Mir Wais Hotak who hberated Kandahar from the Safavi occupation in 1709. After his death, first his brother and afterward his son ruled over it until 1738. However, in 1747 the Durranays, under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Durranay, following the death of Nadir Shah Afshar, founded a more permanent rule that lasted for about two and a half centuries, until 1978 Thus, Kandahar was associated with the ruling. dynasties of the mo most important divisions of the Pashtuns.

Kandahar was the site of human settlement from prehistoric times. Alexander the Great founded a city there too, as did Nadir Shah 46

Afshar in the eighteenth century. The modern city of Kandahar was founded in 1 761 by Ahmad Shah Durranay, and it remained the capital city Of imperial Afghanistan until Timur Shah Durranay transferred the capital seat to Kabul, in 1776. Having produced emperors and kings, the Durranays looked upon themselves as a proud people, calling other inhabitants of the city opras (strangers).

In 1880, Viceroy Lord Lytton in line with the "divide-and-rule policy" which the British reputedly applied in their colonies intended to separate Kandahar from Afghanistan and subject it to the British rule. He considered Kandahar to be necessary for India strategically and commercially. To secretary of state for India, Lord Cranbrook, he wrote,

Although our primary reason for holding and improving this route [Quetta-Kandahar-Herat-Central Asia] is, no doubt, the undisputed command of southern Afghanistan and the means for forestalling Russian influence at Herat, we cannot lose sight Of the fact that this route has iRen at all times one Of the main tracts of Central Asian traffcs. l

To maintain a hold over the province of Kandahar. Lytton arranged to link it to India by a railway, the construction of which had already begun, and was scheduled to bc completed by the end of 1880. 2

Sardar Sher 'Ali Khan, a son Of Sardar Mehrdil Khan, was a cousin of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. Following his accession, Amir Nfohammad Yacqub Khan appointed him the governor of the province. He was still the governor when a British army- under General Donald Stewart occupied it in 1879. The governor threw in his lot with thc British in return for their recognition of him as zeali (governor) of the province. Lytton even went so far as to hold that the wali was ". . . well able to hold his own entirely subject to our control. "3 On May I l, 1880 Sardar Sher 'Ali Khan was recognized officially in a public durbar as the "Wali of Kandahar and its dependencies." In a letter that was read on the occasion the viceroy addressed had him thus: "1 have the pleasure in announcing to you that Her Majesty the Queen-Empress has been pleased to recognize Your Highness as an independent ruler of Kandahar."4

Lytton to Cranbrook, 20 Nov. 80, PANEA, 110.

2 Ibid

 Balfour, Izptton's Indian Adrüistration, 382.  PANEA, 109.

                                       THE AFGHAN VICTORY AT MAIWAND                                47

Colonel St. John, the Political Representative was more eloquent in a statement that he read in Persian, stating the following:

Under the just rule of the Wali Shei 'Ali Khan, and under the protcction of England, Kandahar will, if it plcascs God, remain frcc from foreign aggression, and nse to such a height of wealth and prosperity that it will be the envy of the whole of Islam.5

The walii rule was declared hereditary, but his foreign relations were to be conducted by a British political representative quartered in Kandahar. The wali was allowed to have the Friday sermon (khutba) read and coins issued in his name, and he was also granted weapons and money. He was, thus, allowed to enjoy the appearance of an independent ruler.


Howeven the wal?s dependence on the British soon turned his countrymen against him. Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan and the mullas (religious functionaries) denounced him as a 'kafir' or 'infidel'. 6 The latter also declared their support for Mohammad Ayyub Khan, and their opposition to the wali. 7 Except for a few Barakzay relatives of the wali the bulk of the Durranays of Kandahar boycotted him, and even his mother and family advised him to oppose the British.8 Only the Ghilzays of Qalat paid him revenue, but most of the inhabitants of Kandahar refused to do so, and, also, defied his authority. The wali, nevertheless, remained loyal to the British, and organized an army.

In June 1880 the wali moved with his army to Girishk west of Kandahar to fortify his frontier and, further, incite people in Taimani and Farah against Sardar Mohammad Ayyub khan, who was rumored to be advancing on Kandahar.. However, the wali made it dear to the British that he needed their military support if he was to move beyond Girishk. When, in late June, Ayyub Khan's advance became certain, a British force 2,400 strong under Major General G. R. S. Burrows, was dispatched to Helmand, near Girishk.

s Wheeler, S., The Amm Abdur Rahman, New York, 1895, 94.

6 PANEA, 118.

Kandahar Diary (Kand D), 1-8 June 80, PSLI, 25, 1025. 8 Stewart to Lyall, 12 May 80, PSLI, 25, 1025.

the permission of the shah of Persia, and in possession of seventyfive-thousand Persian qirans (roughly half Of rupees). HC had gonc to Nlashhad after his father, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, had imprisoned his full-brother, Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub Khan (See Chapter One). In Hcrat, Ayyub Khan had already rcccived military training from one Colonel Mehdi Khan, a Russian convert to Islam, who was finally banished for espionage.'" Toward the end of his life when he had traveled from Lahore to Kashmir and Japan Ayyub Khan composed diaries in Persian that were . simple, lucid and full of useful information and observations, though replete with grammatical errors and idiomatic slips." He was, however, so much conservative that he had become, according to his son, "the creature of the clergy" 10 and his "narrow-mindedness" shut him off from c'. . . things which are at once the master keys to human advancement and progress." However, this Ayyub Khan came to impress the image of a real hero in the minds of Afghans by inflicting a most stunning defeat on the British invaders. As his son correctly states, the "secret of his prominence [lay] in his patriotism, for which he sacrificed everything and spared nothing."ll

Early in 1879 Ayyub Khan assumed the administration of Herat after his full-brother, Sardar Mohammad Yacqub Khan, had become amir in Kabul. As the result of having had little contact with his father, when he was young, and because he had overseen his own entourage from an early age, the sardar had developed an independent personality. He was so sensitive about his independence that even the command of his brother, the amir, irritated him much, despite the fact that all along he had been his "true brother and henchman."12 In response to his brother's "'bossing" him "which was for

173, 151.

178.

the permission of the shah of Persia, and in possession of seventyfive-thousand Persian qirans (roughly half Of rupees). HC had gonc to Nlashhad after his father, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, had imprisoned his full-brother, Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub Khan (See Chapter One). In Hcrat, Ayyub Khan had already rcccived military training from one Colonel Mehdi Khan, a Russian convert to Islam, who was finally banished for espionage.'" Toward the end of his life when he had traveled from Lahore to Kashmir and Japan Ayyub Khan composed diaries in Persian that were . simple, lucid and full of useful information and observations, though replete with grammatical errors and idiomatic slips." He was, however, so much conservative that he had become, according to his son, "the creature of the clergy" 10 and his "narrow-mindedness" shut him off from c'. . . things which are at once the master keys to human advancement and progress." However, this Ayyub Khan came to impress the image of a real hero in the minds of Afghans by inflicting a most stunning defeat on the British invaders. As his son correctly states, the "secret of his prominence [lay] in his patriotism, for which he sacrificed everything and spared nothing."ll

Early in 1879 Ayyub Khan assumed the administration of Herat after his full-brother, Sardar Mohammad Yacqub Khan, had become amir in Kabul. As the result of having had little contact with his father, when he was young, and because he had overseen his own entourage from an early age, the sardar had developed an independent personality. He was so sensitive about his independence that even the command of his brother, the amir, irritated him much, despite the fact that all along he had been his "true brother and henchman."12 In response to his brother's "'bossing" him "which was for

173, 151.

178.

the permission of the shah of Persia, and in possession of seventyfive-thousand Persian qirans (roughly half Of rupees). HC had gonc to Nlashhad after his father, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, had imprisoned his full-brother, Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub Khan (See Chapter One). In Hcrat, Ayyub Khan had already rcccived military training from one Colonel Mehdi Khan, a Russian convert to Islam, who was finally banished for espionage.'" Toward the end of his life when he had traveled from Lahore to Kashmir and Japan Ayyub Khan composed diaries in Persian that were . simple, lucid and full of useful information and observations, though replete with grammatical errors and idiomatic slips." He was, however, so much conservative that he had become, according to his son, "the creature of the clergy" 10 and his "narrow-mindedness" shut him off from c'. . . things which are at once the master keys to human advancement and progress." However, this Ayyub Khan came to impress the image of a real hero in the minds of Afghans by inflicting a most stunning defeat on the British invaders. As his son correctly states, the "secret of his prominence [lay] in his patriotism, for which he sacrificed everything and spared nothing."ll

Early in 1879 Ayyub Khan assumed the administration of Herat after his full-brother, Sardar Mohammad Yacqub Khan, had become amir in Kabul. As the result of having had little contact with his father, when he was young, and because he had overseen his own entourage from an early age, the sardar had developed an independent personality. He was so sensitive about his independence that even the command of his brother, the amir, irritated him much, despite the fact that all along he had been his "true brother and henchman."12 In response to his brother's "'bossing" him "which was for

173, 151.

178.

The first British shell caught the scarlet umbrella held over the prince, and the Afghans responded with a general frontal assault. They doubled [sic], while the adversary was searching every corner of the battlefield Mith perfect impunity. The passive resistance or the A@hans was due to their muzzle loading fire-arms, which were no match to the Martini Henry and the Snider rifles of the adversary. One battery of the Armstrong alone kept the kettle boiling, while the rest or the Afghan guns [said to be 30 Or 35] kept mum. This state of affairs placed the endurance Of the warriors of the crescent to a most severe test. Their condition was worsened with Loynab's retreat at the head of 4,000 Herati irregular cavalry. For a while victory awaited the English with open arms, when the Afghan omcers in utter desperation rushed their men with drawn swords against the enemy squares. Though their death rate cost them appalling casualties, yet it, nonetheless, ealed the fate of the enemy. The attackers [Afghans] tightened the cordon and their smooth bore guns, confident of their range, belched Out with the perceptible result of British lines swinging to and fro. In spite of the tenacity of their offcers, an orderly retreat seemed impossible to perform. 29

Toward the end of the battle

a handful of the British infantrymen, . , literally fought to the last man and the last shot, to uphold the honor of the British flag, which won them the ever-lasting appreciations of their adversaries They kept the Afghans at bay, and held their standard high, till the last man fell 30

Many of those ". . . who were hiding in streams, wells, and gardens perished at the hands of women, who, from the roofs hurled heavy objects such as millstones, rocks, well-pulleys and stone mortars at them. "31 Effendi states: "Thus the entire British forces were annihilated [in four hours] with the exception of three scores, who were destined to reach Kandahar, to relate the tale of woe "32

According to St. John the Afghans killed and wounded numbered 2,150, and the English about 1,100. Ayyub's army was made up of 4,555 infantry, about 3,200 cavalry, and 4,000 ghazis [fighters against the 'infidels'] many of whom were talibs (students of Islamic studies), while that of General Burrows made up of 2,800 regular with 2,000

29 Effendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 187—188.

 Ibid., 188-189.

Tar-zi, Reminiscences, 14.

32 Effendi, RO-yaLf and Royal Ma&ant, 189.

                                       THE AFGHAN VICTORY AT MAIWAND                                  51

The first British shell caught the scarlet umbrella held over the prince, and the Afghans responded with a general frontal assault. They doubled [sic], while the adversary was searching every corner of the battlefield Mith perfect impunity. The passive resistance or the A@hans was due to their muzzle loading fire-arms, which were no match to the Martini Henry and the Snider rifles of the adversary. One battery of the Armstrong alone kept the kettle boiling, while the rest or the Afghan guns [said to be 30 Or 35] kept mum. This state of affairs placed the endurance Of the warriors of the crescent to a most severe test. Their condition was worsened with Loynab's retreat at the head of 4,000 Herati irregular cavalry. For a while victory awaited the English with open arms, when the Afghan omcers in utter desperation rushed their men with drawn swords against the enemy squares. Though their death rate cost them appalling casualties, yet it, nonetheless, ealed the fate of the enemy. The attackers [Afghans] tightened the cordon and their smooth bore guns, confident of their range, belched Out with the perceptible result of British lines swinging to and fro. In spite of the tenacity of their offcers, an orderly retreat seemed impossible to perform. 29

Toward the end of the battle

a handful of the British infantrymen, . , literally fought to the last man and the last shot, to uphold the honor of the British flag, which won them the ever-lasting appreciations of their adversaries They kept the Afghans at bay, and held their standard high, till the last man fell 30

Many of those ". . . who were hiding in streams, wells, and gardens perished at the hands of women, who, from the roofs hurled heavy objects such as millstones, rocks, well-pulleys and stone mortars at them. "31 Effendi states: "Thus the entire British forces were annihilated [in four hours] with the exception of three scores, who were destined to reach Kandahar, to relate the tale of woe "32

According to St. John the Afghans killed and wounded numbered 2,150, and the English about 1,100. Ayyub's army was made up of 4,555 infantry, about 3,200 cavalry, and 4,000 ghazis [fighters against the 'infidels'] many of whom were talibs (students of Islamic studies), while that of General Burrows made up of 2,800 regular with 2,000

29 Effendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 187—188.

 Ibid., 188-189.

Tar-zi, Reminiscences, 14.

32 Effendi, RO-yaLf and Royal Ma&ant, 189.

Khan probably felt that he either could not force the British army, or because of the presence of Amir CAbd al-Rahman Khan, he saw it advisable to come to terms with the British from a position of strength. Mhatever the truth, despite the fact that thc negotiation bore no fruit, the Maiwand battle dealt a deadly blow to the Bntish scheme of dividing Afghanistan.

Battles are organized by generals and fought by warriors.

the battles are won the generals are viewed as heroes, and the warriors are forgotten perhaps because pcoplc want to have herocs and forget about those who have actually made them. That is why Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan is known to this day as the hero or victor of Maivand, and the actual fighters are forgotten, although it was they fought the battle with a fierce determination, at an enormous cost, to the point of final victory. Of course, they did so when a dynastic prince led them to the battlefield to defend the fatherland, Islam, and independence. The Maiwand victory compares with the victory that was won over forty years earlier in Kabul against a strong British army and camp followers from among •whom only about three hundred survived, and only one, Surgeon William Brydon, escaped. Both damaged the reputation of the British, a superpower of the time. But at Maiwand according to Sir Charles M. MacGregor it was not s'. . . so bad in the way of the losses . . . but worse for our honor as they [the British soldiers] ought all to have been killed. "39 On the other hand, both victories established the reputation of Afghans as Spartans and rescued them from being conquered by a European colonial superpower. That is why they left a deep mark not only on Afghans of the time, but on Afghans of the future generations as well.

The victory in Kabul was the outcome largely of the statesmanship and generalship of Ghazi Mohammad Akbar Khan, and that in Maiwand largely of the efforts of his nephew, Ghazi Mohammad Ayyub Khan. These individuals as well as the memory of Maiuand have come to symbolize Afghan gallantry and patriotism. Both have contributed much toward consolidating the Afghans as a nation, a notion actually inherited from Mir Wais Hotak and Ahmad Shah Durranay. Emotionally evocative, all these names have become the ngredients of Afghan culture. However, in the long run, the victories

'9 MacGregor, War  217.

at Kabul and Maiwand kept the Afghans isolated from the currents of science and technology, and other progreésive aspects of modern life, and they also contributed to a legacy of xenophobia.

The Zimma A feeling

The British offcials in Kabul feared that the Afghan victory at Maiwand would upset the arrangement that they had made with Amir CAbd al-Rahman Khan. Griffn wired the foreign secretary, Alfred Lyall the following message:

The Kandahar news alters the position hcre and unless Ayyub can be beaten decisively and quickly, may cause all arrangements to collapse. Amir will not be able to stand against Ayyub, Gctorious. Many of his adherents will abandon him and his troops here and in Turkestan may mutiny. If he marches to Ghazni, the country will join

The amir himself shared this fear, and he and Griffin agreed to cooperate. During a two-day meting in Zimma41 just north of Kabul, on July 31—August l, 1880, the amir pressed Griffn to conclude a treaty with him. However, Griffn was not authorized to do so, because at the time, the British Government of India viewed the amir's position as precarious. Alternatively, in order to help the amir consolidate his position, the Governmcnt granted him a few light guns and nearly two million rupees which actually belonged to the Afghan treasury. More importantly, Grimn promised him that the British troops would leave soon, a promise that enabled the amir to tell his people that he was sending the invading army away.

In return for the British assistance, the amir promised to persuade the Ghilzay elders to allow a British force to pass through their land on the way to Kandahar. A select army of ten thousand strong, with artillery guns and nine thousand camels appeared to be for the purpose of evacuating Kabul, but in reality had been sent to relieve the besieged army in Kandahar, as the British found it difficult to send troops there from their nearest base, in the city of Quetta. Starting

          '0               to Lyall               28 July 80, PSI-I, 26, pt. 3, 47.

For the text of the Zimma meeting, see Kakar, .4fghanistan, A Stu" in lnUmal Politid 1880—1896, Punjab Educational press, Lahore, 1971 , 256—281.

on August 7, the army, under General Roberts, covered 324 miles in twenty-three days, which was a remarkable feat, although the army was traveled unhindered, and MacGregor who had accompanied it, states, "People, civil. they say apologetically by order."42 As previously noted, the amir had asked their elders not to molest the British army.

The army arrived at kandahar on August 31 and found that the besieged British offcers there had been under tremendous pressure. According to MacGregor, as they had lost over 200 men, with eight offcers, in an unsuccessful sortie, they were "looking very cheap. On September l , 1880, the British army, commanded by General Roberts, defeated the army of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan in an engagement in the Baba Wali Pass, near the city, with a loss of about 200 to the British and about the same number to the Afghans.H Ayyub Khan returned to Herat on September 22, 1880, and Roberts and his army left Kandahar for India for good. As William Trousdale states,

Roberts' . , . defeat of [Sardar Mohammad) Ayub near Kandahar vas vengeance for the British, but the true victory belonged to Aldur Rahman who was thus spared the necessity of defeating Ayub Kian in a military challenge for the crown.4S

The Collapse of the Scheme of Partition

The Afghan victory at Maiwand dealt a deadly blow to the 'independence' of Kandahar, and Lord Lytton's 'new order' for Afghanistan. Foreign Secretary Alfred Lyall, who visited Kandahar shortly after Maiwand to assess the situation, concluded that, ' . the Durranis of Kandahar are much opposed to the occupation, either directly through [VVali] Sher Ali or any other nominee, or directly through our officers."" The British government then decided to hand over

 MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 232.

Ibid., 239.

 Ibid. Offcially, the British casualties were 35 killed and 229 wounded. The Afghan losses are diffcult to ascertain, and estimates vao' from 700 to 1,200. It is to be noted that since the Baba Wali battle was not a major one these figures appear to be high.

 Trousdale, Introduction in War in Afghanstan, 63.  Lyall on Kandahar, Nov. 90, PSLI, 27, 547.

Kandahar to the amir despite the strong opposition of the Gceroy's council,' ; but since Ayyub Khan was . . . the most popular candidate for rule in southern Afghanistan' the amir did not want to occupy it immediately." However, the British were anxious to withdraw thcir troops before the summer heat hit thc region, and on April 16, 1881 they handed over Kandahar to the amir's officials along with weapons and money, but let themselves meet the feared challenge of the victor of Maiwand. Shortly afterward, they left the city for good. Wali Sher 'Ali Khan, who had been guaranteed 'dynastic hereditary rule' was granted an allowance for life, settled in Karachi, and faded into obscurity. Thus, the Second British War on Afghanistan came to an end. It was fought with the utmost ferocity, had an enormous death toll, weakened economics and disrupted the normal ways of Afghan life. The war also stained Britain's reputation and doomed its Forward Policy. What the British gained from this and their first Afghan war was the everlasting bad will of Afghans.

Sardar Mohammad ,4yyub nan and the Haatis

Upon his return to Herat Mohammad Ayyub faced a major rebellion which forced him to postpone his early march on Kandahar.50 The Heratis, that is, the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Parsiwans, the nomadic and semi-nomadic Char Aimaq (Jamshcdis, Firozkohis, Taimanis and the Sunni Hazaras of Qal'a-c-Nao) and others—were sick and tired of Kabuli rule. When the position of Ayyub Khan had been weakened, 'Northern Afghanistan' had formed the amir's kingdom, and Kandahar was still controlled by the British, the Heratis felt that the time had come for them to rule Herat themselves. Animosity had first appeared in Mazar between the Herati and Kabuli troops

For details see Memoranda on Kandahar, PSI—I, 27: 541, 547, 566, 1354, 1143, 1137, 1141.

 Lyall on Kandahar, Nov. 80, psu, 27, 547.

Mahomed, 17" Life ofAbdur Rahman, l, 208.

My description of the relations Of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan Bith the people of Herat, featured in my book (1971), is basically the same as that provided by Riyazi in al- While my 1971 account is based on reports from the

Kandahar Diary, my present account is based mainly on the work of Riyazi, a Of Herat.

during the anarchy that followed the death of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. This and the tyranny exercised over the Heratis by the Kabuli troops prompted them to initiate an upnsing. Illey declared Fay Mohammad Khan as their ruler and Colonel Yar Mohammad Khan Alkozay as their military leader.

According to Mohammad Yusuf Riyazi, a contemporary native chronicler, " 165,000" Ordinary men and artisans from class and tribal sections" took part in the uprising. On the day of the action a small number of people from the army joined them, but the leaders were not up to the task. The Kabuli troops of Ayyub Khan commanded by seasoned Ghilzay offcers and armed with superior weapons and artillery suppressed the rebels-51

Sardar Ayyub Khan had already crushed the Jamshedi and Qbchaq tribes by disposing of their elders, Khan Agha Jamshedi and Qazi Jahandar Khan Qbchaq for their pro-British policies, even though the former was his father-in-law.52 Sardar Ambia Khan, elder of the Taimani tribe, also refused to pay revenue and, in addition, showed loyalty to the British.53 Of the Char Aimaq tribes only the Hazaras of Qal'a-e-Nao, under their elder, Mohammad Khan Nizam alDawla, remained loyal and fought on the side of Ayyub Khan.54 Thus, the sardar asserted his rule over the people of Herat, but they became alienated, and the alienation later became fatal to his rule.

Ayyub Khan's next step was to recover Kandahar, and he began to build up his army for the purpose of doing so. However, he needed to raise money, and was, therefore, compelled to exact taxes and customs dues. He was also in need of war materials, since the British had pressured the shah of Persia to prohibit their export to Herat. 55 Still, the sardar was able to build up an army of 4,400 men,56 made up of the Kabuli, Herati and Uzbek regiments, in addition to a large number of Herat and Qibchaq feudal cavalry.57

In early July 1881 the sardar, accompanied by his offcers, set out

5' Riyazi, •Ayn al-Waqaytt, 200—205.

52 Ibid., 195. MacGregor writes of Khan Agha Jamshedi whom he had met k'hile on the way to Kandahar. "I had a long talk qith him, he was very anxious for us to to Herat, saying it was ours." The in Ughanistan, 228.

Sardar Ambia Khan to St. John, Kand D, 28 Mar. 80, PSLI, 28, 767.

Riyazi, CAyn al-Waqa», 200, 209.

St John to Lyd, 15-21 Jan. 81, PSI-I, 27, 1039.

* St. John to Lyall, 19 July 81, psu, 29, 508. 5' Riyazi,                       al-Waqa/, 206.

for Kandahar. After his advance force encountered a setback in Girishk, it defeated in Girishk the amir's larger force at Karez-e%Aua. Subsequently he entered Kandahar a military encounter.

The Il'ar of Reu*ation


The occupation of Kandahar set Sardar Mohammad Ayyub in direct opposition to the amir. The sardar, who had the superior claim and more public support still did not march on Kabul even though the amr's position there was said to have been ' . extremely critical. "58 Instead, he stayed in Kandahar and waited for the amir to confront him there. He did so because his Durranay supporters did not show enthusiasm for marching on Kabul. Also, from a vague letter addressed to him by St. John, then the Political Agent in Baluchistan, Ayyub Khan suspected59 that if he marched on Kabul the British forces at Quetta might occupy Kandahar. In contrast, the amir acted boldly to meet the first challenge to his rule. After holding consultations Mith elders of the eastern Ghilzays and the Tajiks of Kohistan he set out for Kandahar in early August 1881. On the way, he won over the support of the southern Ghilzays mainly by presenting gifts and cash to their elders and the promise of a just government to all. He also provided free cooked food for the public. It was during this time that he demonstrated the greatest generosity of his life time.

Although he was the legal ruler, the amir was only able through presents and money to persuade the mullas to denounce Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan as a 'rebel'. In contrast, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub, though only a claimant to thg throne, declared jihad against what he called the "farangi amir." The mullas of Kandahar went even further, denouncing the amir as a "kafir" and calling on Muslims c'. .. to fight against the nominee and coadjutor of the infidels.''60 The legal rulings (fatuns), thus, justified bloodshed between cousins and Muslims of the same denomination, and showed that the sardar enjoyed more public support than the amir. Still, Ayyub Khan expressed willingness to negotiate with the amir, proposing an alliance

* AB, Kabul Correspondent, 4 Aug. 81, PSLI, 29, 771. 5' st. John to A„ub Khan, 10 Aug. 81, PSI-I, 29, 721.

Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Ripon, 22 Shawal 1298, PSLI, 33, 86.

with him against the British. He also proposed that Afghanistan be ruled in effect as a confederation by the six surviving princes uhose fathers had ruled provinces under their grandfather, Amir Dost Nlohammad Khan.Gl However, the amir refused either to forge an alliance with him or rule the country in association with his peer cousins in spite of the fact that at the Zimma meeting he had shown no desire either for Kandahar or Herat.62 The matter was, thus, left to bc scttlcd by the sword.

St. John, who widely reported on the developments in southern Afghanistan, described the confrontation between the rival cousins as a war between the two "hereditary  Ghilzays and Durranays whose "ancestral animosity" he considered to have been by far the strongest political passion in southern Afghanistan. "63 He concluded that the Durranays flocked to Ayyub Khan, ' . the 1 eprcscntauve of the Durranay against the Ghilzays [to defend] their city agamst the Ghilzay invader."64

Although the southern Ghilzays were traditionally on bad terms with the Durranays, the conflict was not inter-tribal, but shaped more by religion, fear of foreign domination, and the hope of the acquisition of rewards. The Ghilzays took part on both sides; while the Tarakay Ghilzays supported Ayyub Khan, and closed the road behind the amir as a sign of rebellion. 65 the Hotak Ghilzays were dinded in their loyalty. As the name indicates, the Qalat regiment, which went over to Ayyub Khan in Girishk, was, in all probability, composed of the Ghilzays. Further, many of Ayyub Khan's senior oficers were Ghilzays, although most Ghilzays supported the amir, but he bought their service with money and the promise of. plunder. The amir's army also had two thousand Kandahari horseman, most of whom were Durranays, although the Durranays flocked to Ayyub Khan in the belief that he was 'a champion of Islam' and the anur 'a creature of the British.' This was because they opposed thc idea of being ruled by another puppet which they believed the amir to be. This also accounts for the presence of many mullas and talibs (students of Islamic studies) in the army of the sardar. Further, as

St. John to Foreign, (T), 5 sept. 81, PSLI, 29, 977.

62 Grimn to Stewart, 4 Aug. 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 5, 869.

St. John to Lyall, 22 sept. 81, PSI-I, 30, 117.

Ibid., ng.

St. John to Lyall, 22 sept. 81, psu, 29, 1063 a.

already noted, the Maiwand battle had made Ayyub Khan an unquestionable hero.

The sardar had a larger army—snenteen thousand versus the fourteen thousand or thc amir's more experienced offccrs—Sipah Salar Hussayn Qizilbash, Na'ib Salar Hafiz Allah Ghilzay, Sardar CAbd Allah Nasir. and General Taj Mohammad Ghilzay. However, thc sardar had fewer guns than the amir had because he had lost many guns to the

On the day of the battle (September 22, 1881), the prevailing impression was a victory for the sardar's army. Indeed, at the start of the encounter, his army made advances against its adversary, but all of a sudden it retreated and dispersed; this occurred when some of the sardar's troops from the rear fired on the main body of the army. This was apparently the result of the discord that existed benseen the omcers of the sardar about some unreliable troops; some officers wanted to disarm them, while others were against doing so.67 In the heat of the battle, these troops, which according to one source, were the three Kabuli regiments that had surrendered in the battle of  and according to another69 were the Herati and Kabuli regiments, fired on the Kandahari troops and the mullas and talilß. The latter constituted the core of the army of the sardar.

The retreat and dispersal of Ayyub Khan's troops were also due to the discord of his offcers that the sardar's army had been with- drawn from inside the city to a suburb near Chilzeena, close to the old city (Shahr-e-Kohna) where the armies fought. The relocation, which was intended to save civilians from being killed and property from being destroyed, created fear among the troops of the sardar while, conversely, it emboldened the amir's troops. 70 The relocation . was looked upon as a retreat for the arrny of the sardar and an advance for that of the amir. Also, unlike the amir who "was everywhere deploying and reinforcing his troops" and was ' 'in full control

66 Riyazi, '4yn al-Waqgpt* 206. According to Mohammad Hashim, a native agent of the British, the total number of the amir's army was 14,000 while that of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan was 17,000. Hashim to St. John, 26 Sept 81, PSLI, 30, 8. But Sultan Mahomed's figures for the former are 22,000 and for the latter are 20,000. The Life of Abdur Rahman, I, 212. The figures noted by Hashim seem to be more accurate.

Riyazi, •Ayn al-Waqgvit, 211.

Ibid., 208.

Mohammad Hashim to St. John, 26 Sept. 81, PSI—I, 30, 81. 70 Riyazi,                        al-Wapit, 211.

60

already noted, the Maiwand battle had made Ayyub Khan an unquestionable hero.

The sardar had a larger army—snenteen thousand versus the fourteen thousand or thc amir's more experienced offccrs—Sipah Salar Hussayn Qizilbash, Na'ib Salar Hafiz Allah Ghilzay, Sardar CAbd Allah Nasir. and General Taj Mohammad Ghilzay. However, thc sardar had fewer guns than the amir had because he had lost many guns to the

On the day of the battle (September 22, 1881), the prevailing impression was a victory for the sardar's army. Indeed, at the start of the encounter, his army made advances against its adversary, but all of a sudden it retreated and dispersed; this occurred when some of the sardar's troops from the rear fired on the main body of the army. This was apparently the result of the discord that existed benseen the omcers of the sardar about some unreliable troops; some officers wanted to disarm them, while others were against doing so.67 In the heat of the battle, these troops, which according to one source, were the three Kabuli regiments that had surrendered in the battle of  and according to another69 were the Herati and Kabuli regiments, fired on the Kandahari troops and the mullas and talilß. The latter constituted the core of the army of the sardar.

The retreat and dispersal of Ayyub Khan's troops were also due to the discord of his offcers that the sardar's army had been with- drawn from inside the city to a suburb near Chilzeena, close to the old city (Shahr-e-Kohna) where the armies fought. The relocation, which was intended to save civilians from being killed and property from being destroyed, created fear among the troops of the sardar while, conversely, it emboldened the amir's troops. 70 The relocation . was looked upon as a retreat for the arrny of the sardar and an advance for that of the amir. Also, unlike the amir who "was everywhere deploying and reinforcing his troops" and was ' 'in full control

66 Riyazi, '4yn al-Waqgpt* 206. According to Mohammad Hashim, a native agent of the British, the total number of the amir's army was 14,000 while that of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan was 17,000. Hashim to St. John, 26 Sept 81, PSLI, 30, 8. But Sultan Mahomed's figures for the former are 22,000 and for the latter are 20,000. The Life of Abdur Rahman, I, 212. The figures noted by Hashim seem to be more accurate.

Riyazi, •Ayn al-Waqgvit, 211.

Ibid., 208.

Mohammad Hashim to St. John, 26 Sept. 81, PSI—I, 30, 81. 70 Riyazi,                        al-Wapit, 211.

on that account had made it a sanctuary. 7+ With the exception of the province of Nlaymana which was pacified in 1884, all of Afghanistan was, thus, brought under the control of the central government, and reunited.

As the result of his victory at Xlaiwand, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan had become so popular that his presence e',cn in Mashhad was considered a threat to the amir's rule. The British once again helped the amir; in order to neutralize the danger, and also to keep the amir under pressure the British Government of India, in 1887, persuaded Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan as well as Persia to make a deal in which Ayyub Khan agreed to live in India. India granted Persia a handsome sum of money in return for this deal. In 1888, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, accompanied by over eight hundred followers, arrived in Karachi via Iraq (where the author Effendi was born) and settled in Lahore on an allowance. The British never before or afterward had such an Afghan dignitary with so many followers in India.

As a resident of India, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan was not the same person that he had been in his native land. According to his son, "While in Afghanistan and Iran he was virile and active, in India he became morose and reserved. "75 Content with the life of a 'Royal Mendicant' he kept his distance from the British officials, declining even . to draw the increment in his allowance, which rendered his financial position deplorable" and also affected his twelve sons and seven daughters and several uåves. 76 In 1907, he visited first Kashmir and later Japan. Living with the dignity of a fallen hero among his conservative followers, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, who was the epitome of Afghan patriotism, "died in his sleep of heart failure, caused by chronic blood pressure" in 1914, at the

agc of fifty-seven.

 1bB., 30.

IS Ehndi, Royals 272. Ibid., 231.

c:HAP1'ER

THE PACIFICATION OF EASTERN AFGHANISTAN

The preceding chapters have described the events that led to the establishment of the rule of Amir %Abd al-Rahman Khan. This and the following chapters describe how he extended the government authority throughout Afghanistan.

Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, who was well experienced in the politics of his people and their intractable elders; knowledgeable about the willingness of elders of some minority ethnic groups to undergo foreign domination; and concerned about the presence of dynastic rivals in the neighboring lands as well as about the danger to Afghanistan posed by the Russians and the British, took a wide range of measures for the institution of a centralized government in order to safeguard the country as well as to ensure his dynastic rule. This two-pronged program made it necessary for him to build up a strong army and create sources of income by imposing a wide range of taxes. All of these measures enabled him to rule the country directly through government officials. He was, thus, the first Afghan ruler to do so in a country where people resented government control of their autonomous communities. The people most of whom were small landowners and landless peasants living within an agrarian economy opposed the taxes, as well as the amir's absolutist style of ruling. The amir, neiertheless, pushed his program, and this resulted in over forty uprisings of which I have studied only the major ones. I

 The minor failed rebellions not studied in the present study are, as follows, and the source of all references to this entry is Siraj al-Tawarikh, vol. 3: a rebellion in Panjsher in 1881 (l Il, 384); a rebellion in Sedrah in Nijrao in 1181 (385); a rebellion in Rustaq and Badakhshan until crushcd in 1 882 (395); a r&llion by the Nurzays of Dehrawud in Kandahar in 1881 (398); a rebellion by the inhabitants of Khost in 1881 (401); a rebellion by Patanzay Achakzays in 1881 (406); a rebellion in Katawaz and Zurmula (Zurmut) in 1882 (407); a rebellion in Farajghan n Laghman in 1882 (401); a rebellion in the Ghassak valley in Nijrao in 1882 (413); a rebellion in Chaghanserai in Konarr in 1882 (413); a rebellion by the Achakzays in 1883 (416, 417); a rebellion in the part of the Alishung valley in laghman in 1883 (441); a rebellion in Waigal, Kulman and Sao in Laghman in 1885 (443); a rebellion in Pasha in the district Of Jalalabad in 1885 (592); a relxllion by the Sapays of Konan iri 1886 (490); a rebellion in Baghran in 1886

C.H.AFYI*F.R

The Eastern Province

         64                                                                         C.H.AFYI*F.R

The Eastern Province

CHAVITR

rivers, while those of the Lower Mohmand reside in the northwestern corner of the relatively fertile Peshawar plain.

The city of Peshawar is in the Mohmand country, and members

of the Khalil and Khwaezay divisions are conspicuous among its inhahtants. Both parts of Nlohmand are divided into the main divisions of the Tarakzays, Baezays, Halimzays and Khwaezays. These divisions are the descendants of the Masayzay, who, along with Uthmanzay and Dawaizay are the descendants of Mohmand, known as Mohmand Baba. The Mohmands like the Durranays and Yusufzays are the descendants of Sarbun. The first known dwelling place of the Mohmands was Murgha, east of Kandahar from which they, like rmny other divisions of eastern Pashtuns, migrated first to Ghazni and then to their present land, in the sixteenth century. It was after their  here that they were divided into the two parts.

In both parts the very strict Masayzay code known as dode cando (Code of Grando?) is applied in criminal cases such as theft, homicide, adultery. rape, etc. In these matters this code rather than the Sharita is applied even though the latter is the law of the land, and the clergy enjoy considerable influence among the Mohmands. In controversial cases, the Masayzay code specifies that certain households in both parts of the Mohmand are authorized to act as courts of appeal. Their verdict is final with no right of appeal.[2]

The inhabitants of the two parts of Mohmand did not have much dealing with each other. Strangely, the inhabitants of the Lower Mohmand were mild by comparison to those of the Upper Mohmand who were warlike. Also, the power of the khans of the Upper Mohmands had developed greatly, and, among them the khan of Lalpura was the most important, and the other khans of significance were those of Pandiali and Goshta. Carpenters, blacksmiths, weavers, barber, and potters lived in almost all of the villages of the Mohmands, as in those of other tribes; a special group of people, the Parachas, carried on trade among them.

The only khan (head of a tribe with feudal privileges) who retained his position throughout the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was the khan of La]pura, Mohammad Akbar Khan. Lalpura was

     66                   CHAVITR

rivers, while those of the Lower Mohmand reside in the northwestern corner of the relatively fertile Peshawar plain.

The city of Peshawar is in the Mohmand country, and members

of the Khalil and Khwaezay divisions are conspicuous among its inhahtants. Both parts of Nlohmand are divided into the main divisions of the Tarakzays, Baezays, Halimzays and Khwaezays. These divisions are the descendants of the Masayzay, who, along with Uthmanzay and Dawaizay are the descendants of Mohmand, known as Mohmand Baba. The Mohmands like the Durranays and Yusufzays are the descendants of Sarbun. The first known dwelling place of the Mohmands was Murgha, east of Kandahar from which they, like rmny other divisions of eastern Pashtuns, migrated first to Ghazni and then to their present land, in the sixteenth century. It was after their  here that they were divided into the two parts.

In both parts the very strict Masayzay code known as dode cando (Code of Grando?) is applied in criminal cases such as theft, homicide, adultery. rape, etc. In these matters this code rather than the Sharita is applied even though the latter is the law of the land, and the clergy enjoy considerable influence among the Mohmands. In controversial cases, the Masayzay code specifies that certain households in both parts of the Mohmand are authorized to act as courts of appeal. Their verdict is final with no right of appeal.[3]

The inhabitants of the two parts of Mohmand did not have much dealing with each other. Strangely, the inhabitants of the Lower Mohmand were mild by comparison to those of the Upper Mohmand who were warlike. Also, the power of the khans of the Upper Mohmands had developed greatly, and, among them the khan of Lalpura was the most important, and the other khans of significance were those of Pandiali and Goshta. Carpenters, blacksmiths, weavers, barber, and potters lived in almost all of the villages of the Mohmands, as in those of other tribes; a special group of people, the Parachas, carried on trade among them.

The only khan (head of a tribe with feudal privileges) who retained his position throughout the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was the khan of La]pura, Mohammad Akbar Khan. Lalpura was

CHAPTER

Even though the Upper Mohmands were a poor people owing to the shortage of arable land except for that along the Kabul River the cffce of their khanate was more developed than those of " . the little republics of Safed Koh and Tirah" as well as that of the Lower Mohmands. This was due morc to the strategic location of their country than to its tribal structure. As guardians of the Khyber, the khans of Lalpura collected tolls on the Jalalabad—Pcshawar road at Dakka, and levied dues on the rafts on the Kabul River. The significance of the Mohmands in the area can be understood from the fact that, as Moutstuart Elphinstone had noted in the early part of the century that "A single Mumand will pass a whole caravan' through the Khyber. For the same reason Kabul paid thc khans of Lalpura allowances for keeping the Kabul road safc as well as for proGding militia in times of emergency. All of this may account for the existence, especially among the khans, Of a destructive sense of competition and the custom of badal (revenge). This destructive custom was so prevalent among the Mohmands that important individuals perished at the hands of rivals than due to natural causes.

In December 1879 the people of the Upper Mohmand rose in protest after the British in Kabul deported Amir Mohammad Ya'qub Khan to India. Soon a split cxcurred among elders of the uprising and Mohammad Akbar Khan accepted the position of ruling the Upper Mohmand from the British " . . on condition of his loyalty and good services to the British Government. "6 In return, Akbar Khan supplied the British forces with provisions and opposed the jihad movement against them,7 so keeping the intractable Mohmands in as ordered as could be expected.e

After the withdrawal of the British forces from Afghanistan, the amir gradually stripped Akbar Khan of his privileges by taking over the management of the road,9 and in 1883, confiscating the Lalpura tolls. l• Before that Akbar Khan's annual income amounted to about one hundred thousand rupees. Afterward the amir paid him allowances in return for his agreement to serve the state with militias in times

Bographical Accounts of Chiefs, Sirdars and Others of Afghanistan, Official publication, Calcutta, 1888. Henceforth BACA, 31. Ibid.

  • Griffn to Ste%zrt, 8 May 80, PSLI, 33, 512.
  • Peshawar Diary CPD), 18 Sept. 80, PSI-I, 34, 9.
  • Mohammad Akbar Khan to Peshawar Commisioner, 30 Nov. 83, PSI-I, 38,

of emergency. I J Akbar Khan had no alternative but to comply: first, his request . . for the intervention of the British Government met with the reply that he comply with the orders received from . . . the second, among his many peers, Akbar Khan vcas only the first among equals, and had brothers and cousins, who were formidable rivals.

The Pacha of Konan

For centulies the long and narrow valley of Konarr (Kunar) with Pashat as its main town had been ruled by a Pashtunizcd reputedly sayyed family Of CArab descent. Sayyed Termizi, known as the Pir Baba, who had accompanied Mohamrnad Zahir al-Din Babur from Terrmiz, was the founder of the family. His shrinc in the village of Paucha in Bonair is venerated to the present day. Emperor Humayun, who was the son and successor of Babur, had granted him Konarr free of revenue. His descendants known local)v as de Konarr pachayaun (rulers of Konarr) as well as de Konan soyedaun (sayyeds of Konarr) gradually became secular. They took the revenue at the rate of one-third of the production of the land14 and in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries their annual income fluctuated between sixty thousand and eighty thousand rupees. 15 According to Malcolm Yapp, they

. had successfully maintained a substantial degree of indepen&nce of the Kabul Government but under the Barakzays there began a series of attempts to bring the area under control. . . . In 1834 Sayyid Faqir was deposed by Dost Mohammad and Sayyid Baha al-Din made ruler on his undertaking to pay an annual tribute of 19,000 rupees. In 1839 Baha al-Din was deposed and replaced by his brother, Sayyid Hashim, who agreed to pay 28,000 rupees per annum, 16

PD, 31 May 83, PSLI, 44, 860. Noelle, stau and Tribe  cntu,y Ughanistan, 183.

BACA, 32. '3 Ibid.

 Statement by Sayyed Mahmud, 1893, PSI-I, 67, 1078. Siyal, Zeeno Pa-htano @ba'lo Shajaray, 86.

Noelle, State and Tribe in .Mnzeenth Cattur Afghanistan, 193.

16 Yapp, M. E., "Disturbances in Eastern Afghanistan, 1339—42", BSOAS, pt 3, 1962, 504.

69

of emergency. I J Akbar Khan had no alternative but to comply: first, his request . . for the intervention of the British Government met with the reply that he comply with the orders received from . . . the second, among his many peers, Akbar Khan vcas only the first among equals, and had brothers and cousins, who were formidable rivals.

The Pacha of Konan

For centulies the long and narrow valley of Konarr (Kunar) with Pashat as its main town had been ruled by a Pashtunizcd reputedly sayyed family Of CArab descent. Sayyed Termizi, known as the Pir Baba, who had accompanied Mohamrnad Zahir al-Din Babur from Terrmiz, was the founder of the family. His shrinc in the village of Paucha in Bonair is venerated to the present day. Emperor Humayun, who was the son and successor of Babur, had granted him Konarr free of revenue. His descendants known local)v as de Konarr pachayaun (rulers of Konarr) as well as de Konan soyedaun (sayyeds of Konarr) gradually became secular. They took the revenue at the rate of one-third of the production of the land14 and in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries their annual income fluctuated between sixty thousand and eighty thousand rupees. 15 According to Malcolm Yapp, they

. had successfully maintained a substantial degree of indepen&nce of the Kabul Government but under the Barakzays there began a series of attempts to bring the area under control. . . . In 1834 Sayyid Faqir was deposed by Dost Mohammad and Sayyid Baha al-Din made ruler on his undertaking to pay an annual tribute of 19,000 rupees. In 1839 Baha al-Din was deposed and replaced by his brother, Sayyid Hashim, who agreed to pay 28,000 rupees per annum, 16

PD, 31 May 83, PSLI, 44, 860. Noelle, stau and Tribe  cntu,y Ughanistan, 183.

BACA, 32. '3 Ibid.

 Statement by Sayyed Mahmud, 1893, PSI-I, 67, 1078. Siyal, Zeeno Pa-htano @ba'lo Shajaray, 86.

Noelle, State and Tribe in .Mnzeenth Cattur Afghanistan, 193.

16 Yapp, M. E., "Disturbances in Eastern Afghanistan, 1339—42", BSOAS, pt 3, 1962, 504.

to Kandahar to oust Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan. 21 Fearful of his son's defection as well as of his own partisanship of the house of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, Nlahmud Pacha refused a summons to Kabul unless he obtained an assurance of his safety from the British Govcn.ment. The pacha also reminded Griffn, who was then the Viceroy's Agent in the Central Province of India, of the services that he had rendered the British Government. The pacha wrote to him that

Up to date as far as lay in my power, I had served the Govcrrment, and incurred a bad name among my clansmen. The service was not rendered with the object that it should bear good fruit in the next world.

The British Government of India and the amir exchanged several letters on the subject. In one letter, Foreign Secretary Alfred Lyall even addressed the amir in an unusually complimentary langmge, stating that the viceroy "is assured that the feelings of justice for which Your Highness is so distinguished will make you hesitate of visiting upon Syud Ahmad [Sayyed Mahmud] the sins of his son. "23 This failed to impress the amir as in reply he wrote that if the pacha

. . . comes with the purity of heart to pay his respect to me . . . I will not punish him for the sins of his son. Should actions prove contrary to his professions, I shall have no Other course but to drive him away.

When it had occupied Afghanistan, the British Government of India considered Konarr as well as Kandahar, strategically important. Consequently, it gave explicit guarantees to the rulers of both. Like Kandahar, Konarr was situated on a road leading ultimately to Central Asia and western China. Also, from the upper part of Konarr, one road led to Chitral and another to the territories of the tribes along the northwestern parts of India, territories that were part of Afghanistan but at that time were not under centralized administrative control. From the lower part of Konarr was a road leading to Jalalabad. Despite the strategic importance of Konarr the Government of India reneged on its promise to the ruler of Konarr,

  • Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Ghüzay elders, AB Ctn Ghazni), 16 Aug. 81, PSI-I, 29, 1014.
  • Sawed Mahmud to Griffn, PSI—I, 33, 514.
  • Lyall to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 12 Jan. 82, PSLL, 33, 514. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Lyan, I Feb. 82, psu, 33, 414.

just as it had to the ruler of Kandahar. It did so because, due to much wider considerations, it had pledged to assist the amir in the consolidation of his rule, and to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of his kingdom. Nevertheless in the same manner that the govemment of India had backed away from Kandahar it likewise backed away from Konarr. It did so because, due to much wider considerations, it had pledged to assist the amir in the consolidation of his rule, and to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of his kingdom. The viceroy then left the fate of the pacha to the amir's mercy, arguing that because of its geographical location

. the possessions Of the Bad-shah are so situated as to render it imposSible to give him any active assistance without the violation Of the amir's territory in a manner amounting practically to an act of war.25

In November 1882, after an. advance was made against him by a contingent of the government army, the pacha, who had been abandoned by his British ally, and was opposed by his own people for his pro-British activities, fled first to Mittai and later in 1886 to Hassan Abdal, in India. Soon afterward, Kabul established direct control over Konarr. During his residence in India, the pacha lived on a British allowance, and returned to Konarr after the amir had died in 1901.

The Shinwarays

Kabul treated the Shinwarays more leniently than it treated other tribes because they kept the road to the Khyber pass open. Kabul also allowed them to levy tolls on the road to Peshawar and, in addition, paid allowances to them.26 It even exempted two of their divisions—Sangu Khel (or Sun Khel) and Sipai—from paying revenue. The Shinwarays have four main divisions, the others are Ali Sher Khcl and Mandozays. The Shinwarays, though a very important tribe, had no one khan or elder as influential as that of the Mohmands.

Kabul changed its policy in 1882, when Amir 'Abd al-Rahman garrisoned Dakka27 Prior to the rebellion, the Shinwarays sent a jirga

23 Ripon to Hartington, 23 Dec. 82, PSLI, 34, 221.

  • 6 Jenkyns, W., A Report on the District of Jalalabad, Chiefly in regard to

Revenue, Calcutta, Offcial publication, 1879, 12—15. PD, 18 Dec. 82, PSI-I, 34, 9.

                            THE PACIFICATION OF EASTERN AFGKANISTA.N                           

(a council or deputation of elders) to the amir to discuss the restoration of what they called their 'rights'. The amir imprisoned the jirga and executed some of its members. During this time he declared the introduction for the first time in the whole of the eastern province, including the Shinwar (land of the Shinwarays) the three-portion system of taxation on land (se-kot) whereby landouners were demanded to pay one third of their revenue to the government. 2B The Shinvarays opposed the new measures, but in 1883 they were defeated in a battle with the government army, led by General Ghulam Hayder Khan Orakzay.

The battle hardened the attitude of the Shinwarays, especially when more radical younger members assumed leadership after some of their elders were killed in the battle.29 The new leaders rejected the concessions which required them to pay a tithe ('ushr), or onetenth of their revenue, to the government, instead of one-third, provided they agreed to be disarmed and hostages taken from them.30 Several battles were fought in many of which the Shinwarays were routed. They then fled to the upper part of the Spin Ghar Mountain, but still persisted in their demand that the amir should completely annul the revenue. The victorious army burned their houses and destroyed their crops. The Shinwarays resorted to robbery, announcing, "We have no mind to return to our country, and we do not care for the amir. We will support ourselves by plunder and

In 1885, Ghulam Haydar Khan Charkhay, the Sipah Salar, (commander-in-chief) took over the administration of the eastern province in both civil and military affairs. His arrival signaled hope for a settlement as he sent many jargas to the Shinwarays. Although the jirgas failed to bring about a settlement, they caused dissension among the Shinwarays.32 Some of the Shinwarays stood for a settlement, while others opposed it. During the uprisings of the Ghilzay in 1886 (See Chapter Five) and of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan in 1888 (See Chapter Six), the amir adopted a conciliatory attitude

28 Gazetteer of Afghanistan, pt. 4, Kabul, Offcial p±hcation, Calcutta, 1910, 495. Henceforth GAK GAK, 488.

so PD, 1 June 83, PSLI, 36, 1549.

Shinwaray elders to General Ghulam Haydar Orakzay, Il May 85, PSLI, 44, 1079.

32 Monthly Memorandum (Henceforth MM), Sept. 86, PSLI, 48, 511.

toward the Shinwarays. During these periods, many Jtrgas attempted a settlement, but failed to produce a substantial result.

Although the Shinwaray elders agreed to pay revenue in proportion to the quality of the land,33 and although the Sangu Khel section accepted the payment of a tithe and the stationing of a governmen—appointed judge (qazi) in their region,34 the bulk of the tribesmen rejected the agreement, because they had lost faith in the amir. Compelled by the tribesmen the elders wrote to the amir, stating,

We are ready to submit to Your Highness's authority . . . but two things prevent us from carrying these wishes into effect: first, that we are in poverty and are compelled to commit depredations; allowances should be fixed upon us; secondly, Your Highness's subjects are in great straits; both days and nights arrests are made. Most Of the Khugianis and Mohmands have fled on account of oppression. How can we be consoled and assured that we will be treated well?35

However, the Shinwaray elders made this plea too late, for by then the tribesmen had lost their unity.

After the other, more serious uprisings elsewhere had been put down, the amir began to pressure the Shinwarays to submit to his authority. Toward the end of 1888 he dispatched tribal militias from other parts of Ningrahar36 and the district of Taga037 which, together with government troops and some Afridays and Shinwarays of the occupied areas, defeated the Sangu Khel, the most determined of the Shinwarays.3B Although they were still far from being defeated, their position had actually become untenable, since by then they had been driven to the upper parts of the Spin Ghar Mountain, and the Sangu Khel were living under extremely harsh conditions. Exhausted, they finally agreed to pay half a rupee per half acre of land (jarib) as revenue." However, the Sangu Khel still held out until 1892, when the tribe as a whole settled down.40

The extension of the government authority in Shinwar illustrates how the government tried to extend its authority elsewhere, especrally

Col. 'Atta Allah, British agent in Kabul, 17 Feb. 88, PSLI, 52, 1073.

34 PD, 22 Feb. 88, PSLI, 52; 768.

 Shinwaray elders to Amir %Abd al-Rahman, 16 Mar. 88, PSLI, 53, 511. PD, 28 Nov. 88, psu, 55, 1243.

" PD, 22 Dec. 88, PSI-I, 55, 1368.

MM, Mar. 89, PSLI, 56, 1072.

'9 col. •Atta Allah (in Mazar), 5 Nov. 89, PSLI, 58, 849. GAK, 500.

74                                                         CHAPTER FOUR

toward the Shinwarays. During these periods, many Jtrgas attempted a settlement, but failed to produce a substantial result.

Although the Shinwaray elders agreed to pay revenue in proportion to the quality of the land,33 and although the Sangu Khel section accepted the payment of a tithe and the stationing of a governmen—appointed judge (qazi) in their region,34 the bulk of the tribesmen rejected the agreement, because they had lost faith in the amir. Compelled by the tribesmen the elders wrote to the amir, stating,

We are ready to submit to Your Highness's authority . . . but two things prevent us from carrying these wishes into effect: first, that we are in poverty and are compelled to commit depredations; allowances should be fixed upon us; secondly, Your Highness's subjects are in great straits; both days and nights arrests are made. Most Of the Khugianis and Mohmands have fled on account of oppression. How can we be consoled and assured that we will be treated well?35

However, the Shinwaray elders made this plea too late, for by then the tribesmen had lost their unity.

After the other, more serious uprisings elsewhere had been put down, the amir began to pressure the Shinwarays to submit to his authority. Toward the end of 1888 he dispatched tribal militias from other parts of Ningrahar36 and the district of Taga037 which, together with government troops and some Afridays and Shinwarays of the occupied areas, defeated the Sangu Khel, the most determined of the Shinwarays.3B Although they were still far from being defeated, their position had actually become untenable, since by then they had been driven to the upper parts of the Spin Ghar Mountain, and the Sangu Khel were living under extremely harsh conditions. Exhausted, they finally agreed to pay half a rupee per half acre of land (jarib) as revenue." However, the Sangu Khel still held out until 1892, when the tribe as a whole settled down.40

The extension of the government authority in Shinwar illustrates how the government tried to extend its authority elsewhere, especrally

Col. 'Atta Allah, British agent in Kabul, 17 Feb. 88, PSLI, 52, 1073.

34 PD, 22 Feb. 88, PSLI, 52; 768.

 Shinwaray elders to Amir %Abd al-Rahman, 16 Mar. 88, PSLI, 53, 511. PD, 28 Nov. 88, psu, 55, 1243.

" PD, 22 Dec. 88, PSI-I, 55, 1368.

MM, Mar. 89, PSLI, 56, 1072.

'9 col. •Atta Allah (in Mazar), 5 Nov. 89, PSLI, 58, 849. GAK, 500.

While Bajaur itself was a dependency of Jalalabad.•• Importantly, Asmar held a key position in the territories further east and because of this significance it can be compared to the Khyber Pass, as a gate to India.

 Over two thousand three hundred years ago, Alexander the Great Of Macedonia chose Konarr, not Khyber, for his advance on India. The people he encountered there, as well as in Bajaur and Swat, during his military campaign, from November 327 BCE to February 326 BCE, were called Aspasians and Acvaka [the Asva—Ghana of

Sanskrit and Abgan of the middle Persian] from which the names

Yusufzay and Afghan have evolved. In the words of the historian Peter Green,

most Of the tribesmen he came against proved themselves first class fighters. During one engagement he got an arrow through his shoulder; and by the end of the campaign his condition can perhaps best be described as jittery.

In 1892, the easy pacification of Konarr and the stationing of govemment troops in Asmar under Sipah Salar Ghulam Haydar Charkhay became a signal for the pacification of Bajaur and the regions further east. Because of the conflicting policies of the khans of Bajaur, there was even a strong impression among its inhabitants that their khans might accept the amir's rule.'6

Béaur, Dir and Swat

The vast territories of Bajaur, Dir and Swat were autonomous principalities or khanates commonly known asyghistan (the land of rebels), to the east of the Konarr valley from which they were separated by a rocky mountain. Numerous divisions of the Pashtun Yusufzay and Mandir tribal confederation, their clients (hamsayas), and others populated the three khanates. The relatively fertile region of Bajaur is

        Fayz Mohammad,             al-Tawarikh, 749.

Kakar, '(khan, Afghanistan and the Afghans and the Organization pf State in India,

Persia and A%haniftan, (in Persian), Kabul University press, 1979, 17. Kohzad, murnad

Ali, 4*anistan Yaahnana, (in Persian) [Afghanistan in th Shahnama], Baihaqi Book Publishing House, Kabul, 1976, 288. Green, peter, Akxand« ofAfac& 336—323 BC, A Hi_sørital Biou*, University Of California Press, 1992, 382.

  • s PD, 23 Feb. 722.

                              THE PACIFICATION OF EASTERN AFGHANISTAN                       77

comprised of the five valleys of Charmang, Babuqara, Sur Kamar, Rud and Mamun< (or Watalai). Nawagai, the seat of the khanate, lies in the Sur Kama," valley. Bajaur is peopled principally bv theYusufzay Tarkanays, but Mohmands, Sapays, Uthman Khel and others also live there. Although outnumbered by other groups of people, the Yusufzays and Mandirs were supreme in the region as a whole on account of ovcning the land and wcrc as important thcrc as the Durranays were in Kandahar. (The Durranays and Yusufzays are descendants of a common ancestor, the Sarbun.)

A khan ruled over a khanate, maintained some troops, and collected revenue on the basis of a tithe ('ushr). However, his power was limited by a Jtrga (council) of the heads of clans among whom the khan was the first among equals. No khan's position was secure or permanent, though some were khans because their fathers had been khans. On the whole, a khan was powerful when he had a strong character and many relatives with a substantial follow•ing among the minor khans under his jurisdiction. Only with the approval of the elders did he have the right to levy a tithe as tax and recruit men for military service in times of war."

During the period under discussion, COrnara Khan (Urnra Khan) of Jandol emerged as the most powerful khan. Situated between the Bajaur and Panjkora rivers, Jandol had many khans known as Mast Khel. Among them C Omara Khan, son of Aman Khan Tarkanay, finally emerged victorious, and by 1890 he made himself the khan of Jandol as a result of a decade-long struggle." He scored the victory that made him powerful in 1890 when he occupied Dir, and expelled Mohammad Sharif Khan. The defeated khan who was a member of the ruling house founded by Mulla Ilyas, known as the Akhund Baba, took refuge in Swat. By expelling the khan of Dir,

C Omara Khan threatened the mehlar (ruler) of the principality of Chitral. By the middle of 1891, he likewise threatened Nawagai and, tö a lesser extent, Swat.49

Mornand, M. J. Siyal, Da Zeno Pashtano @ba'ib Shéaray, 97. Yapp, M. E., "Disturbances in eastern Afghanistan, 1839—42", reprinted from the Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. xxv, part 3, 1962, 500, Noelle, State and Tribe in Mtnetenth Cent" Afghanistan, 178.

48 Impena! Gazetteer of India, Provincial Series, Norå West hontiet hovince, Calcutta, 1908, 129. Henceforth GNWFP.

       MM, Apr.                    120. Siyal, Da Zeno Pasht.ano QabaUo Sh4aray, 92,

'Omara Khan's rapid rise to power turned many khans against him. Safdar Khan, the khan of Bajaur, made an alliance with Mohammad Sharif Khan, the exiled khan of Dir.30 Additionally, Mian Gul 'Abd al-Wadud of Swat incited the people in his domain against 'Omara Khan;hl his support was important because he was the son of %Abd al-Ghafur Khan, who was known as the Akhund of Swat, as well as the Ghous (Saint) of Saido or the Babajee of Swat, and was the most celebrated former ruler of Swat. Among his many disciples some were as influential as he himself was such as Mulla  and Mulla Najm al-Din. The Mohmands of

Mitui likewise supported the khans who were against 'Omara Khan in their endeavors22

The amir supported Safdar Khan with larger allowances, and even expressed willingness to support him with troops if necessary.53 The concentration Of troops at Asmar under the command cf C•huiam Haydar Khan Charkhay, himself a Yusufzay Pashtun, had changed the balance of power in favor of the latter, in particular after his troops scored a victory in Shurtan, in Bajaur.54 The defeat of 'Omara Khan and the extension of the amir's rule in Bajaur seemed imminent. However, at this juncture the Government of India warned the •ah salar as well as COmara Khan not to move against each other. Specifically, it warned the former that his advance into Bajaur would be regarded as an act of hostility to the Government of India "55 The strong tone of the warning indicated the resolve of the British to implement its Forward Policy, which culminated in concluding the Durand Agreement in 1893 (See Chapter Ten).

Although the amir maintained his claim to Bajaur, he instructed the sipah salar not to advance on it. As for COmara Khan, the British finally forced him to flee to Afghanistan after he, in conjunction with Sher Afzal, the pro-Kabul exiled brother of the mehtar of Chitral, occupied that principality in 1895. Thus, a remarkable khan, the socalled 'Napoleon of Bajaur' was forced out of the region. He had,

 MM, May 91, PSLI, 63, 497.

PD, 21 July 91, PSLI, 63, 1068.

32 PI), 13 June 91, PSLI, 63, 624. In 1917, Mian Gul was acclaimed as the ruler of Swat, and later in 1926 recognized by the British as the wali of Swat. Siyal, Zeno Pashtanao  89.

 PD, 8 Aug. 91, PSI-I, 63, 1183.

PD, 28 June 92, PSLI, 67, 308. PD, 28 June                       308.

                                 THE PACIFICATION OF EASTERN AFGHANISTAN                            79

through statesmanship and military action, carved out a kingdom that comprised Dir, Jandol. and Chitral and, like the amir; he had been determined to overrun Bajaur and Kafiristan. The exiled Mohammad Sharif Khan became the khan of Dir once again, this time with the additional title of nawab (ruler). This occurred in 1897 through an agreement qith the British in which they undertook to pay him a regular allowance and grant him weapons in return for his keeping the road to Chitral open. He ruled the khanate until he died in 1904. 36

Kuma

 From latc 1891 onward, Kurma (Kurram), inhabited by Shi% 'Ali Khel Pashtuns, commonly known as the Turis (the Blackened) was frequently raided by the neighboring Sunni tribal, elders and mullas, who had been encouraged to do so by Amir %Abd al-Rahman Khan.57 Finally a widely known adventurer, Sarw•ar Khan of Chinarak, nicknamed Chikkai, who had given much trouble to the British at Kohat, occupied Lower Kurma (Kuz Kurrna) and the Turis paid him revenue.58 This occurred after Chikkai and his armed men returned from Kabul where the amir had received him with unusual honor. "39 Having given up hope of recovering the territory60 the Turis concluded a truce with Chikkai, according to which they agreed to let him retain Lower Kurma, while he agreed to make no further advances. 61

The amir tried to make the Turis his subjects, but he wanted to do this through a proxy to avoid antagonizing the Government of India, which had already told him that Kurrna would not be restored to Afghanistan.62 By the treaty of Gandumak Kurrna had first been conditionally assigned to the Government of India, and later annexed

% Siyal, De Zeeno Pzshtano Qba'ilo Shajargy, 92.

 Derajat Confidential Diary, 15 Dec. 91, PSI-I, 65, 513. Fayz Mohamrrud, Sirg al-Tawaikh, 826.

 KD, 4-8 Dec. 91, psu, 69, 1706.

59 MM, Oct. 91, PSLI, 66, 1324. MM, June 91, PSLI, 66, 1323.

MM, May 92, PSLI, 66, 884.

62 Fayz Mohammad, Sir• al-Tawarikh, 82.

by it. After the Government of India exchanged some correspondence with the Amir on the subject, British troops forced Chikkai and others out of Kurrna. in October 1892, and affected a settlement there.G3 The amir remained silent.

The Afidays

Settled in high walled forts and villages in the Khyber, Akhor, Kovwatt and Tirah from ancient times the Afridays or Apridays are the rnost important Pashtun tribe of the historic twenty-three—milelong Khyber Pass extending from Jamrud to Dakka. The Afridays are probably the people known as Aparaytae, described by Herodotus. Due to their mountainous territory, and their hard style of living they have lived beyond the pale of government authority even to the present day. Parts of the Khyber valley are also inhabited by the Mohmands and Shinwarays, but the Afridays are the predomimant tribe. As the guardian of the Khyber, these tribes were collectively referred to as the Khyberays. They were, thus, singularly Important because as a gateway of Central Asia to South Asia, the Khyber Pass served as the shortest thoroughfare for the passage of caravans, conquerors, merchants and people. Additionally, the Khyber Pass directly connected the cities of Peshawar and Jalalabad.

The Khyberays became famous in the latter stage of the Roshaniyya movement when they rose several times in rebellion under the leadership of Aimal Khan Mohmand and Darya Khan Afriday against the Mughal rulers of India. Aimal Khan "who was a born general, declared himself king, struck coins in his name and invited all the Pathan tribes to take part in the national struggle." For four years he kept alive the independence struggle of the Afghans from Kabul to Peshawar. In the Khyber area in 1672, the Pashtuns under his leadership killed 't a large number of soldiers and officers of the [Mughal] empire, . . and enslaved thousands of them." According to the Imperial Gazetteer of India, the entire Mughal army numbering 40,000 soldiers perished in this encounter. The Afridays are divided into the eight distinct divisions of Malik Din Khel, Qambar

63 Harris, L, Brigish Policy on the North West Frontier of India, 1889—1901, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis at London University, 1960, 88.

80

by it. After the Government of India exchanged some correspondence with the Amir on the subject, British troops forced Chikkai and others out of Kurrna. in October 1892, and affected a settlement there.G3 The amir remained silent.

The Afidays

Settled in high walled forts and villages in the Khyber, Akhor, Kovwatt and Tirah from ancient times the Afridays or Apridays are the rnost important Pashtun tribe of the historic twenty-three—milelong Khyber Pass extending from Jamrud to Dakka. The Afridays are probably the people known as Aparaytae, described by Herodotus. Due to their mountainous territory, and their hard style of living they have lived beyond the pale of government authority even to the present day. Parts of the Khyber valley are also inhabited by the Mohmands and Shinwarays, but the Afridays are the predomimant tribe. As the guardian of the Khyber, these tribes were collectively referred to as the Khyberays. They were, thus, singularly Important because as a gateway of Central Asia to South Asia, the Khyber Pass served as the shortest thoroughfare for the passage of caravans, conquerors, merchants and people. Additionally, the Khyber Pass directly connected the cities of Peshawar and Jalalabad.

The Khyberays became famous in the latter stage of the Roshaniyya movement when they rose several times in rebellion under the leadership of Aimal Khan Mohmand and Darya Khan Afriday against the Mughal rulers of India. Aimal Khan "who was a born general, declared himself king, struck coins in his name and invited all the Pathan tribes to take part in the national struggle." For four years he kept alive the independence struggle of the Afghans from Kabul to Peshawar. In the Khyber area in 1672, the Pashtuns under his leadership killed 't a large number of soldiers and officers of the [Mughal] empire, . . and enslaved thousands of them." According to the Imperial Gazetteer of India, the entire Mughal army numbering 40,000 soldiers perished in this encounter. The Afridays are divided into the eight distinct divisions of Malik Din Khel, Qambar

63 Harris, L, Brigish Policy on the North West Frontier of India, 1889—1901, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis at London University, 1960, 88.

to any or

the more worthily admired for the courage which they show in attack and in hand-to-hand fighting with the sword. "09

Just as other tribes in eastern Afghanistan, the Wazirs of Waziristan also looked on the ruler ot Afghanistan as a Muslim sovereign of their own ethnic stock. In i 883, they invited the amir's omcials to their land, but when the officials arrived there the Kabul Khel section of the tribe drove them away70 even though a militia of Kabul had been stationed in Wana, a town in Southern Waziristan. Subsequently, however, the Wazirs and Dawars agreed to pay a tithe, but the Biland Khel section incited the speen gund, as opposed to the tore gund against the amir. 71

Among the Wazirs, as among some other Pashtun tribes, the speen gund (white bloc) and tore gund (black bloc) were two leagues Of tribes traditionally at odds with each other. Although the existence of the leagues should have made it relatively easy for the government to penetrate the Wazirs, it actually made this more difficult. The schism bemeen the two leagues was so pronounced that even the amir's marriages with the daughter of Malik Rahmat Khan and the sister of Malik Tirin Khan did not help him extend his authority in Waziristan. These maliks were probably associated with the tore gund, as one Shahzada, a leader of the speen gund, went so far as to invite Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan to return, promising him the support öf "sixty-thousand" families of the Wazirs and Tanays to unseat the amir. 72 Actually, Shahzada resented the allowances, which the amir paid to his relations, fearing that the allowances would strengthen his opponents.

82

to any or

the more worthily admired for the courage which they show in attack and in hand-to-hand fighting with the sword. "09

Just as other tribes in eastern Afghanistan, the Wazirs of Waziristan also looked on the ruler ot Afghanistan as a Muslim sovereign of their own ethnic stock. In i 883, they invited the amir's omcials to their land, but when the officials arrived there the Kabul Khel section of the tribe drove them away70 even though a militia of Kabul had been stationed in Wana, a town in Southern Waziristan. Subsequently, however, the Wazirs and Dawars agreed to pay a tithe, but the Biland Khel section incited the speen gund, as opposed to the tore gund against the amir. 71

Among the Wazirs, as among some other Pashtun tribes, the speen gund (white bloc) and tore gund (black bloc) were two leagues Of tribes traditionally at odds with each other. Although the existence of the leagues should have made it relatively easy for the government to penetrate the Wazirs, it actually made this more difficult. The schism bemeen the two leagues was so pronounced that even the amir's marriages with the daughter of Malik Rahmat Khan and the sister of Malik Tirin Khan did not help him extend his authority in Waziristan. These maliks were probably associated with the tore gund, as one Shahzada, a leader of the speen gund, went so far as to invite Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan to return, promising him the support öf "sixty-thousand" families of the Wazirs and Tanays to unseat the amir. 72 Actually, Shahzada resented the allowances, which the amir paid to his relations, fearing that the allowances would strengthen his opponents.

82

to any or

the more worthily admired for the courage which they show in attack and in hand-to-hand fighting with the sword. "09

Just as other tribes in eastern Afghanistan, the Wazirs of Waziristan also looked on the ruler ot Afghanistan as a Muslim sovereign of their own ethnic stock. In i 883, they invited the amir's omcials to their land, but when the officials arrived there the Kabul Khel section of the tribe drove them away70 even though a militia of Kabul had been stationed in Wana, a town in Southern Waziristan. Subsequently, however, the Wazirs and Dawars agreed to pay a tithe, but the Biland Khel section incited the speen gund, as opposed to the tore gund against the amir. 71

Among the Wazirs, as among some other Pashtun tribes, the speen gund (white bloc) and tore gund (black bloc) were two leagues Of tribes traditionally at odds with each other. Although the existence of the leagues should have made it relatively easy for the government to penetrate the Wazirs, it actually made this more difficult. The schism bemeen the two leagues was so pronounced that even the amir's marriages with the daughter of Malik Rahmat Khan and the sister of Malik Tirin Khan did not help him extend his authority in Waziristan. These maliks were probably associated with the tore gund, as one Shahzada, a leader of the speen gund, went so far as to invite Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan to return, promising him the support öf "sixty-thousand" families of the Wazirs and Tanays to unseat the amir. 72 Actually, Shahzada resented the allowances, which the amir paid to his relations, fearing that the allowances would strengthen his opponents.

82

to any or

the more worthily admired for the courage which they show in attack and in hand-to-hand fighting with the sword. "09

Just as other tribes in eastern Afghanistan, the Wazirs of Waziristan also looked on the ruler ot Afghanistan as a Muslim sovereign of their own ethnic stock. In i 883, they invited the amir's omcials to their land, but when the officials arrived there the Kabul Khel section of the tribe drove them away70 even though a militia of Kabul had been stationed in Wana, a town in Southern Waziristan. Subsequently, however, the Wazirs and Dawars agreed to pay a tithe, but the Biland Khel section incited the speen gund, as opposed to the tore gund against the amir. 71

Among the Wazirs, as among some other Pashtun tribes, the speen gund (white bloc) and tore gund (black bloc) were two leagues Of tribes traditionally at odds with each other. Although the existence of the leagues should have made it relatively easy for the government to penetrate the Wazirs, it actually made this more difficult. The schism bemeen the two leagues was so pronounced that even the amir's marriages with the daughter of Malik Rahmat Khan and the sister of Malik Tirin Khan did not help him extend his authority in Waziristan. These maliks were probably associated with the tore gund, as one Shahzada, a leader of the speen gund, went so far as to invite Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan to return, promising him the support öf "sixty-thousand" families of the Wazirs and Tanays to unseat the amir. 72 Actually, Shahzada resented the allowances, which the amir paid to his relations, fearing that the allowances would strengthen his opponents.

government in their affairs.

  • Additionally, with regard to some districts of eastern Afghanistan the amir was in a less advantageous position than his predecessors had been. In critical moments of the negotiations for the amirate, the representative of the British Government of India told the then Sardar %Abd al-Rahman Khan that the frontier districts and some passes mentioned in the Gandumak treaty would not be restored. At the time he remained silent, presumably allowing himself space for future political maneuver. After the expulsion of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, the amir embarked on establishing control over the lands of the eastem Pashtuns. However, it took him ten years to pacify the Shinwarays, and also to put down major rebellions elsewhere before he was able to pacify the eastern Pashtuns. Throughout this period, and later, until his death even in spite of the Durand Agreement he concentrated on peaceful penetration. He did so mainly by granting allowances to the Pashtun elders and mullas, employing many mullas and emissaries for this purpose. Also, from nowhere else to the same extent as from these areas did so many jirgas of elders visit Kabul where (he amir treated them as his subjects.

The amir's many booklets on the jihad were addressed mainly to the people of the regions as noted. The progress of his pacification of these areas was slow but steady. After the pacification of the Shinwarays he finally dispatched a military force under his most able government in their affairs.

  • Additionally, with regard to some districts of eastern Afghanistan the amir was in a less advantageous position than his predecessors had been. In critical moments of the negotiations for the amirate, the representative of the British Government of India told the then Sardar %Abd al-Rahman Khan that the frontier districts and some passes mentioned in the Gandumak treaty would not be restored. At the time he remained silent, presumably allowing himself space for future political maneuver. After the expulsion of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, the amir embarked on establishing control over the lands of the eastem Pashtuns. However, it took him ten years to pacify the Shinwarays, and also to put down major rebellions elsewhere before he was able to pacify the eastern Pashtuns. Throughout this period, and later, until his death even in spite of the Durand Agreement he concentrated on peaceful penetration. He did so mainly by granting allowances to the Pashtun elders and mullas, employing many mullas and emissaries for this purpose. Also, from nowhere else to the same extent as from these areas did so many jirgas of elders visit Kabul where (he amir treated them as his subjects.

The amir's many booklets on the jihad were addressed mainly to the people of the regions as noted. The progress of his pacification of these areas was slow but steady. After the pacification of the Shinwarays he finally dispatched a military force under his most able government in their affairs.

  • Additionally, with regard to some districts of eastern Afghanistan the amir was in a less advantageous position than his predecessors had been. In critical moments of the negotiations for the amirate, the representative of the British Government of India told the then Sardar %Abd al-Rahman Khan that the frontier districts and some passes mentioned in the Gandumak treaty would not be restored. At the time he remained silent, presumably allowing himself space for future political maneuver. After the expulsion of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, the amir embarked on establishing control over the lands of the eastem Pashtuns. However, it took him ten years to pacify the Shinwarays, and also to put down major rebellions elsewhere before he was able to pacify the eastern Pashtuns. Throughout this period, and later, until his death even in spite of the Durand Agreement he concentrated on peaceful penetration. He did so mainly by granting allowances to the Pashtun elders and mullas, employing many mullas and emissaries for this purpose. Also, from nowhere else to the same extent as from these areas did so many jirgas of elders visit Kabul where (he amir treated them as his subjects.

The amir's many booklets on the jihad were addressed mainly to the people of the regions as noted. The progress of his pacification of these areas was slow but steady. After the pacification of the Shinwarays he finally dispatched a military force under his most able government in their affairs.

  • Additionally, with regard to some districts of eastern Afghanistan the amir was in a less advantageous position than his predecessors had been. In critical moments of the negotiations for the amirate, the representative of the British Government of India told the then Sardar %Abd al-Rahman Khan that the frontier districts and some passes mentioned in the Gandumak treaty would not be restored. At the time he remained silent, presumably allowing himself space for future political maneuver. After the expulsion of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, the amir embarked on establishing control over the lands of the eastem Pashtuns. However, it took him ten years to pacify the Shinwarays, and also to put down major rebellions elsewhere before he was able to pacify the eastern Pashtuns. Throughout this period, and later, until his death even in spite of the Durand Agreement he concentrated on peaceful penetration. He did so mainly by granting allowances to the Pashtun elders and mullas, employing many mullas and emissaries for this purpose. Also, from nowhere else to the same extent as from these areas did so many jirgas of elders visit Kabul where (he amir treated them as his subjects.

The amir's many booklets on the jihad were addressed mainly to the people of the regions as noted. The progress of his pacification of these areas was slow but steady. After the pacification of the Shinwarays he finally dispatched a military force under his most able government in their affairs.

  • Additionally, with regard to some districts of eastern Afghanistan the amir was in a less advantageous position than his predecessors had been. In critical moments of the negotiations for the amirate, the representative of the British Government of India told the then Sardar %Abd al-Rahman Khan that the frontier districts and some passes mentioned in the Gandumak treaty would not be restored. At the time he remained silent, presumably allowing himself space for future political maneuver. After the expulsion of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, the amir embarked on establishing control over the lands of the eastem Pashtuns. However, it took him ten years to pacify the Shinwarays, and also to put down major rebellions elsewhere before he was able to pacify the eastern Pashtuns. Throughout this period, and later, until his death even in spite of the Durand Agreement he concentrated on peaceful penetration. He did so mainly by granting allowances to the Pashtun elders and mullas, employing many mullas and emissaries for this purpose. Also, from nowhere else to the same extent as from these areas did so many jirgas of elders visit Kabul where (he amir treated them as his subjects.

The amir's many booklets on the jihad were addressed mainly to the people of the regions as noted. The progress of his pacification of these areas was slow but steady. After the pacification of the Shinwarays he finally dispatched a military force under his most able government in their affairs.

  • Additionally, with regard to some districts of eastern Afghanistan the amir was in a less advantageous position than his predecessors had been. In critical moments of the negotiations for the amirate, the representative of the British Government of India told the then Sardar %Abd al-Rahman Khan that the frontier districts and some passes mentioned in the Gandumak treaty would not be restored. At the time he remained silent, presumably allowing himself space for future political maneuver. After the expulsion of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, the amir embarked on establishing control over the lands of the eastem Pashtuns. However, it took him ten years to pacify the Shinwarays, and also to put down major rebellions elsewhere before he was able to pacify the eastern Pashtuns. Throughout this period, and later, until his death even in spite of the Durand Agreement he concentrated on peaceful penetration. He did so mainly by granting allowances to the Pashtun elders and mullas, employing many mullas and emissaries for this purpose. Also, from nowhere else to the same extent as from these areas did so many jirgas of elders visit Kabul where (he amir treated them as his subjects.

The amir's many booklets on the jihad were addressed mainly to the people of the regions as noted. The progress of his pacification of these areas was slow but steady. After the pacification of the Shinwarays he finally dispatched a military force under his most able

          92[4]                                                      CHAPTER FIVE

Probably, as Fayz Mohammad, the omcial chronicler states, Mulla 'Abd al-Karim was declared something similar to badshah (ruler)" \Vhatever the truth, by inviting Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan the rebels planned to oppose the amir more effectively.

The Sulaiman Khel and the Andar took the first step toward rebellion by looting a Durranay army contingent in the Muqur area,21 and afterward marching on the city of Ghazni. However, in late October 1886, at Talkhakzar [Talkha Guzar?] the army led by General Ghulam Haydar Orakzay defeated them, and the general sent the heads of about two thousand fallen rebels to Kabul where, after the fashion of Timur Lane, a tower of skulls (kala munar) was displayed as a warning to others.[5] The leading rebels escaped to the country of the Kakars in the British territory.

Confrontation and Suppression

After the victory, the amir instructed General Ghulam Haydar Orakzay to disarm the Andar and their allies. He also instructed him to stop the allowances that the government paid to religious scholar-s, to sell the lands and underground irr*gation canals of those who had escaped, and to confiscate the lands of the Qarabagh region. In addition, he instructed the general to build a fort in Ataghar in the heart of the Hotak land. [6] With the exception of the latter the instructions were carried out, the Ghilzays were harshly treated, and their women insulted. The uprising appeared to have been suppressed, although it was the •winter that created that impression.

Meanwhile, the amir tried to isolate the Ghilzays as a whole while he appealed directly to their elders to submit. He also tried to win the support of his own tribesmen, the Durranays, who, until then, were on bad terms with him, warning them that the Ghilzays were after their ruling position.24 The Ghilzays had, after their looting of the Durranay contingent, made it known that they had risen against

THE GREAT GHIL7-AY UPRISING AND ITS SCPPRESSION

the amir only, and that they had no quarrel with the Durranays. However. the amir still continucd to incitc them against the Ghilzays, just as he had done the opposite when he was engaged in the fight against Sardar Mohammad Khan. Further, the amir Ict them enjoy their lands free of revenue as before, whereas prior to the Ghilzay uprising he had ordered them to pay it. E'

Ultimately, the amir failed to win over other people against the Ghilzays. He succeeded only in weaning the Hazaras from the Ghilzays with the help of the Qizilbashes,2" but failed to win the support of the Tajiks of Ghazni and Kohistan. The amir's notable failure was with the «ulema (Sunni religious scholars), as only a small number of them condemned the Ghilzays as rebels, while most sat on the fence by declaring that he was justified in fighting those who were dangerous to Islam.27 This reference could not apply to the Ghilzays because a distinguished scholar, Mulla 'Abd al-Karim-led them in the campaigns against the amir. More importantly, the amir failed in his efforts to calm the rebel leaders, even though he promised them that he would lower their rate of revenue if they desisted from rebelling.28 The rebel leaders rejected his overtures, and Mulla CAbd al-Karim declared that the amir's tyranny "had exceeded all and that he was an infidel, the extirpator of Islam, worshipper Of himself, and the friend of an alien Government. "30 The nonDurranay Pashtuns of the neighboring lands, including the Kakars, supported the Ghilzays, but among the latter the Tokhays did not participate in the rebellion.3 1

The uprising took formidable proportions during the following spring. The tothl number of the rebels was reported to have increased from twenty thousand in March 1887 32 to one hundred thousand in April. 33 However, after their initial successes in Qalat and Ataghar,34 the rebels were defeated at Ataghar,35 QalCa-e-Katal, and still later

Kand D, 25 Jan. 87, PSLI, 48, 487.

26 Fayz Mohammad, Sir' al-Tawarikh, 539, 527, 541.

2' KD, 29 Oct. 86, PSLI, 48, 1137.

 PD, 7 Apr. 87, PSI-I, 50, 244.

PD, 8 Jan. 87, PSLI, 49, 283.

PD, 29 Mar. 87, PSI], 49, 1320.

Fayz Mohammad, Sir@ al-Tawariå, 539.

32 MM, Mar. 87, PSI-I, 49, 1281.

3' PD, 7 Apr. 87, PSLI, 50, 243.

" BACA, 178.

RD, 20 May 87, PSLI, 50, 879.

      94                                                      CHAPTER FIVE

in Other unspecified  the government army under the command of General Ghulam Haydar Khan Orakzay. In its final phase the uprising found support in an unexpected quarter. The Ghilzays in the army at Herat, who had earlier risen in support Of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, 37 arrived and joined their recalcitrant kinsmen, and inflicted the final defeat on the army and recovered Nawa in July 1887. $b However, thereafter with the onset of winter and against the well-organized army which was continually reinforced they could no longer fight, and the uprising petered out. About twenty-four thousand Ghilzays were killed in all the clashes.

 Ghilzay uprising provided an opportunity for Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan to try his luck once again. However, he traveled in the wrong direction, and failed to arrive at the Afghan border until late September when the uprising was over. Thus, the sardar lost his final opportunity to enter Afghanistan, as by then the amir had fortified the frontiers, and the Persian Government, under pressure from the British Government, had ordered his seizure.39

The Ghilzay uprising was essentially a war between the government and the Ghilzay landowners, whose power the amir had resolved to break. Among the provocative measures that the amir took, he imposed heavy taxes on the landowners, resulting in the uprising led by the Ghilzay elders. The elders were actively supported in their stand by almost all of their own tribesmen, while others responded with good will, The amir had neither, as he failed to send tribal militias against them, or to obtain a legal ruling (faåva) from the 'ulcma to denounce them as rebels as he had done in response to other rebellious tribes. However, since the Ghilzay. elders had poor weapons and no other means of fighting, they had no chance of success against the well-disciplined and well-equipped army. The uprising illustrated the ineffectiveness of a popular uprising against a well-organized military power.

After their defeat, the amir intentionally disabled the Ghilzay by impoverishing them economically and weakening them politically, doing with a view to preventing future uprisings. YVhat the amir

MN, June 87, PSI-I, 50, 1239.

  • Riyazi, 'Ayn Wag", 262.
  • KD, 5 July 87, PSLI, 50, 283.

 For Riyazi, al-W*, 226—232. Riyazi had met Ayy•ub when the latter was on his way to Afghanistan.

THE GREAT GHIIÆAY CPRISI.NG AND rrs SUPPRESSION

had once believed about the Andar he now believed about the entire tribe, stating that "when they [Andar] have no money left with them, [they] will not again raise disturbances."" He proved correct in his prediction, and the Ghilzays never rose en masse again. The uprising also had another important consequence; after its suppression the amir drew closer to his own Durranay tribe—in particular, to the Mohammadzay section to which hc belonged. He pro•.ided annual allowances to its membcrs residing in Kabul whether female or male and treated the whole section as a partner of the state (shaHk-e-dawla0.

  • o The Amir to Na'ib Kotwal of Kabul, RD, 7 Dec. 86, PSLI, 49, 149.

                         THE GREAT GHIIÆAY CPRISI.NG AND rrs SUPPRESSION                 95

had once believed about the Andar he now believed about the entire tribe, stating that "when they [Andar] have no money left with them, [they] will not again raise disturbances."" He proved correct in his prediction, and the Ghilzays never rose en masse again. The uprising also had another important consequence; after its suppression the amir drew closer to his own Durranay tribe—in particular, to the Mohammadzay section to which hc belonged. He pro•.ided annual allowances to its membcrs residing in Kabul whether female or male and treated the whole section as a partner of the state (shaHk-e-dawla0.

  • o The Amir to Na'ib Kotwal of Kabul, RD, 7 Dec. 86, PSLI, 49, 149.

ΤΗΕ REVOLT 0F SARDAR MOHAMMAD ιςι--Ι.ηρ ΚΗΑΝ

98

With its excellent cotton and wheat, Balkh was still a kingdom, though a dependency of the Achaemenian Persia, when Alexander the Great invaded it in 330 BCE. Its ruler, Bessus, and his successor, Spitamenes, waged "a nationalist war, with strong religious overtones", and "between them they gave Alexander more continuous trouble than all the embattled hosts of Darius."3 Afterward, in the Hellenistic Greco-Bactrian period, "Bactria occupied much of modcm Afghanistan", a country then known as "the land of a thousand cities" The Greek colonists of the post-Alexander period had contributed to this development by fraternizing with the native population so much that, according to Frank Holt, nineteenth century European scholars saw in Bactria the best of all ancient worlds. "4 It was for its grandeur that in the Islamic times Bactria was called urnm al-bilad (the mother of cities), as well as janat al-arz (the paradise of the earth), and khai7 at-turab (the best of soil).5 However, the city of Balkh was totally destroyed in the Chingizid onslaught of the thirteenth century as were all other cities of Afghanistan. During the second reign of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, the governor of Turkestan, Sardar Mohammad Afzal Khan, transported the debris of Balkh to Takhtapul. During the second reign of Amir Sher %Ali Kham the Shif governor of the region, Na'ib Mohammad 'Alam Khan, enlarged Mazar-e-Sharif (the noble mausoleum) at the expense of Balkh. Mazar was (and still is) assumed to be the site of the shrine Of 'Ali, the fourth caliph of Islam, and the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad.6 There also lie the graves of Ghazi Mohammad Akbar Khan and Amir Sher 'Ali Khan.

3 Green, P., Alexander Q/ Macedon, 338. Arrian, The Campaigns of Akxander, transl. by A. de Selincort, Penguin Books, 1958, 229—232. That the inhabitants Of Bactria were patriotic is evident from a statement by Zoroaster as, according to him, instructed by Ahura Mazda: have made ev•ery• land dear to its people, even though it had no charms whatever in it: had I not made every land dear to its people, even though it had no charms whatever in it, then the whole living world would have invaded the Airyana Vaego. The first of the good lands and countHes which l, Ahura Mazda, created was the Airyana Vaego." "Selections from the ZendAvesta", Transl. by Darrncstctter, Jamcs in The .%cred of East, the Colonial Press, New York, MDCCCXCIX, 67.

  • Holt, Frank L, The numdaüg Zeus, The of Hellenistic Bactri, University of California press, 1999, 9—20.
  • Leitncr, Dardistan, 10.
  • McChesney, R. D., Ctnbäl *fid, FÖtå Htåidtd ruts b" a Muslim Shrine, 148—1889. Kakar, Gvtmment and Society of 141.

THE REVOLT OF SARDAR MOHAMMAD ISHAQ KHAN

By the 1830s, Balkh still functioned as a city, but afterward was completely replaced by Mazar as the political and commercial center of the region, and Turkestan comprised al] of the territories lying between the Oxus, the Hindu Kush, the Pamir steppe and Herat.' However, under Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan 1851) Turke:taninhabited by Uzbeks, Arabs, Hazaras, Tajiks, Pashtuns and others with its capital at Mazar, comprised only the plains south of the Oxus between Andkhoy and Badakhshan.

Estrangement Of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq khan

As early as 1881, Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan asked the amir to recognize him as the exclusive owner of Turkestan." Unwiling to provoke the sardar, the amir promised him that he would do so "When all our anxieties and troubles [are over] the "anxieties" he spoke of were caused by the presence of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan in Herat. However, the demand strained relations between the amir and the sardar. When Kandahar and Herat fell in late 1881, and Ayyub Khan was expelled, Ishaq Khan asked the amir to appoint his younger brothers as governors there. The amir refused to do so and instead trusted the sardar with vast power and the authority to keep the revenue of the province to himself. Further, the amir even sent him money from Kabul to consolidate his positiOn in this important frontier province.

Consequently, Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan had de facto independence in Turkestan, although, like all gQvernors, he also sent valuable presents, especially horses, to the amir from time to time. The presentation of gifts by provincial governors to the Kabul ruler was a custom of the land, as was the reading of Friday sermon (khutba) in his name. In Kabul, the amir kept the sardar's three younger brothers apparently as his 'guests', but they were actually hostages.

In 1884, the fall of Maymana proved crucial in the relationship betwccn the amir and Ishaq Khan. Because the latter had undertaken an expedition against Maymana. and because the district had

Wheeler, J. T., Monorandum on Ughan-Turhstan, Calcutta, 1869, Gazet&c Ughaniftan, part 2, Afghan Turkistan, Calcutta, 1912, i—xii. 8

Reports are unanimous concerning the popularity of the sardar with the people under his jurisdiction. In fact, even in 1880, the people themselves had chosen the sardar as their governor after he crossed the border from Samarqand where he, •like the amir, had been in exile. More importantly, the sardar's administration was mdd in sharp contrast to that of the amir which was rigid. The contrast between the two men was apparent even more in their characters; the sardar was gentle and pious whereas the amir was stern and rigid.

Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan's adherence to the Naqshbandiyya mystic order of Islam had drawn him closer to the Uzbeks who observed Islam in its 'Cminute detail",9 and to the Turkmen in particuhr, among whom the order was V4hdespread; 10 he had first adhered to the order while he was living in exile in Samarqand. He was also popular with his army which he paid regularly." Because Turkestan was a frontier province, and because it was under the apparent threat of Russia the amir had allowed the sardar to raise a large army, and, in addition, from to time sent him money from Kabul to meet the expenditure. 12 Thus, the sardar had not been obliged to exact money from the people and make himself unpopular with them.

For the reasons cited, relations between the amir and Ishaq Khan were far from cordial. The amir's efforts at affecting conciliation with the sardar through some influential dynastic members faded to bear fruit. While the amir maintained the facade of good relationship, he tried to remove the sardar from Turkestan. Several times he invited him to come to Kabul. The summons was not unusual, and in line with the amir's policy of removing governors in disgrace before they became wealthy and influential, and then giving their posts to nonMohammadzay sardars, or head servants of the royal court. Govemors from influential families, including those from among the Moham-

Reports are unanimous concerning the popularity of the sardar with the people under his jurisdiction. In fact, even in 1880, the people themselves had chosen the sardar as their governor after he crossed the border from Samarqand where he, •like the amir, had been in exile. More importantly, the sardar's administration was mdd in sharp contrast to that of the amir which was rigid. The contrast between the two men was apparent even more in their characters; the sardar was gentle and pious whereas the amir was stern and rigid.

Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan's adherence to the Naqshbandiyya mystic order of Islam had drawn him closer to the Uzbeks who observed Islam in its 'Cminute detail",9 and to the Turkmen in particuhr, among whom the order was V4hdespread; 10 he had first adhered to the order while he was living in exile in Samarqand. He was also popular with his army which he paid regularly." Because Turkestan was a frontier province, and because it was under the apparent threat of Russia the amir had allowed the sardar to raise a large army, and, in addition, from to time sent him money from Kabul to meet the expenditure. 12 Thus, the sardar had not been obliged to exact money from the people and make himself unpopular with them.

For the reasons cited, relations between the amir and Ishaq Khan were far from cordial. The amir's efforts at affecting conciliation with the sardar through some influential dynastic members faded to bear fruit. While the amir maintained the facade of good relationship, he tried to remove the sardar from Turkestan. Several times he invited him to come to Kabul. The summons was not unusual, and in line with the amir's policy of removing governors in disgrace before they became wealthy and influential, and then giving their posts to nonMohammadzay sardars, or head servants of the royal court. Govemors from influential families, including those from among the Moham-

Reports are unanimous concerning the popularity of the sardar with the people under his jurisdiction. In fact, even in 1880, the people themselves had chosen the sardar as their governor after he crossed the border from Samarqand where he, •like the amir, had been in exile. More importantly, the sardar's administration was mdd in sharp contrast to that of the amir which was rigid. The contrast between the two men was apparent even more in their characters; the sardar was gentle and pious whereas the amir was stern and rigid.

Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan's adherence to the Naqshbandiyya mystic order of Islam had drawn him closer to the Uzbeks who observed Islam in its 'Cminute detail",9 and to the Turkmen in particuhr, among whom the order was V4hdespread; 10 he had first adhered to the order while he was living in exile in Samarqand. He was also popular with his army which he paid regularly." Because Turkestan was a frontier province, and because it was under the apparent threat of Russia the amir had allowed the sardar to raise a large army, and, in addition, from to time sent him money from Kabul to meet the expenditure. 12 Thus, the sardar had not been obliged to exact money from the people and make himself unpopular with them.

For the reasons cited, relations between the amir and Ishaq Khan were far from cordial. The amir's efforts at affecting conciliation with the sardar through some influential dynastic members faded to bear fruit. While the amir maintained the facade of good relationship, he tried to remove the sardar from Turkestan. Several times he invited him to come to Kabul. The summons was not unusual, and in line with the amir's policy of removing governors in disgrace before they became wealthy and influential, and then giving their posts to nonMohammadzay sardars, or head servants of the royal court. Govemors from influential families, including those from among the Moham-

Reports are unanimous concerning the popularity of the sardar with the people under his jurisdiction. In fact, even in 1880, the people themselves had chosen the sardar as their governor after he crossed the border from Samarqand where he, •like the amir, had been in exile. More importantly, the sardar's administration was mdd in sharp contrast to that of the amir which was rigid. The contrast between the two men was apparent even more in their characters; the sardar was gentle and pious whereas the amir was stern and rigid.

Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan's adherence to the Naqshbandiyya mystic order of Islam had drawn him closer to the Uzbeks who observed Islam in its 'Cminute detail",9 and to the Turkmen in particuhr, among whom the order was V4hdespread; 10 he had first adhered to the order while he was living in exile in Samarqand. He was also popular with his army which he paid regularly." Because Turkestan was a frontier province, and because it was under the apparent threat of Russia the amir had allowed the sardar to raise a large army, and, in addition, from to time sent him money from Kabul to meet the expenditure. 12 Thus, the sardar had not been obliged to exact money from the people and make himself unpopular with them.

For the reasons cited, relations between the amir and Ishaq Khan were far from cordial. The amir's efforts at affecting conciliation with the sardar through some influential dynastic members faded to bear fruit. While the amir maintained the facade of good relationship, he tried to remove the sardar from Turkestan. Several times he invited him to come to Kabul. The summons was not unusual, and in line with the amir's policy of removing governors in disgrace before they became wealthy and influential, and then giving their posts to nonMohammadzay sardars, or head servants of the royal court. Govemors from influential families, including those from among the Moham-

Reports are unanimous concerning the popularity of the sardar with the people under his jurisdiction. In fact, even in 1880, the people themselves had chosen the sardar as their governor after he crossed the border from Samarqand where he, •like the amir, had been in exile. More importantly, the sardar's administration was mdd in sharp contrast to that of the amir which was rigid. The contrast between the two men was apparent even more in their characters; the sardar was gentle and pious whereas the amir was stern and rigid.

Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan's adherence to the Naqshbandiyya mystic order of Islam had drawn him closer to the Uzbeks who observed Islam in its 'Cminute detail",9 and to the Turkmen in particuhr, among whom the order was V4hdespread; 10 he had first adhered to the order while he was living in exile in Samarqand. He was also popular with his army which he paid regularly." Because Turkestan was a frontier province, and because it was under the apparent threat of Russia the amir had allowed the sardar to raise a large army, and, in addition, from to time sent him money from Kabul to meet the expenditure. 12 Thus, the sardar had not been obliged to exact money from the people and make himself unpopular with them.

For the reasons cited, relations between the amir and Ishaq Khan were far from cordial. The amir's efforts at affecting conciliation with the sardar through some influential dynastic members faded to bear fruit. While the amir maintained the facade of good relationship, he tried to remove the sardar from Turkestan. Several times he invited him to come to Kabul. The summons was not unusual, and in line with the amir's policy of removing governors in disgrace before they became wealthy and influential, and then giving their posts to nonMohammadzay sardars, or head servants of the royal court. Govemors from influential families, including those from among the Moham-

and under respond himself

1884, when drew still closer to the people. and became popular, whereas the amir was not. The latter's oppressive rule, which was evident from the desertion of the army and the acceptance of the rebel sardar's claim by the people of Turkestan and Badakhshan helped him in his bid for the amirate of the whole land. Had he shown courage and resoluteness in the critical hour of military confrontation he might have unseated the amir, and changed the course of Afghan history. However, during the fateful hour of the battle, he revealed cowardice and a lack of sound judgment. He fled precipitously, and his flight left the people of Turkestan and Badakhshan at the mercy of the amir who went to .Mazar the next year.

For about one year of his stay in Mazar, the amir took very stern measures against all those who had supported the rebel sardar. Meanwhile, he stepped up anti-Russian rhetoric and arranged for the fortification of military posts along the border, especially in Dehdadi. More important in the long run, the amir encouraged Pashtun and other ethnic groups from the densely populated regions south of the Hindu Kush to settle in the sparsely populated regions north of the Hindu Kush, and to cultivate the plots of state land which the government granted them on favorable terms. 39 This land grant continued to be issued until recently as part of the population relocation policy. In particular in the 1930s, Sher Khan Kharotay and Mohammad Gul Khan Nlohmand became, as the nationdly— known governors of Kunduz and Mazar respectively, overzealous in implementing the policy. As a consequence, from demographic perspective, northem Afghanistan became largely mixed and transformed from a dependency into an integral part of the country.

THE

and under respond himself

1884, when drew still closer to the people. and became popular, whereas the amir was not. The latter's oppressive rule, which was evident from the desertion of the army and the acceptance of the rebel sardar's claim by the people of Turkestan and Badakhshan helped him in his bid for the amirate of the whole land. Had he shown courage and resoluteness in the critical hour of military confrontation he might have unseated the amir, and changed the course of Afghan history. However, during the fateful hour of the battle, he revealed cowardice and a lack of sound judgment. He fled precipitously, and his flight left the people of Turkestan and Badakhshan at the mercy of the amir who went to .Mazar the next year.

For about one year of his stay in Mazar, the amir took very stern measures against all those who had supported the rebel sardar. Meanwhile, he stepped up anti-Russian rhetoric and arranged for the fortification of military posts along the border, especially in Dehdadi. More important in the long run, the amir encouraged Pashtun and other ethnic groups from the densely populated regions south of the Hindu Kush to settle in the sparsely populated regions north of the Hindu Kush, and to cultivate the plots of state land which the government granted them on favorable terms. 39 This land grant continued to be issued until recently as part of the population relocation policy. In particular in the 1930s, Sher Khan Kharotay and Mohammad Gul Khan Nlohmand became, as the nationdly— known governors of Kunduz and Mazar respectively, overzealous in implementing the policy. As a consequence, from demographic perspective, northem Afghanistan became largely mixed and transformed from a dependency into an integral part of the country.

and under respond himself

1884, when drew still closer to the people. and became popular, whereas the amir was not. The latter's oppressive rule, which was evident from the desertion of the army and the acceptance of the rebel sardar's claim by the people of Turkestan and Badakhshan helped him in his bid for the amirate of the whole land. Had he shown courage and resoluteness in the critical hour of military confrontation he might have unseated the amir, and changed the course of Afghan history. However, during the fateful hour of the battle, he revealed cowardice and a lack of sound judgment. He fled precipitously, and his flight left the people of Turkestan and Badakhshan at the mercy of the amir who went to .Mazar the next year.

For about one year of his stay in Mazar, the amir took very stern measures against all those who had supported the rebel sardar. Meanwhile, he stepped up anti-Russian rhetoric and arranged for the fortification of military posts along the border, especially in Dehdadi. More important in the long run, the amir encouraged Pashtun and other ethnic groups from the densely populated regions south of the Hindu Kush to settle in the sparsely populated regions north of the Hindu Kush, and to cultivate the plots of state land which the government granted them on favorable terms. 39 This land grant continued to be issued until recently as part of the population relocation policy. In particular in the 1930s, Sher Khan Kharotay and Mohammad Gul Khan Nlohmand became, as the nationdly— known governors of Kunduz and Mazar respectively, overzealous in implementing the policy. As a consequence, from demographic perspective, northem Afghanistan became largely mixed and transformed from a dependency into an integral part of the country.

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